Chinese Diplomacy Discourse in the Prism of the Relations with the Sub-Saharan Region

Chinese economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping have given China the necessary push for the development and growth of the domestic economy. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) under Xi Jinping claims, that the originally planned transformation is completed, and China is ready for achieving new goals, such as first peripherical and, later, global dominance, leadership in manufacturing and technology and probably even the moral benchmark. The PRC presents a new model of global order with its active position as the super nation. Chinese current behaviour on the international stage is the direct illustration of the political thought of Xi Jinping. To understand the main principles and the vision of the PRC under Xi, his principles of diplomacy have been analysed. This paper claims, that the rhetoric of Xi Jinping and his administration is a neo-pragmatic approach, which includes nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism within. The article takes as a case study for the implementation of the Chinese foreign policy the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) member states. Contrarily to the American dominance, China suggests guidance, collaboration with mutual benefits and growth, which involves both sides. “Shift in space” stresses the concrete steps for achieving the “China’s dream” of rejuvenation.


Introduction
Chinese science fiction film of 2019, "The Wandering Earth" (liulangdiqiu 流浪地球) directed by Frant Gwo, at first glance looks like a parody on apocalyptic Hollywood cinema. Based on the 2000s' novel by Liu Cixin, the film has an obvious plot for this genre: the sun is dying out and the world builds giant planet thrusters to move the Earth out of its orbit. Most of the scenes are focused on areas that previously were called China. A Chinese astronaut and his son save the planet with some support of their friends, and of a Russian astronaut, who sacrifices his life to support his Chinese colleague in the supreme mission of saving the humanity (Gwo, 2019).
Is the motive of Chinese heroes with their Russian friends saving the world only a film-makers fantasy?! Could it be a hint for a new global order with new leaders coming from the East, who claim to be able to "save the world": to support developing regions, to elevate climate issues and to guide international interactions based on new values and norms?! Xi Jinping's China cultivates the discourse of a "new global order model", "superpower" and "leadership" of the PRC on the international arena. China gradually enlarges the spheres of influence, claiming that the global order might include multipolar relations with a number of superpowers, which grow their peripheral areas of interests (Heberer, 2015).
Peripheral diplomacy of Xi is a part of the plan for the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" with a focus on steady improvement of its image among the neighbouring countries and regions, expanding to the African continent and the Middle East (CCICED, 2013). This statement helps to connect the global "Belt and Road Initiative" and "Maritime Silk Road" projects, as well as preceding the "Go Global" policy and "made in China 2025" with the gaining meaning narratives of "Chinese new model of global governance", "super-nation", "global leadership", and others. This shapes a new discourse which might support the political strategy of Chinese expanding global influence and power.
However, such a discourse cannot exist in a political vacuum, it is addressing the international arena, where the United States of America for decades are playing the central role. The new Chinese discourse is not attacking Pax Americana but challenging the order through closing complex alliances with different regions and international institutions (Breslin, 2013). It speaks about "China Dream" which cannot be mentioned without a reference to "American Dream" since it is a global discourse. China dream is usually opposing the American one in speaking about a joint national effort, rather than about personal dreams of Americans (Callahan, 2015). The USA and China are not only ideological opponents, currently they are also political rivals. In the time of American declining activity as the leader of the global order, China could rise as the direct opponent of the unipolar world led by the United States (Sorensen, 2013). Therefore, the article presents some examples of the current American discourse as well. Hence, the way China constructs its political discourse, where it puts the accents might be strengthened.
This article deals with the Xi Jinping's era discourse of the Chinese rejuvenation. Through explicit examples of the official rhetoric and its applications in the Sub-Saharan region, it will be shown how geographical areas and strategical principles in international relations.

Political Discourse of Two Rivals
Nowadays, the political discourse plays an important role in understanding international affairs and "balance of power" among the counterparts. Official statements and policies include open or hidden intentions of the governments towards the global order and define the objectives for the further strategies on the international stage.
Before checking the case studies of the Chinese rhetoric used as a political tool to achieve super-nation status, it is important to compare briefly China's narrative to the US rhetoric. America was long time perceived as the only superpower after the Soviet Union's collapse. The relationship between the Chinese and American sides could become essential for peace and stability both in the global and peripheral perspective.
In the time of the America-China confrontation, started in July 2018, and American anti-China tariffs (BBC, 2019), it is important to review the official statements regarding the global order to compare the approaches towards the global leadership and its positioning in the international system. This conflict could bring some shifts in the global order, which would influence developing regions and especially the Sub-Saharan Africa.

The U.S. National Security Strategy of the Foreign Policy under Donald Trump
The 45 th president of the US, Donald Trump, has made quite a few changes in the national rhetoric towards internal and external politics. During the Obama presidency, the US was actively discussing its engagement into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, suggested by China, and its role in the Chinese trade pact plan for Asia Pacific. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing in 2014, both Presidents Xi and Obama announced agreement in a few areas, such as climate change, clean energy cooperation, some maritime and military activities, fight against terrorism and more. The sides confirmed strong interest in mutual trust and cooperation (Heberer, 2015).
The Administration of Donald Trumphas released in December 2017 an updated statement on foreign policy with Trump's foreword. This statement, as well as the tone of the whole document indicates a strong change in the strategical course. The Trump's direction, as it was promised in the election campaign focused on internal matters within a new discourse of aggressive global environment, which was searching for opportunities to exploit the USA and its position of a super nation.
"America First" policy is mentioned in different passages of the statement, strengthening an unstable political environment for America. This text indicates the core principle of the US contemporary foreign policy, statements are focused on the internal interests and distance from the proactive involvement in the global governance (We are prioritizing the interests of our citizens and protecting our sovereign rights as a nation; enforcing our borders; defending without apology). Nevertheless, Trump's approach towards the foreign policy strengthens the will of the States to protect its interests with a "strong hand" (United States faces an extraordinarily dangerous world; the United States will no www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economics Vol. 4, No. 4, 2021 83 Published by SCHOLINK INC. longer tolerate economic aggression or unfair trading practices). The used expressions and chosen narrative with superlative and exaggerating expressions (rogue regimes; rallying the world; we crushed; extraordinarily dangerous, and more) show an emotional call towards the civil society. These statements hardly can be qualified as a common style of official documents and governmental statements.
Chinese contemporary discourse also consists of expressions pointing on China's goal to achieve global leadership. Nevertheless, the used rhetoric manifestly differs from the one, used by the USA in the period of Donald Trump presidency. The text presented above will serve as indicator and comparison tool to show the major difference in the rhetoric of two rivals.

Ten Principles of the Xi Jinping's Diplomatic Thought
Chinese foreign policy is expressed in different documents, one of the most known is the Ten Insistences of Xi's Thought on Diplomacy (Xi Jinping waijiaozhanlüesixiang 习近平外交战略思想).
The principles in original are broadly citated not only in the Internet and in official texts, but they also Belt and Road Initiative is seen as a tool of the foreign policy. This principle will be essential in China-Africa relations. As it is mentioned in the FOCAC official declaration from September 2018: China and Africa unanimously decided to work together to build responsibility and to promote the "One Belt One Road" cooperation between China and Africa (FOCAC, 2018).
Nonetheless, Xi Jinping continues to rely on the "five principles of peaceful co-existence" as the custom of the Chinese diplomacy to show the sustainable development of the Chinese foreign strategy based on the Chinese socialist tradition (Levtov, 2018). This basic principle is also present in the FOCAC declaration as the framework of the China-Africa relations (FOCAC, 2018).
Interesting to see, that the initial starting point addressing China's sovereignty comes as the ninth out of 10 principles. One of the possible explanations is that the previous insistences gave the necessary legitimation framework to insist on sovereignty rights and nation's interests, not only internally, but also externally, like, for example, along the "Belt and Road Initiative" and within "one China", the principles mentioned earlier. In comparison of both texts, the American and the Chinese foreign policy principles, the difference in chosen narrative and particular expressions is well recognized. The Trump's narrative was more focused on internal issues and national interests, whilst the Chinese one seems to be also willing to achieve leadership in the global order, however based on cooperation and win-win results. Hence, through analysing the connotation of the chosen terminology in the Chinese original text, the nationalist interests have been uncovered and become more obvious, than in its English version.
China is using rhetoric and language in an efficient way during the whole history of the People's International Relations theories suggest different approaches to analyse one country's behaviour and its interaction with bilateral and multilateral partners. In order to understand Chinese rhetoric and its implementation on the global stage in general and in the Sub-Saharan region in particular, the neo-classical realism, a theory of the international relations discipline could be applied. On one hand, the choice of the realism paradigm could be explained by strongly expressed national interests in the diplomatic philosophy. On the other hand, the above claimed importance of rhetoric and selected narratives, which are usually neglected by the realists, should be included as political tools. This aspect is covered by the neo-classical approach to the realist theory.
One of the most famous adepts of the political realism paradigm, the American scholar John Mearsheimer, has always seen China as an aggressor (Mearsheimer, 2018). According to his interpretation of the basic principles of "realism", there are three key "beliefs". Firstly, the realists treat states as the principal actors mainly focused on gaining power. Secondly, they believe that a state's behaviour is influenced mainly by the external environment. Thirdly, countries compete for power among themselves (Mearsheimer, 2001).
Realism makes five assumptions regarding international system. Firstly, the global order is www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economics Vol. 4, No. 4, 2021 87 Published by SCHOLINK INC.
characterised by security competition and war, its chaotic nature means that there is no one government above all the governments (Morgenthau, 1973). During the last two centuries, there were different attempts to establish an institution, which will represent equally all the countries` interests, however as a result, a number of international and regional initiatives were recognised by the majority of states, however, one governing global entity has not been established.
Secondly, states are potentially dangerous to each other and their tool for offense is military power (Mearsheimer, 2001). In the 21 st century the "super nations" did not stop to gain weaponry and invest into military innovation. Nevertheless "soft", non-coercive power becomes a new way to compete on the international stage (Nye, 1990). Through diplomacy, economic transnational projects as well as high-technology and innovation, countries are trying to claim their supremacy and leadership. The elements of "soft power" theory by Joseph Nye could be found deeply rooted in Chinese political thought. Moreover, for China, the implementation of the "soft power" measures in the "hard" military power is a common practice, for instance, dispatching peacekeepers world-widely (Blanchard & Lu, 2012). In other words, the current international system respects both "soft" and "hard" power interests.
Thirdly, states are never certain about other states' intention (Mearsheimer, 2001). Countries' motivations and intentions are not necessarily offensive, some political decisions could be even predicted, however they cannot be also judged as peaceful and cooperative par excellence.
The fourth assumption of the paradigm is that survival is the fundamental desire of great powers. And finally, super nations are rational actors and consider multiple factors in their survival strategy (Mearsheimer, 2001). The pragmatic strategy of Deng Xiaoping is one of the examples of survival strategy implemented successfully in the 20 th century. On the international level, he sought to locate China between two superpowers, the USA and the USSR (Taniguchi, 1983). Chinese investments in the Sub-Saharan Africa in natural resources and infrastructure could be also seen as pragmatic decision to guarantee new markets and raw materials for the PRC.
During the 20 th century, realism went through different modernizations. In addition to the "classical realism" of Hans J. Morgenthau, which was prevailing mostly from the late 1940s, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer have suggested two additions of offensive and defensive approaches (Mearsheimer, 2001). This has started a new phase of "neorealism" in the classical paradigm. This new spin of the theory still did not grant enough attention to the internal characteristics (Mearsheimer, 2001) and motives or ideological preferences (Morgenthau, 1973). International relations experts holding on other approaches, like Robert Keohane, who is associated with the neoliberal institutionalism, implement the principles of realism to evolve their own concepts (Keohane, 1984). His theory of hegemonic stability relies on the main realism principle: a state's interest is to gain power. According to Keohane, a hegemon strives to have control over markets, raw materials, sources of capital and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods (Keohane, 1984 the appetite of the PRC for the leadership in the global governance and the willing of the states along the Belt and Road Initiative to cooperate. The theory of hegemonic stability predicts that the more one power dominates the world political economy, the more symbiotic interstate relations will be (Keohane, 1984). Within this framework, leadership and hegemonic position is a necessity and a condition to activate the relationship between power capabilities and outcomes (Keohane, 1984). The Chinese ambition to "Lead the reform of the global governance system" (Yinlingquanqiuzhilitixigaige 引领全球 治理体系改革) serves as a direct example of a global leadership appetite.
The theory of the neoclassical realism, suggested by Gideon Rose in 1998, reconsiders the influential factors on state's behaviour and includes both Innenpolitik and the external environment (Rose, 1998).
The theory still belongs to realism, claiming that a country's foreign policy depends on its place in the international system and relative material power capacities. However, the theory scholars argue that the influence of material capacities on the international affairs is indirect, complex and is influenced by intermediate variables. Neoclassical realists deny the direct link between the material capacities and foreign affairs strategy. They claim that the diplomacy is led by political actors and elites and their perception of the material power and foreign relations influence the-decision-making process (Rose, 1998). This claim explains the U.S. National Security Strategy till 2021, which reflected Donald Trump's rhetoric, known from the media channels. Contradicting the "classical" and "neorealism" belief, that internal developments do not affect the foreign policy, the neoclassical realism concerns the strength and structure of a state relative to its society. This affects the proportion of the resources dedicated to the diplomacy (Rose, 1998). It means, countries similar in capacities but different in structure are incomparable in their global performance. Systemic factors as well as context are playing an important role in analysing the foreign affairs by neoclassical realism.
Chinese current political reality is a complex system with regional and global interests. Since its official position on achieving global leadership in a variety of spheres, and acquiring new markets through a systemic approach, such as "Go Global" strategy or "Belt and Road Initiative" China's policy should be evaluated accordingly. The neoclassical realism allows to include different interdisciplinary concepts and to argue that Chinese political thought as well as political rhetoric demand a special and objective analysis, which does not privilege the Western values and does not idealise the Chinese ones (Mao, 2010). Moreover, the theory supports a separate analysis of Chinese foreign strategy, not as a common trend among great powers or as the US rival only. It allows to include systemic approach into the study, focusing on multiple components influencing China's performance on the international stage and in bilateral relations.

Chinese Nationalism
The perspective of neoclassical realism allows to include Chinese nationalism as one of the shaping factors of the diplomacy of China. Chinese nationalism as a reaction to the Japanese and Western imperialism advocates the Chinese Communist Party and its regime as the one to return the country's prestige on the global stage and to succeed in rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The principle includes www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economics Vol. 4, No. 4, 2021 89 Published by SCHOLINK INC. two core interests: "one-China" and "Great Power" status in the global order (Bhattacharya, 2007).
Chinese nationalism is not limited only to the CCP's legitimation tools. It has a deep connection to the Chinese political tradition and history, the accepted narratives in the different groups of the local and international society related to China, and the meaning of used terminology in the original Chinese language. Neoclassical realists would strengthen that the public support is needed for a certain foreign policy and continuous support for the ruling authority (Sorensen, 2013). In her neoclassical realist analysis of the Chinese foreign diplomacy in 2013, Sorensen claimed that China was not ready to take on itself a new role of great power and global leader. Till 2013, China, according to Sorensen, went through challenging phases caused by the internal processes and did not challenge the unipolar global order led by the United States. Gradually the USA has started to reduce its global influence, as Sorensen mentions, it has opened the PRC a window of opportunity to express its "great power" ambitions (Sorensen, 2013). The neoclassical realism allows to address the Xi Jinping's rhetoric on foreign affairs and Chinese diplomacy principles through textual analysis. By studying the original governmental statements in Chinese language and the process of creation of the political narrative, the intentions of China to achieve both foundations of its nationalism: "great power" and "One China" have been confirmed.
Both concepts are interdependent, and the achievement of one supports the finalisation of the second one. Super-power nation status whilst embraced by members of the international community would support the idea of the unification of China with Taiwan and full integration of Hong Kong into the People's Republic of China. According to Keohane's theory of hegemonic stability, Chinese global leadership will gradually attract more supporters on the international stage. Global leadership is a long-term goal and could be achieved step by step, starting from accomplishing peripherical interests and progressing to the leadership position in the multipolar global order. As it will be shown further, the Chinese involvement in the development of the African continent serves both the Chinese leadership ambition and gains support for the "One China" policy by the African states (FOCAC, 2018). By achieving consensus on its core interests in the Sub-Saharan region, China, based on the African support, might continue to promote its leadership in other regions. The fitting framework for this strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative, which guaranties gradual power gaining.
Xi's administration is granting importance on constructing a narrative, which approaches simultaneously both internal and external public. The importance of political rhetoric and constructed paradigm is not a specific feature of Xi Jinping's government. "The five principles of peaceful coexistence" of Mao has addressed both the international customary law and the Chinese domestic interests in the international relations (Levtov, 2018). "A new type of great power relations" (XinxingDaguo Guanxi 新型大国关系) is a relatively new paradigm of the CPC related to the "global governance" and the "super nation" principle (Heberer, 2015). Heberer's approach justifies the Chinese peripherical involvement and creation of multipolar global order which limits the responsibility towards the international society, as in a unipolar system and increases the chances of China to www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economics Vol. 4, No. 4, 2021 90 Published by SCHOLINK INC.
approach leadership concept in a quantitative and not qualitative way (Heberer, 2015). Multipolarity is less offensive towards the other strong nations and especially the United States and gives China in the current dispute with the Donald Trump's administration a character of bilateral conflict rather than a conflict over the global dominance. Focusing on regional and segmental leadership, allows China to win the time and gradually implement the national strategies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative,

Theories Fusion
The neoclassical approach towards the realism is expanding the framework of the Chinese foreign affairs strategy analysis. It allows to study the internal factors and discourse as influential components of the foreign diplomacy. However, as the theory experts confirm by themselves, there is no one unique explanation which can be used to all the case studies (Sorensen, 2013). Moreover, the origin of the international relations paradigm is the Western philosophy and political thought. Whilst applying the theories to the Chinese reality it is important to take into consideration the necessity to keep objective balance and to include the Chinese historical and political background, sociocultural conditions, and structure of the political narration (Mao, 2010).
Considering the importance of the original discourse and the meaning of the used paradigms in the political storytelling, I suggest analysing the original Chinese texts, to adapt a symbiotic approach towards the study. The Chinese foreign strategy is a soft power tool; therefore, its narrative should be analysed. There is a created discourse by the Communist Party of China which currently works in both external and internal directions. I suggest studying the political discourse creation around the foreign affairs and its influence on the chosen audience, the "space", an intellectual context, where this discourse should be embedded and the consequences of the created political storytelling.

Discourse of Foucault
Constructivism, as one of the paradigms of the international relations, considers "discourse" as an important tool for shaping political reality, and was for decades contradicting to the principles of realism. With the revolution of the realist theory, Michel Foucault's concept of discourse was recognized as shaping component of a state's foreign policy (Brand, 2005). Discourse, as a social construct raised by those, who have power, communication tools and media access, defines the main principles for a society, such as truth and morality, and shapes this society's perception (Foucault 1981).
Foucault understood discourse as influential for the material world, producing practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Applicable to the political thought, discourse creates knowledge together with social practices as a form of subjectivity and power relations (Foucault 1981). Being constructed on purpose to support certain ideas and needs, discourse constitutes roles, spreads authority and produces power (Weedon, 1997). Based on Weedon's interpretation of the Foucauldian thought, discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the "nature" of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern (Weedon, 1997). Another interpretation claims that discourse is a form of power that circulates in a social field and can attach to strategies of domination as well as those of resistance (Diamond & Quinby, 1988). can be made and created and gives the framework for statements which can be said and which not (Kendall & Wickham, 1998). Shaping an appropriate space for adopting a certain discourse could be a constructed and conscious process. However, using Foucauldian methods, both scholars suggest being cautious regarding two following remarks: it is critical to look for contingencies instead of causes and stay sceptical regarding the political arguments (Kendall & Wickham, 1998). This argument leads to a conclusion, that discourse maintains the process of space formation. However, despite the attempts to construct a space to guarantee the efficiency of discourse influence, the space still includes certain unpredicted elements causing a variety of unpredictable probabilities. In other words, the created space cannot be fully controlled and might include unpredictable consequences as well.

Production of Spaceby Henri Lefebvre and Structures of Feeling by Raymond Williams
Lefebvre's approach to production of space reveals a claim that space is unlimited and thus empty, yet at the same time it is full of "juxtapositions, of proximities ("proxemics"), of emotional distances and limits" (Lefebvre, 1991). Space is not a thing and not a "vessel". It is a product of social activity and a mean of production, a social reality and set of interrelations and forms. Social space is "always, and simultaneously, both a field of action […] and a basis of action; it interrelates "everything that is produced either by nature or by society" (Lefebvre, 1991). Therefore, space cannot be totally constrained by any group or individual. Nevertheless, space is impacted by multiple narratives and causes.
By evoking "space", it should be indicated what occupies that space and how it was produced: the deployment of energy in relation to "points" and within a time frame. Space considered in isolation, not within an outline of time, is an empty abstraction (Lefebvre, 1991). For this reason, the created space containing Xi Jinping narratives is connected in multiple ways to time. It is not only directly referring to the era of Xi Jinping, but also to the glorious past and even more magnificent future of the PRC.
Moreover, it has phases which are strongly connected to the time periods. For example, the "Made in Chinese speaking groups world-wide. Such a space should have an active presence to become a social consciousness (Williams, 1977). Therefore, the key principles of the "Made in China 2025" narrative might be repetitive and reflected in other official documents, statements of the political elites as well as practiced physically.
In a concrete social space, language and cultural background are used in discourse production and define social relations. In communication, humans, institutions, and power actors create and maintain social relations by making use of language (Fuchs, 2019). Communication is a concrete process that connects social space and mental space of a person and a society (Williams, 2005). Williams claims a correlation among personal and formal beliefs, values, and meanings in historical and cultural perspective. There is a nuanced interaction between private (selected and interpreted) beliefs and acted and justified by the social space experiences (Williams, 1977). Moreover, language differs from generation to generation (Williams, 1977). Therefore, the constructed discourse should take these nuances into consideration and address different angles of a concrete social space. In other words, a constructed discourse, which includes specified narratives, addresses concrete social beliefs, cultural sentiments, and personal values in order to form a necessary supportive space for realisation of political goals and interests. Interdependence of a discourse and a personal sensibility within a given space influences the success of a political strategy's implementation.
To conclude, a social space could be shaped but cannot be fully controlled due to the endless components of this space. In order to manage a discourse for achieving concrete goals, it is important to define time frame and recipients of narratives, their values and believes. Within this given context, language as a way to communicate a message is an important tool, so-called "space within a space", which grants discourse its characteristics.
A political discourse could include several narratives serving different political interests of a governing power. For better employment of a discourse for political matters, political stake holders take actions to produce their version of a [social] space. Usually limited by time, physical and cultural boundaries, space affects the interaction of elements within this space, but stays unlimited and unpredictable in its outgrowth. A constructed discourse within a space tries to affect individual agents, also groups of individuals, and expands to further societies. If language is a tool for spreading a message, and a context of a social space supports narrative's adoption, in a case of spreading beyond the boundaries of the original space, a message should be compliant with the context of a space it tries to penetrate.
In the era of globalisation, it could be estimated that a narrative should be also accepted on the universal level, to be perceived as a common sense. Nevertheless, it is still a sort of wishful thinking to achieve a global perception on narratives, because there is no agreement on one global hegemon, and it doesn't serve political interests of the international players. Moreover, with the whole development of the modern science, there are still adepts of the "Flat Earth Society" (Note 1) and other subjective beliefs, therefore a global consensus is not realistic.

"Affectivity" of Chinese Contemporary Discourse
Based on Raymond Williams' research, D. Sharma and F. Tygstrup suggest a term of "affective space", a virtual environment, which is created to maintain a certain discourse (Sharma & Tygstrup, 2015).
Affectivity has to do with matters of soul, it addresses the personal and becomes part of the consciousness. Affective space is an influential system of explanation and argument (Williams, 1977).
An "affective space" in the political discourse is created through using a codified language, a set of terms and abbreviations, accurately chosen in advance. Because each generation speaks a language already contrasting with the language of its predecessors, narratives should be adapted to the relevant context (Williams, 1977). Sharma and Tygstrup interpret "affectivity" of Williams with matter of the soul and "attunement" of the human being (Sharma & Tygstrup, 2015). The modern Chinese political pragmatism choses an arration style of approaching the current social experience with underlined modern aspects as well as the cultural heritage of the previous generations.
Therefore, affectivity is possible to be reached in different environments-social spaces: domestic, regional and international. In other words, to achieve a concrete political goal, a specific discourse is needed. However, all the contextual conditions must be respected. to recognise the accepted cultural patterns of the target audience and address them directly using a relevant "language". Nevertheless, the principle of Lefebvre of unlimited and unpredictable space excludes consensus on accepting a certain narrative. However, the more social spaces will accept partly or fully a certain discourse, the closer a power group will be to achieving its political goal.

Filling the Space with Narrative: 3 Pillars of a Successful Affectivity
Taking into consideration the theoretical framework of the previous chapters, the following part of the study will search for the key expressions and new paradigms, which are created to fill the space and nourish the discourse in favour of the political interests in internal and foreign affairs. These particular examples are considered to influence the "affectivity" of the space due to their connection to the existing culture, social beliefs and history, as well as anxieties and concerns. innovative methods to establish a system of discourse in external communication and enhance the right to speak internationally (Liu, 2016). Moreover, the article claims that Xi Jinping has "repeatedly stressed that it is necessary to strengthen the capacity building of international communication, carefully construct the system of foreign discourse, enhance the creativity, charisma and credibility to present positively the story of China, to spread its voice and explain China's characteristics (Liu 2016).
Among the Chinese references there are several rising up paradigms, which are appealing to both internal and externally public. The expressions used in the original text are chosen in the way, their English translation will address the international society with the accepted formulations and terminology. The Chinese characters, on the contrary emphasize another information. For example, commonly used expression "super nation" or "great power", which Western scholars have been applying to describe the USA and the USSR during the cold war and continued using towards America after the Cold War period. China also claims to be called "super nation", however the characters used in Chinese for this principle regarding the USA, the USSR and Japan, for example, differ from the characters used for the PRC. China names itself 大国 (daguo), whilst others are called 强国 (qiangguo). 大 (da) can be translated as big/large/great, related to size, and 国 (guo)-as country/nation/state. Both words do not have a direct "threatening" meaning. Daguosynonym, qiangguo (强国) includes the character 强 (qiang), meaning strong/powerful/to force/strengthen. For instance USSR superpower-"qiangguosulian" (强国苏联) and Japan superpower "qiangguoriben" (强 国日本) (Renmin ribao, 2018). In its discussions on the "Chinese new model of the global order" China is promoting a new form of "great nation relations" 大国关系 (daguo guanxi 大国关系), using same characters for great power as it uses towards itself. Clearly, the model is not referring to a theoretical great power, but to China itself as the image of great power.
China's initiative to promote a new type of big powers relationship during the transitional period of leadership and collective leadership marks China's active construction of diplomatic theory, international strategy and policy measures (Yang, 2013). Moreover, it could be also proposed a different interpretation, that China does not claim the status of qiangguo due to the responsibilities connected to the "super nation" status. Domestically, China is still suffering from different problems and is counted as developing country and towards its population the message is that China is a "big country"-daguo geographically and defiantly has "global leadership" ambitions, but it is still in transition to become qiangguo. It is demonstrated in the "Made in China 2025" policy through the claim to achieve the strategic goal of (becoming) manufacturing "great power" (qiangguo) in "three steps" (Guowuyuan, 2015). Nevertheless, whilst mentioning the final stage to be achieved towards the 100 years jubilee of the People's Republic of China, daguo is still used to characterise China as "manufacturing super nation" entering the forefront of the world's manufacturing "great powers" (qiangguo) (Guowuyuan, 2015).
According to Immanuel C.Y. Hsu (Zhao, 2000) before the 19 th century China did not share the features of the nation state. Culturalism and not nationalism prevailed in the traditional Chinese society.
However, the Chinese defeat in the Opium War of 1839-1842 pushed the local elites to adopt the European concepts of nationalism (Zhao, 2000). Out of this bitterness, an idea of China returning its grace and restoring its position as a great power has become the leading motive of the Chinese leaders' discourse. This "great power" idea is the core of the modern Chinese nationalism (Zhao, 2000).
During the 20 th century, the political elites have developed three approaches to "make China's rejuvenation": nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism. Therefore, the constructed discourse of  (Rujiayuanjiaozhiminzuzhuyi 儒家原教旨民族主义). Chinese recovery is in the resistance to foreign influence and pressure. The true independence, according to the nativism supporters, comes through appreciating the traditional principles for gaining the national confidence and strength (Xiao, 1996).
Despite the devotion to the tradition, this concept is neglecting imperialism and strives to establish a modern nation-state. One of the examples of nativism's implementation is Mao's policy of 自理更生 (zi li geng sheng self-reliance). Zhao names the Boxer Rebellion and the Cultural Revolution as two main periods of a strong nativism expression (Zhao, 2000). The attempt to isolate China from the rest of the world was motivated by the idea to minimize the external dependency and the influence of the capitalist world system. However, this approach did not find supporters in the end of 1970s and in 1980s, and the reforms of Deng Xiaoping replaced the old ideological doctrines.
In contrast to nativism, anti-traditionalism sees the Chinese weakness in its tradition. China's cultural heritage (Zhao, 2000). Mao tended to use the antitraditional discourse in his approach towards the traditional Chinese culture of "feudal legacies". The early stages of the Cultural Revolution have expressed this strong antagonism towards all traditional, so-called the four olds: ideas, customs, culture and habits (Durdin, 1971). Nevertheless, this period was a mixture of both nativist anti-Western and antitraditional sentiments (Zhao, 2000).
As an antithesis to both, pragmatism explains the nation's weakness by foreign economic exploitation and cultural infiltration. According to this, lack of modernisation has made China vulnerable to Western imperialism. Pragmatists would use any tools to achieve their dream to make China a great power again.
Deng's expression regarding the cat, whose colour is irrelevant, black or white, as long as it can catch rats is the expression of the pragmatic approach before Xi (Zhao, 2000).

Through its adherence to the national interests in the foreign policy and scientific development, Xi
Jinping could be considered as a neo-pragmatist. His approach differs from the one of Deng Xiaoping.
Xi Jinping's era happens in the time of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which opens for China a window of opportunities to leverage its ambitions for growth and development to the leadership level.

Based on the latest technological innovation of connectivity and visualisation, Chinese Belt and Road
Initiative as well as "Go Global" outwards foreign investment policy enables the PRC under Xi Jinping's regime not only to gain the political and economic power, but also to spread its soft power of values and norms. Therefore, the "new model of the global order" of China has chances to be adopted by the regional Chinese partners and to spread globally. Through the structure of his political messages, Xireaches outto adepts of the nativist and anti-traditionalist thought and still stay perceived as an attractive partner for the members of the international community. By choosing a special terminology in the official statements, which is translated to English in the way, it illustrates the major buzzwords of the Western political thought, Xi's administration appeases both internal and external communities, spreads concrete messages to the Chinese speaking groups abroad and different circles internally.

《新型大国关系》XinxingDaguo Guanxi-New Model of Super Power Relations
Modern diplomacy discourse repeatedly employs the terminology of "global governance" or "global order", "leadership" and "cooperation". Chinese scientific societies are publishing research works on the Chinese new model of global governance (Sun, 2018). This discourse is known also as "Rising China", "Asian Century" and more. It focuses on three major dimensions: space (East vs. West), time (present vs. future, which should be same gorgeous as the past) and position on the global arena (Chinese guidance/leadership vs. Western domination).
Spakowski suggests looking from the global historical perspective, however, ignoring the common focus on the Western world development, to recognise that during the last thirty years we are experiencing not a rapid raise of China, but "re-emergence", "restoration" or even "renaissance" (Spakowski, 2016). In other words, as it is described in the concept of China's rejuvenation, mentioned previously in the "Ten Insistences on Diplomatic Thought" of Xi Jinping. Interpretation of China's performance on the international arena is a matter of the analysis perspective. To reach the full picture, the Western perspective is not enough. However, the Chinese prism should be also analysed with certain scepticism, understanding that the Chinese discourse is subjective and serves particular political interests.
The global discourse regarding the "Asian Century" or the "Chinese Dominance" is produced not only by the open media sources and political analysts but also by the international institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. The institutes are influencing through their reports and global-scale economic data (Spakowski, 2016). There is no global consensus regarding China's rise in the last decade, there is enough speculation on related data, which gives feeling of uncertainty and perception of threat.
Perhaps, the western boom around the rising China was pragmatically used by the Chinese government.
The Communist Party of China, being aware of rhetoric and discourse importance tries to recreate the image of the global leader and great power which was, from their perspective, unreasonably neglected due to the turbulences of the last 150 years. The most prominent example is the restoration of the "Silk  providing aid and cooperation without direct interference into the internal politics of a partnering state.

Shift in Position on the Global Arena (Chinese Guidance/Leadership vs. Western Domination)
Through analysing the official Chinese political statements and white papers on "global governance" and "new global order" it can be seen that China claims to offer an alternative to the Western perception of the "global order". The PRC claims to be ready to take over the global leadership not only in the technological development, as it is presented in the "made in China 2025" policy (国务院, 2015)and the "Artificial Intelligence Development Report" of 2018 (清华大学中国科技政策研究中心, 2018). China also sees itself as responsible leader on the international stage. As a contradiction to the capitalist western powers, the alternative approach to the bilateral relations on the global stage, according to Xinxing Daguo Guanxi, is not a new narrative of the Xi Jinping administration, but a sustainable tradition started in the first decade of the PRC's existence.
The famous Chinese principle of "non-interference" is celebrating its 65 th anniversary due to the unique effectiveness on domestic level as well as on the regional level of Chinese foreign policy. Its discourse "space" was cultivated during all these years and was always adapted to the current existing discourse.
All this became possible through its original flexible interpretation or lack of detailed description of the principle's application, which has kept for the CPC a manoeuvre space for political decisions.
Moreover, the "non-interference" does not contradict the international customary law, which grants China legitimisation of its actions under this principle (Levtov, 2018).
To become a great power nowadays, China should serve the needs of several political narratives. First, the Chinese rhetoric should address the known and accepted terminology of the domestic Chinese discourse, however, it should carry a message of ability to embrace changes and coherence to the gaining political and economic power goal. Second, Chinese positioning should address the regional discourse in a way it would not provoke conflicts, and third, it should not underminedirectly the accepted international (western) norms. In this case, the traditional paradigms related to the international relations, such as "principle of non-interference" should get an updated interpretation and use cases and be aligned with current political strategies.
A gradual way of spreading the influence and achieving "China-centred region order" supports China in promoting its leadership position without provoking serious conflicts. According to Heberer, world's division into the spheres of influence helps China to avoid conflicts with other great powers (Heberer, 2015). Nevertheless, the current US-China dispute shows that the US feels its "great power" threatened.
Moreover, creation of such spheres and spreading the influences contradicts to the traditional paradigm of "non-interference", because regional or global leader status potentially includesan active, even if indirect involvement into the domestic politics of the counterparts. Aid, loans and investments agreed with a local government, might change internal balance of powers and cause tacit interference into the domestic politics. The Communist Party of China cannot publicly turn away from the basic principles of the Maoist approach towards the foreign policy. To avoid a need in a new paradigm is to update the discourse around the old one, to modernise its interpretation or to make re-contextualisation of a www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economics Vol. 4, No. 4, 2021 99 Published by SCHOLINK INC.
paradigm. These considerations are reflected in the terminology chosen for the purpose of promoting the Chinese global leadership. Chinese character for leadership 引导 (yindao) is carrying features of moderate guidance and not of a definite patronage or dictatorship as its' synonym 领导 (lingdao).
Taking into consideration, that English meaning would be perceived in both cases as "leadership", Chinese meaning of these two concepts need to be analysed from the Chinese social space perspective.
Therefore, the original Chinese characters chosen to express these meanings should be revised Most of the Chinese decisions in the post-Mao period could be seen as pragmatic and therefore are serving the national interests and align with the official strategies.
Precise terminology in the official statements indicates the importance granted by the CPC to the rhetoric and creation of the relevant discourse. Sources, which are not the official state documents, but media references, show the degree of the political influence and its narrative penetration into the press. It makes sense, since media channels nowadays are the fastest forwarders of narratives to the target groups. Attention to translation nuances of the chosen rhetoric reveal the intention of the authorities to demonstrate that China claims for the leadership not from a position of power and offense but from an alternative to the Western "strong" and "imposing" leadership position of guidance.
Therefore, it can be concluded that China suggests a new type of a global order with a shifted focus on China as an alternative global leader, which agrees for multipolarities and wins its partnerships through "guiding" a counterpart to the mutual interdependency instead of imposing its lead. New narratives need to be felt natural and be adjusted to the existing discourse to become long-living and relevant. For these purposes, the theory of affective spaces describes the mechanism for creation of discourse and adaptation of new paradigms. Based on the analyses of the effectiveness of the "non-interference principle" in the Chinese diplomacy, affective space created around such principle needs to possess the three above-described elements: nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism. In case of the "non-interference principle" as well as other principles out of the "five principles of peaceful co-existence" (hepinggongchuwuxianyuance 和 平 共 处 五 项 原 则 )due to the broad interpretation stay beyond time, and, therefore, are relevant until today. The Mao's heritage of the principle guarantees the connection to the traditional practices of the Chinese diplomacy and the broad interpretation, which could be adjusted to the modern needs of the foreign policy appeals to the pragmatic approach. Through involving all the three elements, an affective space is created. This "space" simultaneously addresses different sorts of feelings within the target audience without contradiction to the most up to dated discourse. It reminds about the previous glory, the suffer of the generations and speeded up growth of the current period, which will lead to the rejuvenation of the country. This affective space is influential both, internallyby being clear to the Chinese population, and externally showing the international community, that China is relying on three strong pillars:

Shift in
international customs, its own political tradition and agility, which is currently necessary to guarantee development and growth. This affectivity is strongly connected to the dimension of time. The narrative finds its legitimation in the memories of the "past" both,domestically through connection to the historical events and tradition, and internationally by showing asign of sustainable strategy which respects the past agreements and customs.
Time aspect in the gradual plan for closing the gap with the developed world and achieving the leading position is strongly presented in the "made in China 2025" strategy (国务院, 2015) as well as in other developing projects, such as "Belt and Road Initiative" and "New Maritime Silk Road" (苏宁等, 2018).
These strategies have phases and are scalable from the perspective of time. The amorphous "rejuvenation" paradigm in the Chinese interpretation turns into the concrete "leadership" project which might achieve also a new global order.

Shift in (Geographical) Space: East vs. West
To become a global leader, a superpower needs to speak the "same language" with the rest of the international community, or at least with the important global players. However, after taking a leadership, nothing prevents the new hegemon to shape the existing discourse according to its needs, to guarantee sustainable growth of its influence in the region.  (Heberer, 2015). At ASEAN regional forum Chinese official representatives and the Vice Foreign Minister, Liu Zhenmin continue with this concept and are warning the participating member states from the foreign intervention to the regional disputes and processes, meaning the USA as the biggest troublemaker. Moreover, he strengthens the positioning of China as the main responsible for stability and progress in the developing countries (Heberer, 2015). In the book "Global Development Politics and China's Program"(Quanjiufazhanzhiliyuzhongguofangan 全球发展 治理与中国方案) it is stated that China is willing to be involved in the development programs globally and continue supporting on regions in need. Chinese contribution to the African continent's economic growth and continuous partnership relations is one of the Chinese ways to lead global processes and to stay involved in the global governance (Sun, 2018). It illustrates the peripheral diplomacy initiative of Xi Jinping and the Chinese soft power in action. According to the official statements of Xi's administration in 2013, China's periphery diplomacy aims to bring the PRC development to these regions to keep stable and close relationship of cooperation in these areas (Glaser and Pal, 2013).
On the global stage, suggested changes in the accepted Western leadership paradigm could be seen through the Chinese proposal to the United Nations to accept a principle of Responsible Protection (RP). By reinterpreting the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P)-UNSC Resolution 1973, which authorises military intervention for civilian protection purposes, RuanZonghe modifies the R2P approach www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economics Vol. 4, No. 4, 2021 102 Published by SCHOLINK INC.
conceptby forcing to limit the legitimation for an intervention and to deal with the consequences of an armed mediation (Ruan, 2012). The "Responsible Protection" was following the concept of "Responsibility while Protecting" previously suggested by Brazil and widely supported by the Western powers (Garwood-Govers, 2014). According to the R2P, if a state fails to stop "serious harm" to its population, a military intervention for humanitarian purposes will be executed by the UN Security Council (UNSC). R2P does not belong to the customary international law, but is a multi-faceted political concept based on the existing principles (Garwood-Govers, 2014). Since the R2P is not a custom, updates and proposals from the UNSC member states could, in theory, change the implementation of the concept without creating any additional legal duties for international players.
Chinese proposal of a new formulation and different interpretation of the conditions to the intervention and responsibility related to the consequences of an armed involvement, shows its intention to shift the focus of the international normative discourse from the Western dominance towards the Eastern (Chinese). In closer look, Chinese RP still recognises the need for non-consensual military interventions under the R2P, although more restrictive conditions must be applied (Garwood-Govers, 2014). This way, the PRC represents a non-Western responsible leadership which raises the non-Western normative narratives onuse of power and state's sovereignty. The RP principle does not contradict the "non-interference" concept, due to the reactive (instead of the proactive) nature of the proposed protection. However, it allows China to spread the message of its responsible leadership and action within the international community. In this way, the PRC protects its positions in theareas of interest and positions itself as a reliable partner. After mass crimes against humanity in the 1990s, like in Rwanda, Kosovo and other geographies, unstableregions are mostly counted as developing and might include the BRI infrastructure or other investment and strategical assets of the PRC. The RP is not only a positive message towards the sovereignty of these states, but also a promise to minimize the negative consequences if an intervention still will be enforced (Ruan, 2012).
Three years after the Responsible Protection was suggested by Ruan Zhonghe and a year after the analysis of Andrew Grarwood-Govers, an article of Oliver Stuenkel from the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in Sao Paolo summed up both sources. According to Stuenkel, Chinese proposal of the RP as a reaction on Syria-related resolutions is not a new normative "normal", but rather a pragmatic strategic decision (Stuenkel, 2015). The PRC is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and qualified to take part in the future military interventions on the UN behalf. Under these circumstances, the Chinese proposal, even if it will not be fully ratified and supported, is welcomed as an opportunity to engage with an actor that will play a key role in mass crimes prevention in the future (Stuenkel, 2015). Moreover, the Chinese RP approach appeases the neighbouring states feeling threatened by China's assertive rise (Thakur, 2013). Chinese positioning on the international stage as a responsible stakeholder in the global order and its' claims for the "new model of the superpower relations" show a strategy for sharing perception of China as a global leading superpower.
It can be concluded that China expands its peripheral diplomacy to other regions, such as Sub-Saharan www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economics Vol. 4, No. 4, 2021 103 Published by SCHOLINK INC.

Africa, which historically has a developed infrastructure of relationship with China through
South-South cooperation, supports the progress of the relationship and helps to reach the political goals faster. Based on previous discussion, it can be assumed that China adopts the new paradigm of global leader also in the Chinese-African relations.
The affective space of the "non-interference" principle plays a critical role in these relations. Due to the internal political processes in each of the Sub-Saharan countries, the "non-interference principle" does not lose its relevance. First, it refers to the history of the Chinese support in the decolonisation period and guarantees Chinese neutrality to the internal political processes. From the second half of the 20 th century the West has tried to trade in different "development packages" which has been connected to political reforms and internal changes, whereas China has proven itself to be loyal to its own diplomatic principles. Second, the "non-interference" principle does not contradict the international law and the UN Charter principles, which does not put African countries in front of the hard choice between eastern and western sides. Third, the principle allows a broad variety of interpretations and pragmatically fits to the modern political discourse. It is applicable in diplomatic issues as it can be seen in "Responsible Protection". Based on these conditions, the new affective space is ready to include the idea of the Chinese global leadership, because it avoids touching the pain points of the counterparts.
In combination with the "principle of non-interference" in particular and the "five principles of peaceful co-existence" in general, the idea of Chinese leadership in South-South cooperation countries is a serious competitor to the structural adjustment of the West. It could explain the relative success of the Chinese strategic programs and initiatives to be welcomed on the African continent. Paragraph1.4 declares: The two sides believe that China is the largest developing country and is working hard to realize the "two (times) hundred years" of struggle goal and realize the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (shixianZhonghuaminzuweidafuxing de zhongguomeng 实现中华民族伟大复兴 的中国梦)... The two sides will take the opportunity of jointly building the "Belt and Road" (shuangfang jiang yigongjian "yidaiyilu" 双 方 将 以 共 建 "一 带 一 路 ") to strengthen all-round, wide-area and in-depth cooperation to achieve win-win cooperation and common development" (FOCAC, 2018).
In the same declaration, the 53 FOCAC African members (Note 2) declare in the paragraph 8: We agree In parallel, positive narratives are feeding the Chinese discourse and trying to penetrate other affective spaces which share with the mainland China historical, cultural and linguistic background. The two-sided approach of the PRC to invest into the internal discourse as well as into the external one strengthens the legitimation of the contemporary Chinese foreign policy and supports the long-term perspective of the global leadership. The nuanced study of the Chinese rhetoric needed a deeper understanding, which discourse these www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape Advances in Politics and Economics Vol. 4, No. 4, 2021 106

Conclusion
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narratives are occupying and in which way they are affecting the target audience. Based on the theoretical discussion on discourse, rhetoric and space, it was concluded that the affectivity is reached through a pragmatic space construction, which includes the necessary political discourse. Regarding Zhao, the Chinese discourse went through three main stages: nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism. Therefore, the rhetoric of Xi Jinping and his administration could be perceived as a neo-pragmatic approach, which includes all these elements. Therefore, spread narratives address all sorts of public, the adherents of nativism and anti-traditionalism and those, who are strongly supporting the Western political thought. Chinese political discourse is a sort of transformer, which reveals new sides during the analysis. All this is valid also in the English translation. The chosen original wording answers the requirements of the Western political thought and do not provoke too much resistance. The strong critics towards the "made in China 2025" policy in 2018 has caused "lower profile" of the strategy (Mai, 2018), however, has not cancelled it or changed the main goals. Since the Chinese interests already exist in the discourse, they are repeated in a different formulation in other official policies.
The affective space of the Xi Jinping's era is not addressing only the Chinese speaking world, it is simultaneously appealing regional partners and international actors. It includes also the three shifts which symbolise an attempt to trigger a new global order. "Shift in position" presents the global audience a new alternative regional and then global leader. In contrary to the American dominance, China suggests guidance, collaboration with mutual benefits and growth, which involves both sides.
"Shift in time" stresses the concrete steps for achieving the "China's dream" of rejuvenation. Xi Jinping uses time to distinguish the present and the coming future from the past and draws the line between the previous periods of Chinese political history and his rule. Nevertheless, it is done in the style of the for this purpose constructed space, with the full respect to the heritage. "Shift in space" shows the gradual process of the growing Chinese influence on the global governance and order. China is interested to also become a moral benchmark and leader. The traces of this interest are seen in the Chinese activism in the UN discussions regarding the principle "Responsible to Protect".This shift is the most complex, due to its multiple consequences and might be never completed. Nevertheless, the attempts to shift the focus of the global order from the West to the East will bring value. The developing regions which are directly depending on the international institutions will perceive China according to its statements and actions.
Based on the American example of the global leadership, an interference into the internal issues of states is one of the privileges of the super nation status. China can be suspected in the same approach after it will be recognised at least a regional leader. In order to reduce these suspicions, China suggests a new approach of responsible protection which does not contradict to the existing paradigm of non-interference and answers the needs of the "development of peace" approach towards African states.
This soft power mechanism is recognisable in the language used in the official documents on "support" in solving numerous of issues, including guaranteeing security and establishing of the joint "China-Africa Peace and Security Forum" (MFA, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action plan [2019][2020][2021]2018). The language used in the document refers to the meaning of the Chinese 引导 principle, where China is defined as a leader, positively perceived by the counterpart.
The article takes as a case study for the implementation of the Chinese foreign policy the FOCAC member states. The African continent is a unique case due to its growing dependency on Chinese investment, loans, and aid. The FOCAC implements the Chinese political agenda in the cooperation framework and by this justifies Chinese claims for "One China" and growing leadership. Being connected to the rest of the world through numerous trade routes and supply chains and as a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the African continent becomes influential on the global stage. According to the peripheral diplomacy of China, the dominance ambitions might spread gradually, gaining new regions of influence. Taking into consideration, that the BRI is one of the main instruments of the Chinese foreign policy, the cross-national network which will grow with the project's development will support the achievement of Xi Jinping's political goals.