Battle of Poznań of 19 August 1704 between the Saxon and Swedish Armies

The battle of Poznań between the Swedish army commanded by Johann August Meijerfelt and the Saxon army commanded by general Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg began at the dawn of 19 August 1704. The Saxon general had a major advantage in terms of army strength. He was therefore able to push back the Swedish army from the city, but did not capture the tower. The lack of broader researcher interest and the relatively high number of remaining source materials contributed to the tackling the subject. It is worth shedding light on all events that faded into the historical abyss and are forgotten, or worse, are enveloped by false myths. The Republic of Poland, which became an arena for direct military action in 1702-1709 during the Great Northern War, suffered much pain and destruction despite not officially participating in the war. It is perhaps this fact that makes the conflict and its effects difficult to find among valuable Polish historiography works that would objectively show its course and above all the art of war of the early XVIII century. This paper represents only a small droplet of what remains to be done in terms of describing each aspect of the Great Northern War.


Introduction
Contemporary Poznań, being the capital of the Greater Poland Voivodeship and based in western Poland, was a very important political and economic centre. The city was well based and wealthy, full of merchants, craftsmen, citizens, house owners with Polish, German and Scottish names, with 13,000 residents in early XVIII century. Poznań was also the capital of the most populated and wealthy voivodeship in Poland, adjacent to Brandenburg and Silesia. For nearly two hundred years, the city has not experienced a military threat. It was in existence and was developed until the mid-17th century, when it was captured by a foreign army for the first time since the Middle Ages. In the second half of the XVII www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/eprd Economics, Politics and Regional Development Vol. 1, No. 2, 2020 2 Published by SCHOLINK INC. century and in early XVIII century, Poznań suffered much damage due to military action and its effects as well as natural disasters (especially fires and floods). The Swedish invasion of 1655-1657 turned out to be devastating. From that moment, Poznań was besieged, conquered, robbed, destroyed and burned for one hundred fifty years. The above acts were done by Swedish, Brandenburg, Saxon, Russian, Prussian and even Polish troops. Particular armies occupied Poznań for several years or only passed through the city committing heinous acts. From all the conflicts that swept over the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, affecting Poznań directly, the most devastating for the city was the Great Northern War of 1700-1721. Nevertheless, Poznań maintained the status of one of the main political centres in Poland.
All sides of the conflict were aiming at holding the city during the war.
The purpose of the paper is to describe the course of the Battle of Poznań of 19 August 1704 to the greatest extent possible. It is also possible to make the thesis that the actions of the Saxon command (August II) were inconsequential. Instead of controlling the Great Poland along with Poznań to maintain communications with Saxony and suppress the Polish opposition that supported the Swedes, August II avoided the conflict with Charles XII and primarily wanted to reclaim Warsaw and wait for Russian reinforcements (Mankell, 1865, p. 360). It is necessary to stress that at an opportune time, he could have attempted to capture Poznań and the Great Poland using the Saxon army and the support of Polish divisions. Such an opportunity came up when Charles XII went to the south-east Poland near Lviv.
Instead of cutting off the Swedish king from his operational bases, August II was "toying" with him.
August II's indecisiveness caused Schulenburg to have insufficient forces and resources to capture Poznań in August or September 1704. The battle in which he held off the Swedes near Poznań must be deemed as tactically unresolved, because the Saxons have also withdrawn from city's vicinity. It is necessary to stress that it was a battle of the Swedish cavalry with the Saxon cavalry and infantry, in which the cavalry played the main role. An interesting fact is the time of day during which the battle took place, i.e., late night or early morning. The battle was not analysed in-depth as of yet.

Research Status
An interesting phenomenon in the Polish historiography is that the Great Northern War is insufficiently elaborated on. This is even more interesting, because its military operations were taking place on Polish soil for many years. There are probably many reasons for this state of affairs including, among others, the fact that it was not a "Polish war", but is that true? After all, Poles and Lithuanians took active part in it.
It also contributes to a civil war in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in which two sides, one devoted one page to the happenings around Poznań in the period of interest (Wimmer, 1956, p. 277 , which also features little information about the battle of interest (Olejnik, 1982, p. 126 1704, refers to the clash between the Saxon and Swedish armies. However, as mentioned earlier, the paper also does not raise the subject in a satisfactory manner (Kościelniak, 2018, pp. 387-390).
Considering the issue of the lack of full elaboration on the battle of interest, the author of this study makes an attempt of analysing it. For this purpose, based on the current historiographic findings, mainly the preserved source materials, the author wants to elaborate on this seemingly small, but extremely interesting battle to a wider range of readers.

Poznań's Situation in 1703-1704
The Ultimately, in the afternoon of 18 September 1703, after earlier preparations and Poznań's lockout, the Swedes assaulted the city walls. The Swedish troops were able to enter and capture the city very quickly (Kościelniak, 2018, pp. 384-387). After the Swedes captured Poznań, the city's commandant became colonel Gabryel Lilliehöök with his subordinates lieutenant colonel Gabriel von Weidenheim and captain Filip Örnestedt with 500 infantry troops, 100 dragoons and 4 cannons (Jarochowski, 1879, p. 20). The Swedes immediately started to introduce their own order and prepare for a possible attempt by August II to reclaim the city. They were safe for a while, because nothing could threaten their rule in Great Poland due to the fact that they were supported by the then established the Great Poland confederacy (Zwierzykowski, 2010, pp. 186-188 Poland (Olejnik, 1982, p. 125 (Uddgren, 1918, pp. 250-252;Wagner, 2005, pp. 57-70). This enables August to have a substantial freedom of movement in central Poland.

Prior to the Battle
In the clash of August II and Charles XII, the possession of Poznań had great political and economic value due to the proximity of both rulers' operational bases. For Charles XII, it was the Pomerania around Stettin [Szczecin], while for August II-Saxony. However, the negligence of August II, who didn't care for Poznań's proper security at all, was exploited by Charles XII, whose army captured the city and made it an important military, political and economic centre. For August II himself, leaving Poznań in Swedish hands was very dangerous and inconvenient (Kaczmarczyk, 1990, p. 209 (Jarochowski, 1879, pp. 26-27). He quickly had to face the threat of losing control over the region due to the entry of the Saxon corps into Great Poland (Olejnik, 1982, pp. 125-126

Strengths of Both Sides
In order to strengthen the Swedish garrison in Poznań,  (1704)).

Battle
Meijerfelt's regiments were camped in Poznań's suburbs, thereby worsening the Poznań garrison's supply. They were stationed near Chwaliszewo in Ostrów Tumski. This was the best location, because of the fact that Chwaliszewo was based on an island surrounded by Warta waters. It is covered by a thick forest and marshland from the north.  Taube's regiment and one dragoon squadron from the Northern Scania regiment. This is how his 2,292 troops were deployed (http://www.wikiwand.com/ca/Batalla_de_Pozna%C5%84_(1704)).
Schulenburg ordered to attack the Swedes along the entire frontline (Łukaszewicz, 1838, p. 359). The first to attack was the cavalry and then the infantry (Schuster & Francke, 1885, p. 161). In the beginning, the Saxon army outflanked the Swedish right wing and lead to its confusion. In order to stop the attack, Meijerfelt had to counterattack with his forces in the centre and right flank, but this move completely www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/eprd Economics, Politics and Regional Development Vol. 1, No. 2, 2020 9 Published by SCHOLINK INC.
exposed his left flank (Abschrift, 1704, p. 4). The Swedes were able to repel two attacks of the Saxons thanks to a good arrangement of the infantry and artillery. Gustav Horn pulled out a part of the Northern Scania regiment from the centre and attacked the Saxon infantry. The Saxons were however able to form a quadrangle on time and repel the Swedish attack. The Swedes had to withdraw with great casualties.
The structure of the Swedish right flank, as well as the centre, became unsettled and two companies from the Södermanland infantry regiment fell into the Saxon hands. Shortly thereafter, two Saxon infantry battalions emerged from behind the gunpowder smoke and forced the Swedish dragoons to withdraw.
The Saxons marched onwards and inflicted heavy losses upon the Swedes. The fighting in this section of the front lasted for one and a half hour. Thereafter, Meijerfelt was forced to withdraw towards the city. At the same time, colonel Taube and his cavalry assaulted the Saxon's right flank with reiters commanded by general Brause, thereby breaking then apart and forcing them to leave the battlefield. Afterwards, Taube took off after the runaways through the thick forest on a stone pathway one and half a metre wide (Schulenburg, 1834, p. 162;Abschrift, 1704, p. 4 Schulenburg was afraid that his tired and heated troops will want to lunge at the alcohol. While busy drinking, they would be an easy prey for the Swedes. Schulenburg therefore prohibited anybody to enter the enemy camp and ordered everything to be burned (Relation, 1704, p. 256;Querengä sser, 2019, p. 237). However, some Saxon troops entered the Swedish camp and started taking anything they could.
After the Saxons seized the Swedish camp, colonel Taube returned from the pursuit of the Saxon right flank. After colonel Taube scattered the Saxon flank and chased after the runaway soldiers, the Swedish command having no information about him deemed him dead and his troops defeated. However, after two hours from the start of the battle, a wounded Taube returned to Poznań. He informed Meijerfelt about the situation in the Swedish camp, i.e., that the Saxons are busy plundering it, and proposed to take advantage of the situation and attack the Saxons. So he did. He assaulted Schulenburg's troops in the Swedish camp (Mardefeld, 1741, p. 119;Meijerfelt, 1704, pp. 74-75;Relation, 1704, p. 256). As result, the Swedish troops returning to Poznań counterattacked in a disorganised formation. Schulenburg did not dare to resist them and withdrew from the battlefield (Abschrift, 1704, p. 4;Mardefeld, 1741, p. 120). He entered the forest and marched towards the crossing where his soldiers were stationed. Thereafter, he crossed Warta and returned after two days to the rest of his troops stationed at Tomice (Schulenburg, 1834, p. 162).
It is also necessary to note that the commanding officers of both sides disagreed on the result of the battle.
Meijerfelt stated that after pushing the Saxon cavalry on both flanks he has successfully attacked Schulenburg's central forces and deemed the battle won (Meijerfelt, 1704, pp. 74-75). On the other hand, Schulenburg stated that the Swedish cavalry of colonel Taube returned to Poznań. Then, after one and a half hour of battling, the Saxon troops encircled the enemy and forced it to abandon its camp and hide behind the bushes, where the Saxons found it and soon thereafter seized the Swedish camp. Then, he returned to his camp, taking with him five Swedish banners and two captured cannons, while the reason for his withdrawal was the alcohol stockpile found in the Swedish camp (Schulenburg, 1834, p. 160). It therefore seems that both sides deemed themselves victorious.

After the Battle
After Schulenburg returned to his camp, he decided to besiege Poznań and the situation of his corps improved at the beginning of September when August II promised to provide him with heavy artillery from Gubin and that he will dispatch newly formed battalions (Querengä sser, 2019, pp. 237-238).
However, the battalions, commanded by Reibnitz, Reus and Goltz, were very weak and featured only 717 troops. Schulenburg considered combining them into one battalion under the command of colonel von Beneckendorff, but because their numbers grew to 500 men each at the end of the month, they remained unchanged (Querengä sser, 2019, p. 238).
When Schulenburg returned to Poznań with all of his forces (Schuster & Francke, 1885, p. 161;Lillienhöök, 1918, p. 337), Mardefeld described this army as very weak and added that particular units were not fully staffed (Mardefeld, 1741, p. 120). Schulenburg approached Poznań, but this time from the south, from Lublin. The two sides then exchanged prisoners. As stressed by Mardefeld, after several requests from Schulenburg, the Swedes agreed to the exchange due to the insufficient food stockpiles in the city, because they had to feed the prisoners and guard them, which detracted many Swedish soldiers from defending the city itself (Mardefeld, 1741, p. 120;Lillienhöök, 1918, p. 336 Śmigielski to remain at the city with the Great Poland militias of approx. 500 men, additionally supported by 100 Saxon infantry and 100 Saxon cavalry who prevented the Swedes from collecting tribute and supplies as much as they could (Wimmer, 1956, p. 277;Jarochowski, 1879, pp. 24-26). These troops www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/eprd Economics, Politics and Regional Development Vol.  (Kościelniak, 2018, p. 389).
Due to the absence of a part of the Swedish army in central Poland, August II was able to quickly redeploy his army and partially capture Warsaw in September 1704. The forces commanded by Schulenburg and August II were able to combine at Wyszogród in September (Budrowicz-Nowicki, 2013, p. 529). The Russian support corps sent by Peter I to aid August II have also arrived. The army of August II thus grew to 24,000 men and for a while August was hoping that by taking advantageous positions he would be able to hold onto them until the Russian army arrived, but these were false hopes (Wiśniowiecki, 2018, p. 167;Budrowicz-Nowicki, 2013, p. 529).

Summary
When viewing the battle at the Poznań walls, it is possible to concluded that from a strategic point of view the Saxons have won, because they held back the relief army commanded by Meijerfelt, weakened the Swedish garrison in Poznań and commenced the siege. It is necessary to note that Schulenburg had much to gain, however despite his greater numbers, the quality of the Saxon army commanded by him left much to be desired. The lack of heavy artillery was the main reason that prevented Poznań's capture.
The battle itself can be deemed as Schulenburg's tactical defeat, because despite disbanding the Swedish troops and forcing them to withdraw, he didn't really defeat them and has himself withdrawn his troops from Poznań, thereby leaving the battlefield. He only returned after several days with a greater number of soldiers.
Schulenburg's co-operation with Radomicki and Śmigielski could result in Poznań's capture. However, the withdrawal of the Saxon troops to Warsaw squandered this opportunity. Schulenburg had greater numbers, which he used to hold Meijerfelt back in the battle of Poznań, but lacked the quality.
Schulenburg's army was too weak to commence an effective siege of Poznań. As he himself stressed, his soldiers were poorly trained and undisciplined, and he had an insufficient number of cannons and lacked heavy siege artillery which was necessary to capture the Poznań fortress. It is necessary to note that even with such an army, Schulenburg was able to effectively close off the Swedes in Poznań and force them to surrender. However, king August II had other plans that caused such a favourable opportunity of capturing Poznań to be wasted. Nevertheless, the king wasn't going to give up on capturing the city, which is why he left Radomicki's and Śmigielski's troops in Great Poland to weaken the Poznań garrison.
Radomicki's and Śmigielski's actions alone weren't able to harm the Swedes. The Polish commandants were self-confident and allowed the Swedes to surprise and disband them (no camp reconnaissance or protection). It is possible to state that instead of weakening the Swedes in Poznań, they strengthened www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/eprd Economics, Politics and Regional Development Vol. 1, No. 2, 2020