Does Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Make Difference to Civilians?: An Analytical and Evaluation Study

In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State sovereignty (ICISS) proposed rethinking on sovereignty through the prism of a new concept: the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). Several years after, its message has been achieved? This is answer to this question that, in the aftermath of the Arab spring, at the end of an intervention that is controversial in Libya and in the face of the Syrian drama, we decided to make an evaluation, by analyzing this doctrine. From details of methodological of the purpose of this article, the review of the legal framework of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) in international law is based on pre-existing concepts and rules that are sometimes approached such as the international responsibility and criminal responsibility priori conceptualization of the “Responsibility to Protect”, will be the first axis of this study. In the second, axis the responsibility to protect the population rests primarily on the territorial State against war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing. It must be stated that the obligation to protect the concerned State, was necessary before the States itself by establishing international legal standards. If the State is not willing to do or unable, the subsidiary protective role is the responsibility of other actors. The reality of major obstacles reduces the effective implementation on the ground of the “Responsibility to Protect”. These obstacles can be linked with the same design of it, just as they may result from external causes that could make inoperative the responsibility to protect in view of the situation, the international community application does not rely on the implementation of the responsibility to protect in some cases that meet, however, all the conditions to act within this framework. In the third axis of this study, it will be also a review of the operational legal framework. The United Nations has adopted several resolutions on the “Responsibility to Protect”, examining not only their support to the doctrine, but also their willingness to authorize the deployment of peacekeeping operations and to adopt resolutions in support of military intervention paragraph. But www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/elp Economics, Law and Policy Vol. 3, No. 1, 2020 2 Published by SCHOLINK INC. the Security Council of the United Nations has not always been unanimous about the situations to which the “responsibility to protect” applies. The case of Darfur and the crisis of the Syria, there was something else, they were exemplary cases of the application of the “Responsibility to Protect” inertia, and the different responses by the international community in the face of these crises, will allow us in the Fourth axis of interesting conclusions about the difficulties in the application thereof.


Introduction & Overview
From the years 1990, Member States of the United Nations have gradually shifted the center of their security concerns from States to individuals. The state is the first guarantor of the protection of the rights of the human person. There is also an obligation in international law for any State to respond to violations of these rights. The "Rwandan genocide" in 1994 (Nikuze, 2014(Nikuze, , p. 1099Verwimp, 2004, p. 233; Rohr, 2009, pp. 1-4;Graybill, 2002, p. 88) (Note 1) and the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 (Cedric Ryngaert & Nico Schrijver, 2015, pp. 219-220;Southwick, 2005, pp. 192-195;Gruñfeld & Vermeulen, 2009, p. 222;DiCaprio, 2009, p. 74;Herman, 2206, pp. 409-410) (Note 2) make the Member States of the United Nations be aware of, apart from the fact that governments are not always able to protect their citizens, they can sometimes be the source of threats (Sarkin, 2012, pp. 18-19;Thakur, 2016, pp. 416-427;Luck, 2010, pp. 350-361;Luck, 2008, p. 2). With such aim of achieving greater international sovereignty and the imperative to intervene for the purposes of human protection, was the call of the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), set up by Canada in September 2000, proposed, in December 2001, the concept of "Responsibility to protect".
The responsibility to protect leads to thinking of sovereignty as a responsibility and no longer as an absolute right. Responsibility is threefold: to warn of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, to suppress them when prevention has failed and to rebuild the country to ensure that such events do not recur. The responsibility to protect is above all the purview of the State in whose territory the conflicts take place. It is only if a state fails to protect its population, either because of lack of will, or by impossibility (this would be the case of own government failure that it would not be able to put an end to the clashes), it is up to the international community to act (Gagro, 2014, pp. 69-70).
It is clear that the prevention of conflict must remain the first objective of international cooperation in the face of the magnitude of the destruction of property, killings, suffering, injuries and damage to the environment. The second objective is to ensure that humanity be safeguarded in the face of the reality of armed conflict and to avoid human suffering (Zupančič, 2009, pp. 69-70). The purpose of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is specially to alleviate the suffering of all victims of armed conflict in the power of the enemy; it"s the noble ambition of IHL. The latter, is defined as the set of It is worth mentioning that the State is answerable for its international wrongful acts means that its conduct must be assessed in the light of its international obligations, which alone make it possible to engage its responsibility in the international law order. There is a breach of an international obligation by a State where "when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character" (Note 13). Two elements must, therefore, be met: State conduct that may be an action or an omission, and its contrariety with a rule of international law. The origin or the character of the violation, as already stated, irrelevant in the assessment of unlawfulness which may be either in breach of a treaty obligation (Olleson, 2007, p. 102). Professor James Crawford makes a distinction between "Primary obligations" by which "gives rise, immediately by operation of the law of state responsibility and "Secondary obligations" or series of such obligations (cessation, reparation) (Crawford, 2002, p. 876) (Note 14).
It is a settled rule of international law that a State may not depend on the provisions of its Domestic law as support for neglecting to agree to international obligations (Palombino, 2015, p. 504). The supremacy of international law over domestic law has recently been reiterated in the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and ICJ. The most illuminating decision in such manner is that conveyed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Treatment of Polish Nationals. In line with this decision, a State can"t illustrate as against another State its very own Constitution with a view to dodging obligations officeholder upon it under international law or treaties in force (Note 15). Later, in the "Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay" case, the Court held Uruguay liable for breach of its reporting obligations under the 1975 Uruguay River Statute, noting that it gave priority to its own legislation on the procedural obligations it had under the 1975 Statute. In addition that, the breached rule or obligation must be in force with respect to the State in question at the time the breach occurs (Fitzmaurice, 2007, p. 61) (Note 16). Finally, in order for the act in question to constitute a violation of international law, it must not be covered by a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. In other words, there is no wrongfulness when one of the circumstances envisaged is present because by virtue of that presence the objective element of the internationally wrongful act, namely the breach of an international obligation lack. These At first reading of the draft articles of 1976, the Commission held two different categories of violations of international law: the "delict" and the "international crime", the definition of which was given in art.
19 constituted a crime of the state "An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole, www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/elp Economics, Law and Policy Vol. 3, No. 1, 2020 6 Published by SCHOLINK INC. constitutes an international crime" and was thus characterized, Inter alia, as "serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid". The Para.3 of this provision provided a list of international crimes: aggression, the maintenance by force of colonial domination, slavery, genocide, apartheid, serious preservation of the human environment, in particular. All other internationally wrongful acts were described as delict under para.4 (Howard, 2001, p. 8, p. 9, p. 11) (Note 19).
The proposals of the Drafting Committee were to be submitted to the comments of the members of the Commission. Finally, the Commission abandoned any allusion to possible degrees of wrongfulness definitively in the first part of the draft adopted in 2001. On the other hand, this distinction reappears in chapter III of Part II of the draft legal concerning regime applicable to serious breaches of obligations arising from peremptory norms of general international law, i.e., the norms of the "jus cogens". The latter replaces the old terminology "crime", while essentially retaking the provisions that drew the consequences and allowing for future developments.
A provision in the 2001 of the Commission text opens a possibility of broad perspective in terms of the responsibility to protect, that of art. 48 of the draft of the Commission which provides that "Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole". The art.48 relates to the invocation of responsibility by States other than the injured State acting to defend a collective interest. The State other than the injured State is not in its individual quality due to an injury that it suffered, but in its capacity as member of a group of States to which the obligation is due, or even Member of the international community as a whole. Art.48 defines the categories of obligations whose breach may authorize States other than the injured State to invoke the responsibility of a State. Under the terms of paragraph (a), two conditions must be met before this responsibility could be engaged. First, the obligation whose breach gave rise to liability should be an obligation to a group to which part the State invoking responsibility. Second, it must be an obligation established for the protection of a collective interest.
Such obligations are sometimes referred to as "obligations erga omnes parties". Paragraph (b) provides that States other than the injured State may invoke responsibility if the obligation in question was an obligation to the international community as a whole. This provision aims "obligations erga omnes", notion that the ICJ in the "Barcelona Traction" case stated "an essential distinction" between obligations owed to particular States and those owed towards the international community as a whole (Ardit Memeti & Bekim Nuhija, 2013, pp. 32-33;Bird, 2011, p. 884;Villalpando, 2010, p. 401;Sicilianos, 2002Sicilianos, , p. 1131 The cessation of the internationally wrongful fact appears as the first condition for any remedy if this fact is of a continuing nature. In the event that the obligation violated is due to the international community as a whole, any state is empowered to require the responsible State to cease the wrongful fact and in a convenient situation to request restitution. In the case of "Application of the Convention on prevention" and repression of genocide, the Court held that: "Serbia and Montenegro shall immediately take effective steps to ensure full compliance with its obligation to punish against acts of genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide or any other act prohibited by the Convention and to transfer individuals accused of genocide or any other act prohibited by the Convention to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and to fully co-operate with this Tribunal" (Note 23).
In conclusion, the crime of genocide committed by a State or on the territory of another State, or against its own population, any State has the right to demand the cessation of this crime and its repair, but not for himself in favor of the State on whose territory the genocide has been committed, or victims, regardless of their nationality. The "Responsibility to protect" failed the international community thus arises in the same context as in the law of the international responsibility of States for the reaction of the State other than the injured State.
Most of the obligations described as "erga omnes" at the present time imply negative duties, namely an obligation to refrain from certain behavior. In this context, the ICJ, in the judgment on the "Barcelona obligation to respect a certain core of human rights from which "for example, in contemporary international law, the outlawing of acts of aggression and genocide, but also principles and rules concerning the fundamental rights of the human person, including protection against the practice of slavery and racial discrimination, corresponds to an obligation "erga omnes"". In the case "Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide", the court stated that "the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights and obligations "erga omnes"" (Note 24). The category of obligations "erga omnes" covers only those obligations which protect the collective interests which are in the interest of the entirely international community, moreover which is of the same nature as the norms Mandatory The concept of responsibility to protect was created to remind States and the international community of their responsibility to act effectively in the face of major human catastrophes. The authors wanted to learn from both inactions in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and from military intervention in Kosovo without permission from the UN Security Council. In this respect, the responsibility to protect has been conceived as the obligation of each State in exercising its sovereignty to protect its population from disasters that can be prevented catastrophe, mass murder, and systematic rape. If they are not willing or unable to do so, this responsibility must be borne by the entirely international community of the State (Note 25). The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has called the obligation of a joint obligation of all States to a collective responsibility to protect (Note 26).
As part of the responsibility to protect, when the State has failed or wanted to prevent the above-mentioned crimes or punish the perpetrators, victims have a right to seek redress against the State on the basis of the responsibility to protect?
The right to compensation for victims of international crimes, based on the failure of the State to protect, is not yet established. There are certain practices which tend to recognize the possibility for victims to claim compensation against the State (Evans, 2012, p. 17 (Megret, 2010, p. 133). Therefore, it does not appear to establish an obligation to fix the responsibility of the States on the basis of the responsibility to protect. Finally, the victims of crimes under international law have no rights against the States, based on the responsibility to protect; they are receiving but not licensed.

What about Criminal Responsibility?
International criminal repression is based on the principle of the international responsibility of individuals, which has considerable extension in terms of persons and facts subject to its rules, an extension reinforced by the establishment of mechanisms International judicial bodies to judge and punish individuals responsible for certain illicit behaviors. This principle is also entrenched in international law in which individuals must keep lest their states be held susceptible for their "Acts and Omissions" (Levy, 1945, p. 325).
The international responsibility of individuals means a customary regime of criminal responsibility accommodating the discipline of individuals who have executed international crimes. The perpetrators of acts constituting an international offence are responsible for that chief and liable to punishment which is pronounced by an internal court or international criminal court. In other words, the international responsibility of the individual implies that international law determines illegal individual acts as international offences (Bonafè , 2009, p. 13). For the Commission, the term "international responsibility of the individual" refers to the responsibility of individual persons, including State agents, according to certain rules of international law applying to conduct such as Commission of Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
As part of the "Responsibility to protect", the World Summit Outcome has issued several hypotheses in order to implement liability. It refers to crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. These assumptions can be reconciled with the consequences of offences within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. These crimes, marked by the imprint of criminal law, are defined in the instruments of international criminal law. The ICC Statute identifies them in art.5 on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, art.7 on crimes against humanity, art.8 on war crimes, art.6 on crimes of genocide, the latter being also defined by art.2 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide, or by art.4 of the ICTY Statute and art.2 of the ICTR. All these texts are well within the scope of international criminal law. It is therefore for the international community of States to allow and organize the prevention and suppression of international crimes committed by individuals.
The era of the ICC, the most successful of the "Responsibility to protect" in criminal leaders remain, so far, the conviction of former Liberian President Charles Taylor for war crimes and crimes against humanity: aid and complicity of murder, rape, sexual slavery, of recruitment of children soldiers committed in Sierra Leone (Note 27); the arrest of the former President of Côte d"Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, and his transfer to the Hague to answer post-election abuses in 2010, or the surrender of Bosco Ntaganda to the ICC, which was the subject for war crime and crimes against humanity committed in the province of Ituri (Deuitch, 2016, pp. 681-682). These convictions show a considerable progress of international law and reflect the will of the international community to repress serious violations of fundamental human rights and punishing those responsible for the atrocities mainly against civilians. Other international jurisdictions also participate in criminal law enforcement of the crimes covered by the Rome Statute. All this judicial mechanism demonstrates clearly that the "Responsibility to protect" has a substantial criminal warranty that can be used to deter and punish war crimes, crime against humanity, genocide and cleaning ethnic. Therefore, it may be unreasonable to see how the path of impunity remains to be cleared for international criminal law.
We hope to point out that impunity stands as the biggest challenge to face in the fight against serious and massive violations human rights, context even of the "Responsibility to protect". Since the start of the twenty-first century, the human rights movement has been relatively synonymous with the battle against impunity. Today, to help human rights intends to support criminal responsibility for those individuals who have breached human rights or international humanitarian law (Engle, 2015(Engle, , p. 1070. Impunity can be depicted as exception from punishment or sanction. At the point, when the sovereign immunity standard is stratified to the act of sovereign immunity, individuals, who have administrated and taken part in principal human rights violations, are regularly passed the limit of the law to give a cure (Ozdan, 2018, p. 41).
In this respect, the ICC contributes to the fight against impunity and the establishment of the rule of law by ensuring that the most serious crimes remain unpunished and in promoting respect for international law. The Rome statute has in its preamble "Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes". For instance, the  (Barnes, 2011(Barnes, , pp. 1601(Barnes, -1602. In this respect, we can point out the obstacle of immunity from jurisdiction, which is not to impede the States may take the initiative forecasting and repression of these crimes. However , they can establish their own jurisdiction with respect to crimes prosecuted, by providing for their criminality and their repression in domestic law or, give rise to prosecutions of any person presumed guilty of serious offences on sound territory, whatever the nationality of this person or the place where the offences. These include the effective implementation of universal jurisdiction, which fills a legal vacuum that existed between the refusal or inability of States to judge for themselves their national and the lack of adequate international courts (Garrod, 2018, pp. 131-132) (Note 28). Such efforts would undoubtedly criminal density to the "Responsibility to protect".
The prohibition of committing a crime is intended in principle for individuals. The statute of the ICC, ICTR, ICTY and SCSL effectively proved that natural persons are criminally responsible not only when they commit a war crime, but also when they attempt to commit such a crime and that they assist, contest or participate in the Commission of war crime. They are also responsible when they plan or incite to commit a war crime (Note 29). Individual criminal responsibility for war crimes committed in conflict has been explicitly included in three treaties of IHL: Protocol II to the Convention on conventional weapons, as amended, the Statute of the ICC and the Protocol II to The Hague Convention on the Protection of cultural property (Note 30).
The statutes of the ICTR and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) explicitly state that natural persons are criminally responsible for war crimes in non-international armed conflicts. Individuals may also meet, under certain conditions, "a group of persons acting in concert" (Note 31) or a "joint criminal enterprise" and be punished as the ICTY states in Tadič case. The ICTY sought to convict in this case the individuals who had committed such acts. In this regard, he expressly stated that the violation of international law gave rise to individual responsibilities (Note 32). However, individual authors may also be agents of the State, as also mentioned in para.2 of art.4 of the ILC Draft. Such agents include "any organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State". Thus, are involved all individuals, even the highest placed who occupy the leadership functions or other body exercising public authority (Note 33). On the contrary, the individual criminal responsibility of the leaders does not preclude the international responsibility of the State of which they are responsible. Indeed, the fact of the state committed the crime by its organs. Not to incur the same international responsibility as that of the individual, the international crime of the agent does not mean that the state of the agent comes out unscathed from international responsibility.
Supervisors are criminally responsible for the war crimes committed under their command. They can be held directly responsible for having ordered their subordinates to commit illegal acts. They can also be responsible for the illegal conduct of one of their subordinates. It is a form of indirect liability based on breach of a duty to act (Note 34). International criminal law takes into account criminal responsibility of members of an armed group, when they have committed international crimes, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. It also takes into account, to a certain extent, collective accountable nature, although their responsibility is individual. In this respect, the Statute of the ICC, has qualified as crimes against humanity, "a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts (…) against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy" (Note 35).
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Convention of The Hague for the protection of cultural property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Protocol II require that the Contracting Parties pursue any person who committed, or ordered to commit, of the violations under serious conditions (Note 36).
For the ICC Statute, the criminal responsibility of superiors is also committed as there is commission or attempted commission of crime (Note 37). These texts require the States that behaviors prohibited, including in non-international armed conflict, are liable to criminal prosecution.
In fact, obeying an order from his superior does not relieve the subordinate of his individual criminal responsibility. In this sense, art.6 para.4 of the Statute of the ICTR provides "the fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so requires".
Subordinate position exposes the individual to legal action, without knowing it, most often, what it is obliged to perform illegal acts. As for the military, respect for orders of their superiors is the disciplinary framework to which they are subject in all cases. This rule of responsibility of superiors applies not exclusively to the quick superior of a subordinate, yet in addition to his different superiors in the military hierarchy of leadership if the essential criteria are met (Ronen, 2010, p. 318). From there, the Rwandans, under the authority of the Mayor, have committed genocide or other acts against humanity, only because the decision maker of the commune of origin or establishment had decided so.
Also, it can happen that a person is criminally responsible for an Act, although it is possible to judge and condemn it, because they cannot establish the jurisdiction of a court. This is the case, notably, when State officer alleged to be responsible has the protection of the immunities of jurisdiction, thus obstructing the establishment of the jurisdiction of a foreign court (Note 38).
As to the status of the ICC, it devotes two articles to the question of immunity. Art. 27, expressly excludes the benefit of immunity to anyone who would be involved in a procedure before the Court, particularly in its paragraph 2 "Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person". This article shows that the statute excludes absolutely the criminal immunities accorded to a category of people with a formal quality. On the other hand, the art.98 introduced a doubt when he joined the inability of the Court to take binding measures that "would require requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person" (Note 39). The method of reasoning of article 98 is to shield the for requested State Party from being looked with clashing obligations under international law with regards to the a third state from one viewpoint (concerning immunity, or the requirements for consent, respectively) and the ICC then again (obligation to surrender following a demand), and consequently at last to shield that State Party from bringing about international responsibility (Benzing, 2004, p. 198).
From the foregoing, noted that in international law, the fact that an agent had been convicted of violations does not relieve the State of its own international responsibility. The ICJ in the case concerning application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, also perfectly objected to the arguments of the Serbia that the genocide Convention does not commit the responsibility of the States at the rate of genocide (Note 40) as such and clear of the interpretation of art.1 of the Convention an obligation to the responsibility of States not to commit genocide. Indeed, the ICJ notes that although the text of the Convention does not impose on the States expressis verbis refrain from committing themselves a genocide, it is based on the qualification of "crime of the law of the people" given to the genocide by article 1 of the Convention to indicate that, if States have accepted this qualification, they logically obliged not to commit the act as well.
In addition, the Court noted that it had already concluded that the art.1 of this instrument was the responsibility of all contracting parties an obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.
States must therefore prevent their agents to commit such an act. In fact, the Court noted that it would be "ironic that States are thus required to prevent individuals on which they can exert some influence to commit the genocide, but it is not in the best of their ability, forbidden to commit themselves such acts through their bodies, or persons over which they control a so narrow that the behavior of these is due under international law". To sum up, the Court stated the obligation to prevent genocide implies necessarily the ban commit. Furthermore, the ICJ has admitted that a State could be held responsible for a crime of genocide, although this responsibility has so far a criminal character. In this context, art.7 of the Draft stipulates that "the conduct of an organ of the State (…) shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions".
Ultimately, that the Court opens the possibility of engaging the international responsibility of the Serbia for genocide by saying: "The Contracting Parties are bound by the obligation under the Convention not to commit, through their organs or persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to them, genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III. Thus if an organ of the State, or a person or group whose acts are legally attributable to the State, commits any of the acts proscribed by Article III of the Convention, the international responsibility of that State is incurred". The criminal responsibility regarding genocide turns into a kind of essential of state responsibility. However, it emerges the need to set up that persons or groups following up in the interest of the state have in fact committed the wrongdoing of massacre and genocide, along these lines making their state internationally responsible of its execution (Gaeta,  of a group of States to which the obligation is owed. Moreover, as has been observed, the "Responsibility to protect" is limited to the duty of protection of the population against the four categories of crimes mentioned above. These crimes fall under the statute of the ICC, which, under its art. 5, is competent for the most serious crimes affecting the international community as a whole. The importance given to these crimes by the Statute also pleads in favor of the qualification of "jus cogens". While certain crimes may be serious violations of peremptory norms (article 40 of the ILC draft), including the crime of genocide, it is not necessarily the same as violations of certain peremptory norms of general international law, for example torture. If the prohibition of torture is part of these norms (Note 42), this does not mean that any violation of this standard is a serious violation within the meaning of art.40 of the ILC project.
It is apparent that the "Responsibility to protect" seeks the international responsibility of the State which violates the obligations arising from the peremptory norms of general international law "jus cogens". "Responsibility to protect" postulates also the duty to prosecute the perpetrators of "atrocity crimes" that affects the entire international community, and which, paradoxically, have long been unpunished. In this regard, the existence of the International Criminal Court must certainly be regarded as an essential adjuvant for the application of the principle of "Responsibility to protect". The ICC"s opportune intervention can happen in circumstances in which crimes are now occurring. The concentration in these circumstances will be on ceasing continuous crimes and guaranteeing liability for those effectively perpetrated (Holvoet & Mema, 2015, p. 25).
The adoption of the principle of this responsibility to establish the sanction of the failure of human rights and international humanitarian law has a legal scope. However, this principle calls for the idea of accountability which also has a moral meaning.

The State as a Sovereign Responsible
The possibility that sovereign State involves a responsibility to protect populations from grave violations of human rights has been progressively accepted by universal society since it was first verbalized by Francis Deng and supported by Kofi Annan during the 1990s (Glanville, 2010, p. 233).
In the logic of the responsibility to protect, the essential role in the protection of people, whatever their origins, is the authority that is in charge of controlling this territory. The idea that States may be subject by international law to rules that oblige them to protect certain persons under their jurisdiction is far from modern.
The primary responsibility of states to protect their populations has been the concept of "sovereign responsibility" in developing the responsibility to protect. According this concept, the states are capable and responsible to its own people and furthermore to the international society for the guarantee of protection its population. For example where the state can"t or reluctant to satisfy its sovereign duty to secure, the obligation moves to universal society. In other words, states have the responsibilities to prove their obligation to "the common good by protecting the environment, promoting peace, and refraining from harming their population" (Etzioni, 2016, p. 8). The ICISS take over the concept of sovereignty as a responsibility. The drafters of the ICISS report saw the concept as a way of reconciling the principle of sovereignty with the protection of human rights (Note 43). As such, responsible sovereignty will become a central element in their conception of the responsibility to protect.
In their report, the commissioners of the ICISS attempt to reconcile the principle of sovereignty and the protection of human rights, often put in opposition in the years 1990, by necessary redefinition sovereignty. This redefinition shifts the sovereignty of a " (...) from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties". The ICISS stresses that this redefinition of sovereignty is important in three respects. First, it implies that "[...] the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. Finally, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission". Thus, the concept of so-called responsible sovereignty implies that State sovereignty includes not only rights, but also the responsibilities of which States must fulfill.
The ICISS takes on the same dynamic of sovereignty as responsibility, when it declares that the responsibility to protect lies first and foremost on the State whose population is directly affected. The international community has a residual responsibility to protect the affected population when the state in question is unable or unwilling to discharge its responsibility to protect, when it is the actual perpetrator of the crimes or atrocities or when the acts that take place in this state threaten people living outside. The state has failed to fulfill the responsibilities inherent in sovereignty and must be accountable to the international community. It can no longer use the principle of sovereignty and its corollary, the principle of non-intervention, to act with impunity.
While the definition of responsibility to protect has evolved significantly since the ICISS report of 2001, the concept of "responsible sovereignty" has remained a central element. Indeed, both the definition of the responsibility to protect adopted in the final Document outcome of the World Summit of 2005 and the definition adopted in the first thematic debate of the General Assembly devoted to the responsibility to protect in 2009 takes up this concept of sovereignty (Note 44). However, two clarifications should be made. First, the concept of responsible sovereignty is now limited to the responsibility of States to protect its populations against four mass crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the practices of Ethnic cleansing. Secondly, the threshold for triggering the subsidiary responsibility of the international community is more difficult to achieve.
Whereas before 2005, the subsidiary responsibility of the international community was committed when States were "(...) powerless or unwilling to prevent" (Note 45) one of the four mass crimes committed in its territory, it is only committed today if the states clearly do not provide the protection of their populations against them.
Therefore, Responsible sovereignty implies that State sovereignty has no more than rights, but also the responsibility to protect its people from the aforementioned mass crimes. Moreover, responsible sovereignty implies that in the event that a state is clearly unable to fulfill that responsibility, the international community has the subsidiary responsibility to protect the populations of the state in question. Thus the protection of the population against mass crimes covered by the responsibility to protect can no longer be seen as strictly in the internal affairs of the States. The latter must now be accountable to the international community when they do not fulfill this inherent responsibility for sovereignty.
States already had obligations of a legal and customary nature to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and practices of ethnic cleansing before the conceptual development of the responsibility of Protect. Moreover, the prohibition of these crimes is considered to have the quality of jus cogens and the obligations to prevent and suppress these crimes apply erga omnes.
The "Responsibility to protect" recalls certain obligations of each State in terms of prevention, protection and suppression of crimes. These are elements of the theory of international responsibility.
In this context there are provisions in the law of Geneva. It establishes, without question, protection obligations for certain categories of persons (civilians, wounded, sick), which are primarily based on States.
Health law also referred to this type of responsibility. The constitution of WHO states that "Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social measures". The same opinion that there are obligations of protection for the State responsible for the control of the territory has also been imposed, in the law of The Hague, in relation to the now customary obligations of the occupying Power. In this regard, the ICJ recalls in the "a case concerning armed activities in the territory of the Congo" that: "As such it was under an obligation, according to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, to take all the measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the occupied area, (…) comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any third party" (Note 46).
Under international law, States must not only avoid human rights violations, but also protect individuals. It is therefore a double obligation; the first is negative in the sense that it is necessary to avoid committing an action. The second is positive in the sense that it allows for measures to be taken in the training of State representatives and the establishment of a balance of powers within and outside the institutions. It is worth mentioning that Human-rights treaties utilize terms, for example, "secure" or "ensure" when characterizing states" obligations. For instance, the ECHR gives that the High Contracting Parties will anchor to everybody inside their jurisdiction the rights point by point in the ECHR (Mares, 2009(Mares, , p. 1197. This legal basis for this behavior stems also so much from art.1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
This obligation was the subject of a famous recognition in the "Corfu Channel" case: "The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on The Hague Convention of 1907, No. VTII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication; and every State"s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.
(...). In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave omissions involve the international responsibility of Albania".
The Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, such as that against torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, provides two illustrations: States Parties undertake to prevent, then to suppress, certain acts perpetrated against the persons who are under their responsibility, and thus to protect them. As regards the first, the ICJ has found that it "involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations" (Note 47). In the judgment of the ICJ in the case between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbia, the court finds that Serbia breach its obligation to prevent genocide because it did not take all the measures that were in its power to prevent the commission of genocide, not on its territory, but also outside its territory (Gattini, 2007, p. 697) (Note 48).
In the same sense, the ICJ recalled, in the case of armed activities in the territory of the Congo, that Uganda, as the occupying Power in Ituri, is responsible for taking all measures depending on it to restore and ensure as far as possible, public order and security in the occupied territory, respecting, unless absolute impediment, the laws in force in the DRC.
Today, the international obligations to protect human rights that weigh on each state are so widespread that they tend to be clearly imposed on any sovereign state. The General Assembly has, in the final Document outcome, affirmed the responsibility to protect that: "All human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal, indivisible, interrelated interdependent and mutually reinforcing, that all human rights must be treated in a fair and equal manner important, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, all States, regardless of their political, their economic and cultural systems have a duty to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms".
The responsibility to protect is based on elements of international humanitarian law, international criminal law and human rights law. This legal corpus pursue a same supreme goal is to bring this the rule of respect for the human condition. In the absence of the State concerned, others may provide protection that requires the "responsibility to protect".

Is the Security Council a Right Authority, If a State Manifestly Fails to Protect Its Population?
While a state does not want or cannot assume its responsibility for protection, it can then be assumed by others, including through armed intervention. This is still far from being a novelty, as it supports the practices of human intervention. In this regard, the doctrine of "Responsibility to protect" emphasizes the essential role of international organizations, regional organizations and civil society, to protect populations from four specific crimes mentioned above. International, is that of the official procedure of the resolution "Uniting for the maintenance of peace" (Carswell, 2013, pp. 456-457;Ramsden, 2016, p. 270) (Note 49). According to the rules of procedure 63 of The General Assembly, it must "convene in plenary session only and proceeds directly to consider the item proposed for consideration in the request for the holding of the session, without previous reference to the General Committee or to any other Committee" (Note 50). On the other hand, the binding force of the resolutions of the General Assembly is less than that of the Security Council resolutions. Moreover, a technical obstacle made the General Assembly a rather weak player, namely the slowness of decision-making within that body; however, the speed of the reaction is a key factor in crisis situations that the accelerated procedure of the aforementioned resolution tempers only partially.
However, the recurring question still, who would have a prerogative to intervene when the State concerned was failing? Are these states as such or through an entity that is the Security Council?
It is for the Security Council to fulfill this obligation, on the basis of art.24 of the Charter, which specifies that the members of the United Nations confer on it the primary responsibility for maintenance and of international security and recognize that by carrying out the duties imposed on it by this responsibility the Council acts on their behalf. based on this obligation depended to the Security Council, the key documents supporting the responsibility to protect recognize the Security Council as the right authority to take collective action to achieve the international community"s responsibility (Nasu, 2011, p. 390).
In this case, for the implementation of the responsibility to protect, it would seem doubtful, in the state of the positive law, to consider a procedure other than those foreseen in the UN Charter on the qualification of the situation as constituting a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression, and then recourse to the adoption of provisional measures, military or non-military measures Sanctions or the empowerment of a regional peacekeeping and security Organization to take appropriate measures.
There is also a responsibility to protect, an international responsibility to protect populations at risk, and that is why the ICISS has argued that this obligation extends to the responsibility to respond by appropriate means if catastrophe is happening or seems imminent. In extreme cases, this responsibility to react can go as far as military intervention in the territory of a State to ensure this humanitarian  However, after insisting on the fact that it is not to provide alternatives in criterion from the appropriate authority, since the States contemplating action must seek the authorization of the Council, the Commission also found necessary of not "rule out completely any possibility of recourse to other means to ensure accountability to protect when the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention where humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or the Council fails to deal with such a proposal within a reasonable time, it is difficult to argue that alternative means of discharging the responsibility to protect can be entirely discounted".
Indeterminacy appears particularly large here, as sought by the Commission, in which case the Security Council could fulfill its responsibility, the approval of military action by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is an alternative solution to the right of veto blocking the United Nation Security Council. Another solution would be to entrust a regional or sub regional organization with the task of conducting collective action within well-defined limits. Many humanitarian disasters have significant direct effects on neighboring countries, through cross-border propagation that can take the form, for example, of refugee flows or the use of the territory of the neighboring country as a basis by rebel groups.
Neighboring States therefore generally have a strong collective interest motivated in part only by Humanitarian considerations, to respond quickly and effectively to this catastrophe. It has long been recognized that neighboring States acting within the framework of a regional or sub regional organization are often (but not always) better placed to act than the United Nations. It is worth mentioning that Chapter VIII deals with regional agreements. Article 52.1 recalls that "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations".
Thus, only two cases under article 53(2) ensure that regional agreements can act in a coercive manner to resolve matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security: When the Security Council uses the Regional agreements or bodies for the enforcement of coercive measures taken under its authority or where it authorizes regional agreements or bodies to undertake coercive measures on their own initiative.

The Veto Impact
The right of veto exacerbates the political character of the latter and jeopardizes its legitimacy and rapid action. There is always a strong risk that, by using a veto, the five permanent hostages should take humanitarian considerations for their own interests. The 2005 document makes a complete silence in the face of these challenges for the simple reason of reaching a consensus. The ICISS has considered some solutions. First, it proposes the adoption of a code of conduct whereby permanent members refrain from resorting to a veto in decisions concerning crisis humanitarian when their vital interests are not at stake. As the General Assembly"s president underlined in his R2P concept, "It is the veto and the lack of UNSC reform (...) are the real obstacles to effective action" (Banteka, 2016, p. 399 the General Assembly on the basis of the "Uniting for Peace" procedure.
Yet, the use of such a procedure is facing certain obstacles. In addition to the issue of lawful of this procedure in general in the light of the Charter, its application to authorize the military intervention on the basis of R2P seems problematic because in accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 377 V, the recommendation of the Assembly for the use of force is concerning the breach of the peace or act of aggression. As a procedure, the Uniting for Peace procedure appears to have become part and parcel of the institutional law of the United Nations. However, it is far that the Assembly has never recommended the use of force under this resolution. One can only speculate on the reasons why the Assembly has shown so much self-restraint in this respect. One explanation could be that the Assembly has been well aware of the fundamental character of the norm of the prohibition to use force in the Charter, including the danger of eroding this norm at a time when international tension is still prevalent.
An-other reason could well be a policy not to antagonize the majority of the Security Council, if not all of its permanent members. Hence, this particular aspect of the Uniting for Peace Procedure relating to the use of force cannot be deemed a legally valid exercise of the powers of the Assembly and by now it has been well interred in the graveyard of the Cold War. In general terms, through the Uniting for Peace procedure and other relevant practice the functions and powers of the General Assembly have been interpreted in such a manner that the Assembly can also assume responsibility for matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security side by side with the Security Council (Schrijver, 2006, p. 15).
As aforementioned, another possibility provided by the ICISS is to use regional organizations. Despite the ban proclaimed in article 53 of the Charter regarding the use of force by regional organizations, remembering the intervention of in Liberia (Note 57) (Cardoso & da Rosa, 2014, p. 22) and Sierra Leone (Jenkins, 2007, pp. 346-348) (Note 58) without the prior authorization of the Security Council, the ICISS expressed in favor of the intervention of regional organizations who accompanied by approval in Retrospect of the Council. This proposal was welcomed by the Group of personalities.
However, to keep a certain reserve about this possibility. Indeed, the prohibition of the use of force is an imperative rule of international law and some practices may not provide a satisfactory legal basis to derogate. Besides, such a waiver is likely to open the way to abuse of right.
Eventually, we see that none of these solutions can resolve in a satisfactory manner the challenges in this area. ICISS itself confessed his inability by asking the question of what "lies the most harm: in the damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by". This position has been strongly criticized because it opens the window for unilateral intervention.
There is enough sufficient proposals either about the composition of the Security Council and the veto right, is about the creation of other organs. The doctrine must now focus on the issue of realization of these ideas. In other words, it must find ways by which we can compel the great powers to change their positions. It is important to start with less radical proposals having more chance of success. The Secretary-General and personalities will obviously have to play the central role in deployment all their efforts to this end. In this 21st century, we have more and more cases of the application of R2P, proof is the Arab spring. The UN failure will no longer be tolerated and so there is a real threat to the authority of the United Nations. That is why it is important to act now to reform and not tomorrow where there is perhaps more likely to do so.

The Unavailability of Military Force for the United Nations
The United Nations as the axial body in the application of R2P may decide to intervene in a country, but it has no means for the implementation of its decision. Everything is possible for her is to allow the Member States to take measures for its implementation. It is undoubtedly a main hindrance to the effective implementation of R2P. Indeed, when it is the States who assume the task of intervention, they justify it in the eyes of public opinion in their countries on the basis of the face-off of their national interests. Not only the decision of intervention but also its operational implementation on the ground is affected by this involvement of the interests and the opinion of the population. It would be likely that the operation be conducted with uncertainty and somehow loose and ineffective because of the lack of interest of stakeholders. In addition, the current status of United Nations military tasks, particularly in the field of peace enforcement, isn"t feasible. A substantial divergence exists between universal desires and existing U.N. abilities which, if not tended to, could undermine the adequacy of the United Nations and debilitate international standards (Telhami, 1995, p. 673).
The reason for a standing intervention force is cure enter shortcomings in the international community"s conventional way to deal with crisis interventions. These incorporate, among others, delays in deployment; contingents" inadequate kit, armament, transportation and logistics capabilities; conflicts of doctrine and ethos; uneven (and, too often, low) levels of professionalism; and cumbersome command-and-control arrangements (Willis, 2013).
Article 43 was intended to give the U.N. Security Council the capacity to react rapidly through the deployment of U.N. military. Having foreseen the trouble of making a standing U.N. armed force, the U.N"s. originators, including the United States, picked rather to depend on an provision that required a system of standing understandings between the Security Council and member states. This provision was intended to ensure the Security Council prompt access to military forces, offices, and other help. In light of Cold War animosity inside the Security Council, in any case, these Article 43 agreements were never activated (Houck, 1993, pp. 2-3). As well, the sheer diversity of missions handled by the UN make it impossible that a standing force could be prepared for every one of them. The proposition is of constrained importance to certain key difficulties encountered by The UN. Somalia and Bosnia have uncertainty on the abilities of even very substantial expert forces to complete troublesome missions: in these cases it is increasingly the reality of participation, the particular mandates of the forces, and the decision making methodology under which they work, which are The fundamental issues for discussion.
Further, the volunteer force proposition has kept running up against the natural issue that governments appear to be impervious to supplying the UN with an autonomous military capacity, and to financing it  (Roberts, 1994, p. 160).
In order to apply the resolution of the Council, stakeholders States constitute a coalition or give NATO the conduct of the operation. In recent years, NATO is increasingly involved in military operations anywhere in the world. Its unique military power and coordination easier and more effective operation within this framework compared to a temporary coalition explain the reasons for this trend. The Panel declared itself in favor of the use of this organization for the implementation of Security Council resolutions. However, we direct certain criticism in respect of such a hypothesis, at least with regard to the application of R2P. Indeed, it is well known that the R2P, as the theory of the right of interference, is accused of being an instrument in the service of the interests of major powers and the choice of NATO for its implementation only exacerbates mistrust. In other words, UN commitment with regional organizations is a genuine gathering of states with mutual interests meeting up as alliances of the ready to address specific conflict (Kille & Hendrickson, 2011, p. 30). There was also an avoiding of the UN and a transformation to regional organizations and ad hoc alliances of the willing states (Job, 2004, p. 232).
The difficulties for the implementation of the decisions of the Council are not limited to the intervention itself. With respect to peacekeeping missions, forces are formed more by contingents from developing countries which often lack the funding and the necessary logistics for the fulfillment of their mandates. Their military power is very limited compared to the armies of powerful States. It seems that the only real solution that can address all of these challenges is implementing R2P by international force acting through the United Nations.

The Dormancy of the Application of the Responsibility to Protect
The case of Darfur and the crisis of Syria are two exemplary cases of the inertia of application of the "Responsibility to Protect", and the different answers given by the international community in the face of these crises, will allow us to draw interesting conclusions about the difficulties in applying it.

The Case of Darfur: First Failed Test
At first glance, such a threshold seems to have reached in Darfur. Indeed, since the summer of 2003 while the Government in Khartoum supported by Arab tribal militias (Janjaweed) has embarked on a brutal policy of repression and systematic destruction aimed deliberately at civilian populations, the Conflict in the western region of Sudan will have made between 200000 and 400000. At this terrible record, the 2, 5 million of displaced persons piled up in various camps in Chad should be added (Trahan, 2007, p. 990).
At the international level, the United States characterized the action of the Janjaweed as genocide and demanded international trade sanctions against Sudan, and they even spoke of military intervention.
The United Nations is talking about a crime against humanity. The situation in Darfur clearly represents a breach of the state"s "responsibility to protect". However, the international community is Protect" to a particular conflict and by which decides that "UNMIS" mandate shall be expanded as specified in paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 below, that it shall deploy to Darfur, and therefore invites the negotiations on the deployment of UNAMID, the reference the "responsibility to protect" was considered inappropriate, because unnecessary antagonist. In other words, we meticulously avoided any direct association between the "Responsibility to protect" and the deployment of UNAMID. circumstance more dangerous is that notwithstanding expanded assaults by guerillas, the mission is truly under-resourced as far as equipment, personnel and other logistics. These deficiencies made the mission susceptible to threats and assaults (Birikorang, 2009, p. 10) (Note 64).
With the exception of Russia and China, the great voices of the Security Council have supported the ICC prosecutor. The objective of combating impunity in Darfur remained not only valid, but fully necessary, given the continuing violence at the time. Violations of human rights and international humanitarian law continue, he stressed, believing that in this context, justice must be done and the responsibilities established in order to prevent and deter such acts. Impunity for past crimes and what it means for the possible commission of future crimes are unacceptable, regretting that the arrest warrants issued by the ICC remain unexecuted. The case of Darfur proves then that more than ten years after the Rwandan genocide, the Security Council and the Secretary-General, who asked the "Responsibility to protect" at the center of their speeches have failed by lack of will to put at the heart of their action. the project referred to the concept of "Responsibility to protect", recalling "the Syrian Government"s primary responsibility to protect its population" (Note 65). At the end, the resolution was not approved by the Security Council due to the negative vote of China and Russia. These two permanent members saw that the resolution would not help to regain peace in Syria but would, on contrary, exacerbate the tensions. To clarify its use of the veto right, Russia stated that "it is reflected "not so much a question of acceptability of wording as a conflict of political approaches" regarding respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as the principle of non-intervention, including military, in its affairs; the principle of the unity of the Syrian people; refraining from confrontation; and inviting all to an even-handed and comprehensive dialogue aimed at achieving civil peace and national agreement by reforming the socioeconomic and political life of the country" (Morris, 2013(Morris, , p. 1275. The Arab League played a crucial role in the pressure exerted on Syria. On 25 April it published a statement condemning the use of force against demonstrators in favor of democracy in several Arab countries, stating that they "deserve support, not bullets", but the declaration did not extend to naming Syria and Concrete measures to put an end to abuse. But in light of the emergency, the League of Arab States suspended Syria"s participation and later forced authorizes on Syria, asking for a resolution from the Security Council (Atilgan, 2014, p. 225;Norooz, 2015, p. 37 Recently, the Syrian conflict has undergone an evolution complicating its problematics. It takes on a national, regional and then International Army dimension. The year 2013 was really a turning point since it sees the arrival of new actors important in the conflict, as the arrival of the ISL (Daesh).
The war in Syria took a turning point since 2015. The Syrian armed forces began "broad offensive" land with the support of the Russian aircraft bombings. At last, the most recent intervention occurred in April 2017, when the US for the first time since the start of the civil war propelled an assault against the Syrian government, as striking back for the chemical weapons assault that murdered many populations. The US and Russian military forces are as yet present in Syria right now, clearly both battling ISIL. Nonetheless, having a similar foe, collaboration between the two states is rare (Perišić, 2017, p. 800).
Ultimately, it should be noted that for a number of actors on the international scene, it is certain the Syrian crisis was an opportunity to recall the illegality of any military intervention which would not previously have allowed by the Security Council. But it also illustrates the limits of the responsibility to protect when the established authorities persist in the use of force against their people, causing thousands of victims, which is clearly contrary e to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
From there on, we can only regret that the system of alliances in the Security Council continues to empty the "responsibility to protect" it"s content.
In fact, with regard to the concept of responsibility to protect itself, if its theoretical construction appears to be solid and logical, it is nevertheless lacking in terms relating to its practical application. As seen in UI in Syria, the implementation of this responsibility to protect is never simple, especially since these are very predominantly cases in which the State itself goes against some of its own citizens, and therefore does not consent to the interference of the international community. One might therefore wonder whether the very concept of responsibility to protect was not dead from the outset. Finally, from a more formal point of view, the very structure of the United Nations and its Security Council obviously has its role to play, which in particular raises the question of the veto rights of the members of the Security Council. It is his exercise (in particular the Chinese and Russian vetoes) which has blocked the majority of the resolutions on Syria since 2012. The problem is, however, that at the moment it is not possible to remove this veto right, this is where the biggest knot of the situation lies.

The Patchy Intervention in Libya
The debate between the Member States around the Libyan situation did not concern whether or not it was necessary to act to protect civilians but to protect them. That priority has been the protection of civilians against mass crimes reflects a historic breakthrough in the implementation of the principles of In sum, all measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations not slowed Gaddafi, term resulting in the adoption of the resolution 1973 (2011) authorizing the use of force to protect the civilian population in Libya (Brockmeier, Stuenkel, & Tourinho, 2016, p. 116;Naime, 2012, pp. 107-108) (Note 73). The resolution follows the same logic as resolution 1970 (2011), recalling the responsibility that the Libyan authorities to protect its own population and reaffirming primarily to the parties to any armed conflict to take all necessary measures to ensure the protection of civilians (Note 74).
In enforcement measures in Chapter VII of the Charter, which include the use of force, the Security Council requests the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and the complete stop of violence and of all attacks against civilians and requires Libyan authorities respect their obligations under international law, including IHL, the ILHR and the rights of refugees (Naime, 2012, p. 108).
Confirming the principles set out in the resolution 1970 (2011) On October 31, 2011, as part of the enforcement of Chapter VII, the expression "all necessary measures", actually invites the self-appointed the United States, Britain and France members of a "coalition of the willing" to act unilaterally (Nimmo, 2016, p. 82). This is something that not only subverts but perverted logic of collective security of the United Nations in the service of an imperialist policy hidden behind compassionate as those proclaimed by using the slogan "Responsibility to protect".
The prohibition stipulated in art. 4.2 of the Charter, will have lost its meaning, through a resolution in relation to Chapter VII, any member can actually use force to pursue an abstract goal unilaterally and without any control. The room interpretation of the necessary measures "is not the equivalent of a blank cheque; it is limited". As the European Court of Human Rights asserted in another context, the adjective "necessary" [...] is not synonymous with "indispensable" [...] neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as "admissible", "ordinary" [...], "useful" [...], "reasonable" [...] or "desirable" (Corten & Koutroulis, 2013, p. 70). The scope given by the Council must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Then, it should be noted that the way was implemented the resolution 1973 (2011) gave rise to a particularly high number of diplomatic protests. In this context, some States expressed reservations on certain provisions of the resolution of the United Nations; China issued of "serious reservations" on the subject of the resolution explaining: "is always against the use of force", and had "serious difficulty with parts of the resolution", were a clear indication that it was opposed to non-consensual military intervention in Libya. Consistent with its traditional rhetorical emphasis on the non-use of force, China"s preference was for the resolution of "the current crisis in Libya through peaceful means". considering this objective as one of the necessary means to be used to protect civilians (Nesi, 2011, pp. 46-47) (Note 77). In sum, the primary key factor that impacted international action in Libya was the clearness and instantaneous of the danger to the population. The danger of mass atrocity violations was obviously distinguished by senior UN authorities amid February and March 2011, and solidified as Gaddafi forces hedged the town of Benghazi. The second and most essential factor that gave the driving force to military activity in Libya was the regional consensus on the requirement for outer intervention.
Gaddafi"s disagreeability in the Arab world implied that the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference all censured the savagery and the violence in Libya and excluded Libya from the respective organizations. A third critical trigger was the deserting of individuals from the Gaddafi government. A few conspicuous figures, including Libya"s representative to the UN, denounced the routine"s brutality against protesters and approached the UNSC to convey a "conclusive, quick and gallant resolution" (Gowers, 2013, pp. 607-608).
In the light of all these elements, we noted that implementation of the responsibility to protect, in the Libyan case, pursue two agendas: the first is the protection of civilians, which is the responsibility to protect for which a UN mandate has was voted. The last is the fall of the regime, which remains unmentionable in the context of the "Responsibility to protect", because it challenges the State sovereignty.
However The intervention of NATO"s in Libya harmed relations among the Western and the non-Western UNSC members. The Concept of "Responsibility to protect" was utilized as a smokescreen for changing regime has without a doubt undermined the idea"s truthfulness (Gowers, 2013, p. 609

Intervention in Kenya
The Kenyan case clearly illustrates the implementation of the "Responsibility to protect" in the context of the election crisis following the presidential election Comparative articulations summoning the duty of a state to protect its very own natives were made by Francis Deng, at that point UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide, and by Arbor, at that point high commissioner for human rights (Junk, 2016, p. 57).
The Minister of foreign and European Affairs has referred the application of the "Responsibility to protect" the crisis Kenyan by noting the auxiliary y responsibility of the international community: "In the name of the responsibility to protect, it is urgent to help the populations of the Kenya. The Security Council must take up this question and act" (Junk, 2016, p. 57).
The resolution of the crisis to the Kenya is being make therefore in the spirit of the "responsibility to protect" application, by drawing even projects to bring about structural change. Even if they do not come in place as quickly as expected, it is a case where straight out measures of the "responsibility to protect" doctrine has been applied successfully. In fact, the State, the international community and the United Nations system contribute to the implementation of the responsibility to protect for many years already. The international community has shown in Kenya in 2008 that it was possible to avoid the worst, by a mobilization of the entire of the actors. Thence, considering Kenya as a successful case of the deliberate application of R2P was mainly a mostly description by the mediation efforts and the power-sharing agreement.

Ivory Coast
Ivory Cast is another case of the practical implementation of the "Responsibility to protect". loyal to Ouattara and whose purpose was to hunt Laurent Gbagbo from authority. carried out atrocities, as per arraignment proof and reports from human rights groups" (Murphy, 2012, pp. 436-437).
Remains to say the implementation of the responsibility to protect in Ivory Coast highlights two opposing movements. The first corresponds to a humanitarian and cooperation logic. This is the continual evolution of the right to duty to interfere with the responsibility to protect. The second movement corresponds to the political and competitive logic that underpin the humanitarian action authorized by the Security Council. This more negative reading presents the responsibility to protect more as a faç ade behind which the intervention logics specific to each state remain linked to the traditional defense of the national interest.

The Situation in Myanmar: Can the ICC Make Difference to Rohingya?
The events that took place early May 2008 in Burma have given the issue of responsibility to protect a new dimension. Cyclone Nargisen from the Gulf of Bengal devastated the Burmese provinces of the southwest, causing thousands of victims 78,000 dead and 56,000 missing. Yet, despite the extraordinary magnitude of the catastrophe and the number of people affected, the Burmese junta in power refused to open its borders to international assistance, condemning its population to certain death, for lack of food, drinking water and proper care (Wong, 2009, p. 242;Genser, 2018, p. 488) (Note 81).
In order to overcome the seriousness of the situation, the hypothesis of applying the responsibility to protect was soon envisaged, with the aim of forcing access to the disaster areas. Yet, as we have seen earlier, this international duty of protection applies only in strict cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Cases of natural disasters do not come within the context of the situations envisaged by the final Document, despite the report of the ICISS.
In order to circumvent this literal approach a current initiated by Bernard Kouchner, then accused the Burmese military junta, of "crime against humanity", thus justifying the application of the international duty of protection and, the where appropriate, a coercive action aimed at rescuing the population in distress. It should therefore be questioned whether the Burmese government"s refusal to allow relief could constitute a crime against humanity (Haacke, 2009, pp. 163-164). The French Foreign Minister stated: "[w]e are seeing at the United Nations whether we can implement the Responsibility to Protect, given that food, boats and relief teams are there, and obtain a United Nations" resolution which authorizes the delivery (of aid) and imposes this on the Burmese government" (Alison, 2011, p. 587).
In this case, closing borders can be seen as the imposition of deprivation or active behavior.
Nonetheless, a first reservation is evidence of mens rea. Indeed, it seems difficult to prove the mental element which implies that the authors have taken measures calculated to result in the destruction of a part of the population. The objective pursued must be the destruction at least partial of the population.
Moreover, the authors must be aware that this destruction is the result of their behavior and will become part of the ordinary course of events. The second reservation is due to the generalized nature or systematic attack. If the generalized character relates to the number of victims, it is clear from the jurisprudence that the systematic nature relates to a constant and organized practice (Note 82). This implies for the authors a certain preparation based on the continuation of a common and organized plan or policy, the implementation of which requires the commitment of important means. This condition is clearly lacking in the present case (Note 83).
Since 2012, longstanding atrocities between Buddhists in Rakhine State and Rohingya Muslims have emitted into a progression of fierce assaults, slaughtering civilians and dislodging several thousands.
Recently, brutality against minority ethnic groups has taken into account by international community.
Announcing a highly sensitive situation and state of emergency, the government allowed police security forces to execute "clearance operations" throughout Rakhine State, which has prompted an Unfortunately, The Security Council has not summoned R2P with respect to Myanmar, returning to when the country"s circumstance was set on its permanent agenda in 2006. Apart from a presidential articulation that lamented the abuse authorized upon demonstrators amid the Saffron Revolution, the  (Lee, 2019, p. 262).
In conclusion, the situation in Myanmar considers a deprecation of the R2P principle, in which although the principle was never purpose to contain matters of natural disasters, civilian casualties in huge number still take place due to national politics that have been set, leading to gather deaths.
boosting political action, as well as a international community response, could not be realized due to the lukewarm controversy over whether the politics implored is a shape of "Crimes against Humanity" or not (Putra & Cangara, 2018, p. 61

Conclusion
The answer to the question of whether the implementation of the "Responsibility to Protect" allows us to respond effectively to massive violations of human rights, is difficult and varies and depends on the point of view chosen. This would be negative because the major challenges in the field of international policy and the structure of the United Nations still persist, and they are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. They prevent the realization of our hope which consists in giving a decisive and effective answer to all situations revitalizing the responsibility to protect. So there would always be the risk that massive atrocities as we have already testified are repeated.
The very rapid evolution of the Responsibility to Protect for several years from an idea to a generally acceptable standard and to the regular agenda of the United Nations clearly demonstrates that there is a general will and broad support within the international community to put an end to the atrocities. It seems very illogical to wait for the settlement of the obstacles in this matter by it in this short time.
Several steps must be reviewed. In this respect, it is observed that it is evolving every year from both conceptual and operational and institutional viewpoints. Today we are talking about responsible protection. This means that not only do we have the responsibility to intervene in order to protect people, but also when adopting and implementing measures to that end, we must act responsibly and conform to the principles and purposes so that the population is better protected.
We have seen that in some cases the United Nations is confronted with obstacles in the implementation of the responsibility to protect, so I suggest a new doctrine or a development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect which may mitigate the consequences of failure. I call it the "international responsibility to protect". This doctrine is a combination of the responsibility to protect and the rules International responsibility in order to clarify that doctrine or theory; we must go back a little bit. On the one hand, we have already seen that the principle of the responsibility to protect is based on a multilateral decision that every State is required to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and Crimes against humanity. On the other hand, if the state cannot or does not want to protect its citizens, then the international community has the right to intervene and if necessary by force of arms. Thus, the principle of the responsibility of the authorities is like a change in the United Nations to deal with the humanitarian crises of the century and the where, if each state assumes responsibility for its own citizens, the international community is also responsible for assisting the State in its citizens, but if it is unable State to defend its religion or become the is of violence against the national population, and the international community must act in a timely by decisive manner, using chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, normally by taking a range of peaceful measures or using force.
If the United Nations decides to intervene in internal affairs in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council must examine the conflict, and if the conflict is found to be a form of peace and security, the Council decides to intervene in its secretariat, after the peaceful measures, which are contained in chapter VI and VII, and to be a situation of human rights, which would threaten peace and security. The United Nations charter conferred on the Security Council the power to examine any international dispute if it would extend peace and security. The main competence of the Security Council is for the maintenance of peace and security; it has extensive powers in those areas, so that it can intervene to protect populations under chapter VI of the Charter under the title: "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" is in art. 33 to 38, and that rule under the provisions of Chapter VII under the heading of "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression", art. 39, art. 5.
Through concepts and principles such as human security and Responsibility to Protect, the international community has tried in recent years to place man at the center of attention. The goal is that all the activities of States and other actors in the international community would serve the interests of people and the development of societies. However, it does not seem logical that people are the object of all efforts, while they themselves do not play a significant role in these efforts. While international law promotes democratic values for domestic law, on the international scene, which today is an important part of everyone"s life, people have little impact on regulations. Of course, it would not be a question of changing the place of individuals in the order of the subjects of international law, but of seeking ways in which they could participate and influence more actively the development of norms and rights within the international community. International community so that international decisions better reflect their hopes and needs. This is the challenge of international law in the 21st century and the answer it gives it, will determine the effectiveness of the implementation of standards like Responsibility to Protect.