

Original Paper

On the Practical Limitation of The OIC's Solidarity for Refugee

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Abstract

This article discusses relations between the ethical and the practical sphere of solidarity for refugees in Islam. The study on refugees in this article, however, focused on the political and social context of solidarity; thus, theological exploration will not be the main subject. Theoretical discourse on religion and social solidarity is applied to outline the practical limitations of the principles. As for methodology, the literature review method is employed to engage the normative ethics also documents of the OIC initiatives. We find that the Limitation of solidarity in the OIC countries reflect Redekop's idea of social solidarity: multidimensional, religion as the source of solidarity, the social ecology of Muslim countries limits the practical implementation of the common rule, social solidarity has a compositional effect and every resource or responsibility has to be distributed, and solidarity is achieved through various social institutions.

Keyword

Islam, Refugee, Society, Solidarity

1. Introduction

And if anyone of the disbelievers seeks your protection, then grant him protection so that he may hear the word of Allah, and then escort him to where he will be secure (Quram Surah At-Taubah: 6)

In Islam, solidarity for the refugee is symbolized by the event of *Hijrah* which took place in 622 A.D. as Prophet Muhammad and his followers, escape from Mecca to Yathrib (later named Medina) to avoid torture and repression. The sacred event marked the very first year of *Hijriah* (Note 1); while the proponent of *hijrah* is granted the high status of *Muhajirun* (the refugee who fled from Mecca) and *Ansar* (the one who protect, which refer to Medina residents who sheltered the Prophet and the *mihajirun*). Another important note on account of seeking refuge took place in 613 AD, a decade

before *Hijriah* years. At that time, Prophet Muhammad advised his follower to fled from Mecca to Abyssinia, a Christian kingdom ruled by the wise King Negus. The migration indicates the fundamental principle of Islam that everyone has the right to seek protection (Abu-Sahlieh, 1996). Moreover, the migration to Abyssinia symbolize the interreligious aspects of refugee that set as the model of impartiality in Islam.

Yet, when one reflects the actuality, the picture might not fit perfectly. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), as a representation of global Muslim society, is often criticized for not taking an appropriate measure for the refugee problem in Muslim countries (Kirmani & Khan, 2008). The OIC also challenged by the fact that Muslim countries (stretch across Africa, Asia, South America, and the Middle East) has a central position in the global discourse of forced migration, both as the origin of nearly two-third of the world's forced migrants, also as host countries. As the consequence, the OIC counties host over half of all refugees and asylum seekers in the world, with many serving simultaneously as countries of origin, transit, and destination (Ahmed, 2018). According to the UNHCR Global Report (2019) the OIC member countries "*are among the most prolific countries producing forced migrants*" which include Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Note 2).

In 2012, The Declaration on Refugees in the Muslim World is declared in Ashgabat and setting the frame for the OIC to engage in a global crisis of refugees. For OIC, solidarity is mandated in the charter "*to strengthen brotherhood and solidarity and defend human rights and human dignity among its Member States and people*" (Note 3). However, there is an apparent gap between the ethics of refugees in Islam with the practice of OIC as representative of the Muslim society. Thus, limitations of the OIC in applying ethics of refugees will be the objective of this article. A research question to presents the gap between ethics and practice is formulated as follows: "What are the practical limitations of the OIC in practicing solidarity based on the Islamic ethics for refugees?" Analysis on the subject will be divided into four parts: (1) Outlining social solidarity and religion (2) Islamic conception of refugee, (3) The limit of solidarity in the OIC initiative for refugees, and (4) The OIC challenge for an integrated framework. To begin with, a brief methodological standpoint will be explained to depict research resources and procedures.

2. Research Method

We do a literature review method to narrate the ethics and practices of the OIC initiatives for refugees. The design of the literature review method arises due to the necessity and objective of the research that requires a deep understanding of documents related to the topics. Further, the stages of exploration (storing, selecting, and expanding resources), interpretation (analyzing), and communication phase (presenting the analysis) are used as guidelines to answer the research question. Data will comprise of Quran, Hadiths, and the OIC and UNHCR documents on refugees as follow:

Table 1. Sources of Literature

No	Documents	Information
1.	The Quran	The Quran mentions in 27 verses of hijrah (migration)
2.	Encyclopedia of Canonical Hadith (Juynboll, 2007)	Data on Hadiths and Sunnah on Refugee
3.	Forced Migration in the OIC Member Countries: Policy Framework Adopted by Host Countries (COMCEC, 2016)	Data on refugee in OIC member countries
4.	UNHCR Report on Refugee 2019	Data on global refugee
5.	OIC Website	UNHCR, OIC join efforts in addressing a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
6.	The OIC Program Plan	OIC programs on refugee

In addition, literature such as academic journals, newspaper articles, or institutional reports that have a direct or indirect relation to the topic will be the secondary sources to the research.

3. Outlining Social Solidarity and Religion

UNHCR stated the year 2010 to 2019 is a decade of displacement as Grandi in UNHCR Report, 2019 stated that “*We are witnessing a changed reality in that forced displacement nowadays is not only vastly more widespread but is simply no longer a short-term and temporary phenomenon*”. However, discourse on social solidarity for refugees has a long tradition and intersect with a social, political, and also religious dimension. Rorty (1989) pictured solidarity as a “powerful piece of rhetoric”, Bauder and Juffs (2019) describe the Eurocentric influence in the contemporary definition of solidarity which follows the line of Western philosophy, while Jeffrey and Smith (2008) try to defined social solidarity as “*an attachment between individuals in society, becoming a source of consensual morality, and a way of society to pursue social order*”.

Most of the debates on solidarity are inspired by Durkheim's work on the conception of mechanic solidarity derives from "the attraction of like for like" which based on the common moral framework and insists its members obey (repressive law), and organic solidarity, refers to interdependence form of social organization which performs based on social function (by applying restitutive law) (Durkheim, 1984). Alfirdaus, Hiariej, and Adeney-Risakotta (2015) traced the roots of Durkheim's notion of solidarity as a response to Herbert Spencer, Sumner Maine, and Ferdinand Tönnies, who say that as people get more individualistic, solidarity will not exist in modern society. In later development, Lebow (2007) elaborates the roots of international solidarity by using Durkheim's depiction on the relational definition of individual concept "to be the sum of socially assigned roles" which operate based on three essential structures: (1) *their ordering principle*, (2) *the differentiation of function among the units*, and (3) *the distribution of capability across the units*. This structure provides an operational reading on the practices of the OIC in dealing with the challenge of refugees.

In addition to the social functions and moral community, Durkheim's note on solidarity also emphasizes the role of religion that has the energy to solidify people and create unity (Durkheim, 1984). In a similar vein with Durkheim, Davis, and Moore (1945) reflected on the nature of religion as follow:

"The reason why religion is necessary is apparently to be found in the fact that human society achieves its unity primarily through the possession by its members of certain ultimate values and ends in common. Although these values and ends are subjective, they influence behavior, and their integration enables this society to operate as a system".

Further elaboration on the relations of religion and solidarity is made by Redekop (1967) which concluded that religion, indeed plays a significant role in social solidarity. He depicts conditions in analyzing social solidarity, which is: the form of social integration, multidimensional, implies sociological orientation, and observable relationship or act that can identify. Following these conditions, Redekop constructed five accounts of social solidarity: (1) as it is multi-dimension, religion is not the only source of social solidarity; (2) religion can contribute to the breakdown of social solidarity; (3) social solidarity follow a rule of the ecology of solidarity and the complexity of society; (4) social solidarity has a compositional effect and every resources or responsibility has to be distributed; and (5) Solidarity is achieved through various social institutions. This account, in addition to Lebow's reflection of solidarity in international cooperation, will frame a further discussion of the practice of OIC's initiatives for refugees.

Redekop's conclusion, however, moved beyond Durkheim's assumption on the role of religion, particularly when he noted that religion also can contribute to the breakdown of social solidarity. This facet of religion is further elaborated by Juergensmeyer (2000) who coined the term "cosmic war", a powerful aspect of religion that can drove people to conflict and war; as the consequence, social solidarity is dissolved. Grandi stated (in UNHCR Report, 2019) that in this decade of displacement, solidarity is being challenged both at the theoretical and practical level. The conception of identity and difference that intersect with internal solidarity has been much debated since Deleuze, Derrida, and

Foucault to the contemporary theorist such as Simon Beck, Ioannis Trisokkas, and Miguel de Beistegui (Winkler & Olivier, 2016).

On a practical level, Agustin and Jørgensen (2019) exposed a crisis of solidarity that related to the problem of refugees. They also defined solidarity as the result of organizing, (re)shaping of communities, relating to the state (and other institutions), and the kind of alternatives they produce. As a consequence, three types of solidarity are formed: autonomous solidarity (horizontal engagement of group or individual), civic solidarity (engaging solidarity in civil society), and institutional solidarity (a political framework of solidarity). Taking this development into consideration, this article aims to understand the challenges and limitations faced by the OIC in implementing solidarity based on the Islamic ethics of refugees.

4. The Islamic Ethics of Refugee

The history of Islam is the history of solidarity. Abu-Sahlieh (1996) mentioned the importance of *hijrah* in Islam as the holy Quran mentions the term in 27 verses. *Hijrah*, literal meaning is “to abandon” (*An-Nisa*: 34 and *Al-Muddaththir*: 5). Another clear depiction of *hijrah* is stated in Surah *Al-Anfal* (74) “But those who have believed and emigrated and fought in the cause of Allah and those who gave shelter and aided—it is they who are the believers, truly. For them is forgiveness and noble provision”. Abu-Sahlieh also noted several verses that emphasize the need for fleeing from persecution and build a new community, which are:

These verses (An-Nisa: 97, 99, 100; At-Taubah: 20) urge each Muslim living in an infidel country to leave it and join the Muslim community, unless he is unable. Other verses express the same sense. The purpose of this migration was to protect them from persecution, to weaken the infidel community, and to participate in the effort of war of the new community. Therefore, the Quran uses together the terms: those who believe, and those who emigrate and strive in the way of Allah (Al-Baqoroh: 218; Al-Anfal: 72, 74, 75; Al-Anfal: 20; An-Nahl: 110).

In addition to the notion of protection, there are also verses on the advice of practical term of *hijrah* such as *At-Taubah* (23) which mentioned that worldly belongings and connection should be left behind, while the urge for the rich to help the refugee is stated in *An-Nur* (22). War conduct in which the refugee took part is mentioned in Surah *Al-Hashr* (8-10). The need to build fraternity among the refugee and all the believers are depicted in *Al-Hujuraat* (10), *Ali-Imran* (103), and *At-Taubah* (11). Quran also included the rule of inheritance rights of the next kin of a refugee in surah *Al-Ahzaab* (6). Another emphasis on the account of refugees in Shariah is the concept of *aman*. This term is elaborate by Islamic Relief Worldwide (2012) as follow:

Aman refers to the refuge and safeguard offered to non-Muslims, even if they are in conflict with Muslims, and requires that host populations facilitate the voluntary return of refugees to their places of origin when considered safe. Such refuge remains inviolate even if the person who is being offered protection is in a conflict with Muslims (At-Taubah: 6). Islamic scholars

of jurisprudence believe that aman creates an irrevocable bond.

Furthermore, Islamic law also advises on the use of sacred sites to be sheltered by the refugee. If the status is asylum, then it should follow the rule of non-discrimination between a free person and enslave, rich and poor, men or women, Muslim and non-Muslim. *Shariah* also instructs to give refugees the rights to receive *khums* (Note 4) and also *zakat* (Note 5) (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2012). Islam also required the community to provide the basic needs of the refugee.

Islamic robust teaching on refugees offers an alternative perspective for the current displacement crisis. As the international framework required a rigid procedure for a refugee to gain refugee status, in Islam, the status of an asylum seeker is granted to anyone who seeks protection as long they are not involved in a crime (Juynboll, 2007). At a community level, *hijrah* perform two important roles: (1) “*as a revolutionary tool by splinter groups within Islam to create new sustainable communities*” (Hoffstaedter, 2017); and (2) “*It is the duty of the state to strive by all possible means to seek the unity and the solidarity of the Muslim Ummah*” (Abu-Sahlieh, 1996). In other words, the Islamic teaching of refugees plays an essential role in the formation of social solidarity in Muslim society.

Above all, refers to Redekop’s (1967) notion, religion is essential in providing reason on an individual level to engage in social solidarity. On a practical level, the Islamic approach to refugees is highly supported by the UNHCR to reach countries, particularly Muslim countries, which are not signatories of the 1951 convention on the refugee. However, while the *Shariah* constitution is available, there are challenges and limitations in applying the Islamic approach. This problem of practical limitation will be elaborate on in the next two sections.

5. The Limits of Solidarity for Refugee in the OIC Countries

A portrait of Ka’bah sheltered refugees is an ideal image of Islam on humanitarian solidarity. Zaat (2007) review the principle as follow:

The Islamic Law notion of material sanctuary is most manifest in the form of the Ka’bah (Sacred Mosque in Mecca). The Quran gives the Ka’bah an “eternal value for mankind” 119 and refers to it as a safe haven or zone of peace where the persecuted and oppressed may seek refuge. The Quran declares that God has “... given them a sanctuary of safety [at the Ka’bah], while all around them men are carried off by force”.

But in reality, this imagination of solidarity is a luxury compared to the actual provision of refugees in Muslim countries. COMCEC (2016) reports that refugees sheltered in Muslim countries are prone to health issues and have limited access to jobs and education. However, despite the unideal conditions, solidarity for a refugee is shared in multilevel of Muslim society: from an individual, society level, to policy level. In Indonesia, for example, solidarity for Rohingya motivates Muslim communities to conduct humanitarian acts. While in Turkey, UK Based Faith-Based Organization (FBO) Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) and the Kuwaiti Direct Aid Society (DAS) are in the front line in advocating the implementation of Islamic teaching for refugees (Khafagy, 2020). These are examples of solidarity

depict by Agustín and Jørgensen (2019) which refer to autonomous (horizontal type) and civic (civil and NGO) solidarity. Both are highly motivated by religious beliefs as Candland (2000) reflects Durkheim's idea of religion as a powerful source for social bonding. In addition, Candland further explores the function of religion as social capital:

Many social scientists see in religious conviction an eclipse of reason, and in religious motivation a constraint of enlightened social behaviour. Buttressing these perspectives is the observation that religious identity and religious differences are often seemingly the sources of prejudice and violence. In much social science literature there is an aversion to treating religion as the basis for progressive social solidarity.

Candland shares a similar view with Redekop on the double edge of religious power in society. In the context of refugees, solidarity-based religions meet their limitations within social practice. FBOs in Turkey are perceived differently based on their approach and social ecology, and there are cases that encouraging the Islamic view means an act of religious missionary (Khafagy, 2020). In Indonesia, Muslim solidarity is trampled by religious sentiment as a certain community used the circumstance to gain political power (Pratisti et al., 2019), while in Malaysia, religious-based solidarity is tainted by racial discrimination (Hoffstaedter, 2017). Here, Redekop's notion on how social solidarity is influenced by the ecology of solidarity and the complexity of society found its resonance. As Muslim countries are culturally diverse and shared a multi-facet of Islam, the use of religious symbols will be perceived differently according to the spectrum of society (Khafagy, 2020).

Another limitation of solidarity posed by Winkler and Olivier (2016) who consider “*that difference (or variation) is not to be derived from or understood on the basis of a prior identity (or structure) but, rather, that identity—whether the identity of a singular or collective subject, of the self or of a people—is a product of differential relations*”. In Muslim society, differences and identity are internally and continually discussed. Thus, tension does not only arise from political, economic, and security issues, but also from the perception of threat when the Muslim countries (with a different spectrum of Islam) are advised to follow the Islamic universal principle of permissibility, as Zaat (2007) depicts:

The Islamic principle of permissibility which ensures that all actions are legal and therefore permitted except those that are clearly prohibited by the Shariah—is important in determining protection and assistance rights and obligations here. Human beings have inherent rights to all but that which is prohibited in the Quran and Sunnah.

Therefore, challenged by segmented solidarity, Muslim countries found their limitation in practicing social solidarity lies in the ecology of society and the challenge of “difference”.

6. The OIC Challenge for Integrated Framework

Further discussion on solidarity will explore the institutional solidarity of the OIC. Forced migration which posed a significant challenge for OIC member countries, especially those which shared border with the conflicting zone (Note 6), is forced the organization to reflect on the idea of solidarity. Facing this major problem, there are initiatives from the OIC member states that resonate with the Islamic social solidarity for refugees. The role of protector, non-discrimination, and the implication of the concept of *aman* is shown by the list of The OIC member performed as host for refugee, both from OIC countries (Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Afghanistan) and from non-OIC member (such as Burundi, Eritrea, and Myanmar). Persecution and civil war are the main triggers for the current flow of refugees; in addition to that, Morocco now hosted climate refugees due to the extreme desertification in Northern Africa (Note 7). However, as the OIC consist of 57 countries, only 36 countries (Note 8) are Signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to The Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. From those ratified, COMCEC listed only 29 states that are comprehensively implementing the convention in their national legislation.

Despite some countries are reluctant to a ratified international framework, however, all OIC members are agreed to ratify The 2012 Ashgabat Declaration on Refugees in the Muslim World. This Declaration aim to “*sustained and profound engagement of the international community to address the root causes of refugee situations, pleading for sustainable solutions to the problems of refugees, particularly safe return and sustainable reintegration in their country of origin*” (COMCEC, 2016). The declaration, as an addition to the establishment of the OIC Humanitarian Department in 2008, is considered late in comparison to a global framework of refugee, but it gestured an increasing effort towards finding sustainable solutions for forced migrants about the Islamic view of refugee (Ahmed, 2018). Before the statement of the Ashgabat Declaration, the OIC program for refugees are implemented in the form of joint-forced with UNHCR; one example is the humanitarian provision for Bosnian refugees and rebuilt homes in Rudo to guarantee the wellbeing of the refugee after returning home (Reliefweb, 2004).

With Declaration in hand, the OIC has supposedly overcome the lack of an integrated frame as the Islamic view is applied to engage Muslim solidarity. However, later development shows that the integrated framework has not yet materialized; thus, the OIC members relied on national policy or local tradition as a framework for refugees. Few can be mention: Turkey and Jordan refer to their national regulation in providing shelter and basic needs for Syrian refugees, also Malaysia and Indonesia with their version of hospitality to the Rohingya refugee (Note 9). In their report on the policy framework, COMCEC (2016) mention challenges in implementing strategies and practice of the OIC integrated framework, which are: (1) that within the last decades, the flow of refugee reaches unimaginable scale which any available systems are insufficient; and (2) most of the countries has poor data on the refugee that hindrance the assessment on future programs.

To a certain level, these challenges are indeed relevant to the OIC's current development of policy framework. However, the major obstacle in framing the OIC policy for refugees did not lie in a procedural frame or technical data, but the political paradox and perception toward refugees. One issue exposed by Ahmed (2018) set as an exact example of the Saudi policy toward Yemen. On one hand, Saudi as a member of the OIC is amongst the donor for a field hospital in Marzak Camp, a refugee camp to support displaced persons from Yemen. But on the other hand, Saudi also openly led the aggression; the paradox is depicted in UN Report (UNGASC, 2018):

The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has been blacklisted in the 2018 annual report of the UN Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict and included in the List of Shame for causing 670 child casualties among them 370 killed, in addition to 19 attacks on schools, 5 attacks on hospitals, and 15 incidents of denial of humanitarian access, including restrictions on movement, violence against humanitarian personnel, assets and facilities, and interference in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The political paradox led to the ambiguous attitude of the OIC. Ahmed (2018) mentioned that since the beginning of the Yemen crisis, OIC has only issued 17 press releases, with only 1 issue regarding the problem of refugees. Concerning the issue of Yemen, the OIC has been gravely criticized for the lack of will to initiate a refugee program or to press Saudi policy toward Yemen.

Another challenge for the OIC in formulating an integrated framework is the difference of perception among countries. In the context of international politics, perception is defined as how decision-makers perceived the world and their images of others, and the existence of “unpredicted others” posed the utmost threat in political relations. In later development, the concepts of “perception” were also employed to measure relations of non-state actors, including diaspora and immigrants. This development helps us depict various understandings and different frameworks of risk and perceptions of the state’s policy for refugees. Indonesia as one of the countries affected by refugees from Myanmar faces a paradoxical choice: to secure its border from threats or comply with the public demand to accept the refugees by humanity.

In many cases, perceptions of refugees are divided into two perspectives, bringing benefits or posing a threat. Leong (2008) illustrates that the perception of a benefit in the admission of refugees is based on two advantages. The first is the real advantages coming with the availability of additional human resources. The second is the moral advantage that lies in the ability to provide humanitarian assistance and also be able to conform with multiculturalism. Economic security is another significant reason for nations to perceive it as a great risk in admitting refugees as a threat. This perception underlies the policy of repatriation and resettlement for refugees in many OIC countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and other non-signatories of the 1951 UN Convention.

The political paradox and the risk perception of refugees are contradicting Lebow's principle of international solidarity which is based on three premises: the ordering principle, the differentiation of function among the units, and the distribution of capability across the units. Without sharing the same perception of refugees, formulating the ordering principle as the first step toward international solidarity is a far-fetched goal. Islamic principle supposedly provides a foundation for Muslim society; but as Redekop emphasizes the multidimensional aspect of solidarity, the OIC also struggles with the fact that offering Islamic principle is not sufficient to shape an ordering principle. As political attitude and political perception hindering the OIC effort in formulating an integrated framework for refugee, institutional solidarity in Muslim countries is applied limited to specific countries with comprehensive approach to refugees such as Turkey, Jordan, and Morocco (COMCEC, 2016) or issue-based approach, such as OIC initiative for Rohingya (Ahmed, 2018). The segmented forms of solidarity at the society level and different political perceptions appear as the limits of solidarity in Muslim society.

7. Conclusion

The limitation of solidarity, posed as political challenges for OIC, reflects Redekop's idea of social solidarity. First, the OIC member countries are multi-dimensional—on cultures, tradition, economic, and political perception—thus, following Redekop's argument: religion is not the only source of social solidarity. This point explained why did some of the Muslim countries prefer to shy away from the implementation of Islamic ethics, as they also rationalize other aspects in addition to religion. Second, as a powerful social force, religion can be a source of solidarity, but also justified sentiment (in Indonesia), racism (in Malaysia), and prejudice (in Turkey). Third, the social ecology of Muslim countries limits the practical implementation of the common rule, which poses the biggest challenge for engaging Islamic ethics in the multi-facet of the Muslim world. The other two accounts of Redekop's idea on solidarity reflect the limit on institutional solidarity. Fourth, is that social solidarity has a compositional effect and every resource or responsibility has to be distributed; and fifth, solidarity is achieved through various social institutions. On both accounts the OIC shows limited practical capability: as there is no distribution of solidarity (as most of the solidarity performed in segmentation), therefore it is difficult to formulate a comprehensive and well-integrated framework for refugees.

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Notes

Note 1. Islamic calendar or the years of *Hijriah* is based on Lunar orbital consist of 12 months and 354 to 355 days per year. The beginning and the end of *Hijriah* months traditionally announced by observing the moon's position (*hillal*) (Shamsi, 1984).

Note 2. UNHCR Report on Forced Displacement in 2019 record Muslim countries among the top origin states: Syria (6.6 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), Somalia (0.9 million). While in the long run, UNHCR also supervise 5.6 million Palestine refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Another part of Muslim society that taking into consideration is Rohingya with 1.1 million refugee (UNHCR, 2019).

Note 3. OIC. "OIC Charter." (1969) Accessed December 1, 2020. <http://www.oic.oci.org>.

Note 4. 1/5 of income or from the spoils of war.

Note 5. Zakat is a portion of personal property to be given as charity.

Note 6. In addition to the problem of Syrian, UNHCR Global report (UNHCR, 2019) listed another Muslim countries as the origin of refugee which are, Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition to refugee flow between Muslim countries, The OIC member also host refugee from non-OIC member, such Burundi, Eritrea and Myanmar. Persecution and civil war are the main trigger for current flow of refugee; in addition to that, Morocco now hosted climate refugee due to the extreme desertification in Northern Africa.

Note 7. The medieval theologian Ibn al Arabi suggests that providing asylum is obligatory for those fleeing states where there is injustice, intolerance, physical persecution, disease, and financial insecurity (Kirmani & Khan, 2008).

Note 8. The 36 countries are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Co[^]te d, Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Yemen (2008).

Note 9. Malaysia government policy for Rohingya refugee is based on shared religious affiliation (Hoffstaedter, 2017), while Indonesia humanitarian act is based on the local tradition (Acehnese tradition) of *Peumulia Jamee* or honouring guests (Missbach, 2017).