Still Desperate after Pearl Harbor: Investigations of Saburo Kurusu after the War of the Pacific

Saburo Kurusu, an oft-forgotten diplomat who participated in the final three weeks of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, has garnered renewed attention from diplomatic historians in the last several years. Owing to the publication of The Desperate Diplomat (Clifford & Okura, 2016), which included an original research article on Kurusu’s informal diplomacy along with his own English translation of the crucial parts in his memoir, academics now have a better understanding of his diplomatic efforts to stave off the War of the Pacific. A follow-up article, “The Desperate Diplomat Revisited (Okura, 2016),” presented perspectives from Kurusu’s collaborators in his informal diplomacy, an American financier, Barnard M. Baruch, and a Methodist minister, E. Stanley Jones, in support of his innocence. While those two studies are valuable in examining Kurusu’s involvement in the final U.S.-Japanese negotiations, they came up short in enlightening academics about what happened to Kurusu after Japan’s unconditional surrender in 1945. No studies have revealed Kurusu’s struggle after the war to debunk the myth of the deceitful ambassador. Although the International Persecution Section for the Tokyo Trials never indicted him, he was indeed under investigation. This article will seek to fill the gap in research by undertaking multi-archival studies.


Introduction
Only three weeks before the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, the Japanese imperial government dispatched special envoy Saburo Kurusu to the United States to assist Ambassador Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura in an effort to break the diplomatic standstill plaguing the final U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Because of erroneously translated intercepts of Japanese diplomatic cables and his involvement as the Japanese ambassador to Germany in the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Italy, the U.S. negotiators, in particular, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, strongly suspected from the beginning that Kurusu was masquerading as a peace envoy to divert their attention from Japan"s meticulous preparation for war. As if to enhance this suspicion, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu failed, due to clerical errors, to deliver Japan"s ultimatum to Hull until after Japan launched its air strike on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, which extensively damaged America"s infrastructure and national psyche.
The delayed ultimatum became another piece of evidence against Kurusu and cemented the perception that the "peace envoy" already knew the plan of attack prior to his departure from Japan and that he only pretended to continue diplomatic negotiations to deceive the American policymakers. The "myth of the deceitful ambassador" was born, which made his name synonymous with treachery and a symbol of the Day of Infamy. One argued that "to Kurusu" is a slang verb "meant to execute, or seek to execute, a very slick piece of treachery" ("Kurusu Was Surprised," 1945, p. 4). The American media labeled him "a slimy, little skunk" ("Not So Dumb," 1945, p. 6), "Judas envoy" (Hughes, 1952, p. 9), "one of the most hated man in America" (Schwartz, 1945, p. 6), and "admirer of Hitler" (Straight 1941, pp. 721-722), who "would have been lynched" (Howard,1945, p. 84) if Americans had had the opportunity. Caricaturing Kurusu continued even though he insisted that the government did not inform him of the plan of attack beforehand and that he was as dumbfounded and devastated by the news of the attack as anyone at home or abroad. He repeated many times that he entered the final negotiations in good faith and made tireless efforts until the last moment to avert military confrontation between the two nations, which was, by then, deemed unavoidable (Kurusu 1948(Kurusu , 1952. "They [the Japanese government] never told us [Nomura and Kurusu] the attack on Pearl Harbor was coming while our discussions were going on in Washington" (Huth, 1951, p. 4). He repeated: "My sole motive in undertaking the mission was to try to save peace in the Pacific" ("Kurusu Denied He Knew Tojo"s Plan," 1948, p. 8).
The myth of the deceitful ambassador ruined Kurusu"s reputation as a veteran diplomat with thirty-five years of service and cost him his job prospects and financial stability in post-war Japan, which was crippled by hyperinflation. Despite his plea to Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama for leniency, the new post-war Japanese government under Allied occupation banned Kurusu from returning to public office in October 1947. According to The United Press (UP), on November 12, 1947, Kurusu was still optimistic and expressed his hope for aiding the reconstruction of Japan and ameliorating the U.S.-Japanese relations, and he enthusiastically discussed the need for education reform in Japan ("Kurusu Wants to Emerge from Retirement, Aid Japan"s Rebirth," 1945, p. 1). Even after the government removed both former ambassadors Kurusu and Nomura from the purge list in March 1952, Kurusu was unable to take advantage of the new opportunity to return to public service that he so craved, because strokes that he suffered in 1948 had paralyzed the left side of his body. He distanced himself from politics and spent the reminder of his life in retirement trying to regain his physical mobility (Berlin, 1952, p. 13). Kurusu quietly passed away at the age of 68 in April 1954, survived by his American wife, nee Alice J. Little, who had stayed with him in Japan all through the war, and two daughters, Jaye and Pia, both of whom married American servicemen and eventually immigrated to their mother"s home country. An American newspaper sarcastically reported Kurusu"s death in an article entitled "Devil His Due" (1954, p. 10). Coincidentally in the same year, Nomura resurfaced in public and won election to the Upper House, thereby redeeming himself as parliamentary member. He was later posthumously awarded Japan"s highest Medal of Honor. Unlike the decorated admiral, who enjoyed a long life, Kurusu never had the opportunity to vindicate himself fully in the court of public opinion other than to use his two memoirs in Japanese to publicize his effort to prevent the war between the two nations and to express his frustrations for not being able to shed the spiteful label, "the deceitful ambassador." Nearly eighty years have passed since Kurusu"s fateful mission to the United States, and academics have long exonerated him mostly by directly or indirectly citing from his Japanese memoirs or re-translating the erroneously interpreted pre-war Japanese diplomatic cables. However, existing studies on Kurusu or the final U.S.-Japanese negotiations could not inform scholars much about what happened to Kurusu after the war. They give the erroneous impressions that U.S. policymakers simply stopped blaming the deceitful ambassador after winning the war or that they simply forgave his alleged "misdeeds." To close this gap in the research, this article will concentrate on the process of the investigation by the International Prosecution Section (IPS) of Kurusu for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East about which he said little in his two memoirs. Yoshinobu Higurashi, who authored "Kisojyo seisaku no seiji katei" in Sengo gaiko no keisei claimed that the most reliable information for the IPS came from their interrogations of the Japanese and that he used Kurusu as an example of one who provided vast and detailed information about the process of the Japanese-U.S. negotiation (1994, p. 39

Post Pearl Harbor
After a short internment in Hot Springs, Virginia, and then in Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, Kurusu, as well as other Japanese diplomats, finally returned to Japan on board an exchange ship in February 1942. During the war, he devotedly performed his patriotic duties and gave a series of speeches to support Japan"s war efforts, which were translated into English and compiled into a book (Kurusu, 1944 stand the humiliation of being apprehended and tried by an American court" (Crane, 1945, p. 2). The Allied Powers designed to classify war criminals in three different categories: "Class A charges alleging "crimes against peace" were to be brought against Japan"s top leaders, who had planned and directed the war. Class B and C charges, which could be leveled at Japanese of any rank, covered "conventional war crimes" and "crimes against humanity," respectively." Even though Kurusu was not arrested, his investigation was underway. In a cable to the General "One source stated that both his command of English and his American wife have proved somewhat of a handicap to his career in the Foreign Office, as he has been regarded by some Japanese as being too friendly towards Americans" (p. 7).
To counterbalance, the report also listed unfavorable opinions held by policymakers at the time of his arrival in Washington: "One natural observer characterized KURUSU"s mission as "a gigantic blackmail plot" by Hitler against the United States" (p. 3).
The most important statement in the analysis is that, "[a]ccording to one source, Washington was unable to decide whether KURUSU had double-crossed the United States government or had been double-crossed by his own" (p. 5). In its summary, the report concluded: "Available information is insufficient to conclude whether or not KURUSU knew of the plans of his government to attack the United States, when he came to Washington" (p. 7). Waldorf also passed General Thorpe"s personal perspectives to Keenan: "General Thorpe stated that his office had conducted an intensive and exhaustive investigation regarding the activity of both Saburo KURUSU and Admiral NOMURA and felt that both of these individuals were innocent of any crime against the United States" (p. 1). The letter also stated that Thorpe would be happy to send his officers to both former ambassadors to extend an invitation to remain in Tokyo if requested officially (p. 2).
Kurusu"s name appeared in evidentiary documents as the "person implicated" from February to June 1946 with regard to the "preparation for war," "violation of treaties," "conspiracy for aggressive warfare," "expansion," his involvement in the "Tripartite Pact," "affairs with China," "aggression in interviewed Nagano, Nomura and Poruso. The name of the last individual had apparently a typographical error and was crossed out with a semi-legible hand-written correction that may or may not read Kurusu (IPS, 1945). The memorandum did not detail any interrogations with either Nagano or the third person in the letter, which the index suggests was Kurusu, even though the memorandum briefed Nomura"s earnest wish to avert the war ("Notes of Talk with Admiral Ofstie"  to January 24, 1947, and the defense took 187 days (February 4, 1947to April 16, 1948. A total of 176 attorneys (the defense and the prosecution combined) worked on the case with 1,126 personnel contributing, and the mounting court transcript reached 48,288 pages to cover 417 court days (Bix, Awaya & Toyoda, 2000, pp. 320-322, p. 324). The IPS charged the twenty-eight defendants for allegedly committing murder and other conventional war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.
Appropriately three weeks after the trial began, the UP reported that "Saburo Kurusu, special envoy to Washington at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, loosened up and supplied that prosecution with much valuable data after being informed that some of the papers were in Allied hands ("Japan"s Secret Documents to Be Turned against Tojo," 1946 p. 1). Another article the next day added: "Until it became known the secret papers had been found, Kurusu hadn"t said anything. Now he probably hoped to gain favor with the United States" ("No Use Denying," 1946, p. 6 With respect to the Tripartite Pact, Kurusu"s revelation is consistent with what he wrote in his memoirs: 1) Kurusu did not support the three-power pact but represented Japan to sign it as any duty-bound ambassador would have done ("Interrogation of Kurusu," p. 13,17,37,60,; 2)

Former Foreign Minister Matsuoka and German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop via
Ambassador Stahmer negotiated the context of the agreement, and Kurusu had nothing to do with the process (pp. 55-57); 3) he was reluctant to accept the ambassadorial position and rejected then Foreign Minister Nomura"s plea twice until finally accepting it (p. 16); 4) although he never turned down any diplomatic assignments before, Kurusu did not want to engage in something that went against his ideals, i.e., the pact (p. 16); 5) he also believed that easing the tension between Japan and the United States should have had a higher priority than strengthening the relations with Germany (p. 24, 74); 6) the government did not notify him whether there was any secret clause in the Tripartite Pact about Japan automatically joining the war if the United States attacked Germany or about potential German-Japan joint military operations (p. 66, 93, pp. 101-103, 136); 7) he was aware that the United States would consider the pact as a threat to its national security (pp. 55-57); 8) looking back, he believed that the tree-nation alliance was a diplomatic error on Japan"s side (p. 13, 94); and 9) he resigned from the post, as he was unable to support the government"s policy in good conscience (p. 63, pp. 120-122).  (Kurusu, 1948, pp. 10-12). Kurusu finished his second memoir in July 1952, after a stroke partially paralyzed him in August 1948, and he stated that he was then able to discuss what he was not able to reveal or to partially identify those whom he did not mention in his first version (Kurusu, 1952, pp. 1-2 evidence in existing documents that rules out any of these hypotheses.
Who emerged as a victor from the seven-hour interrogation? Who won? It seems that Kurusu executed very well his objectives to portray himself as an "irrelevant," "non-decision maker," which he really was, whose patriotism drove him to take on the challenging assignments that happened to appear threatening to American security-signing the Tripartite Pact and serving as special envoy to the United States-despite his personal reservations about supporting the government"s policies. Best of all, he did not give away anything new to further implicate himself with regard to aggressive warfare or crimes against peace. Furthermore, He did not implicate anybody not previously exposed or provide the IPS with any untold stories about his former colleagues, such as Nomura, Togo or Tojo, or his involvement in the signing of the Tripartite Pact and the U.S.-Japanese negotiations.
In addition to Kurusu"s curious silence about the meeting in his memoirs, another great mystery is Keenan"s master game plan. What new information did Keenan intend to squeeze out of Kurusu?
Nothing out of the ordinary stood out from the interrogation. Perhaps Keenan had hoped to obtain evidence that there was indeed a secret clause in the Pact and that Kurusu also knew the plan of the expressed their support stating that Kurusu aimed to preserve the peace. Grew wrote a letter to Kurusu after the war, in which he stated that Kurusu was doing his best to preserve the peace, which he expressed in his many public speeches (August, 13, 1946). Jones openly discussed his involvement in the side-door diplomacy with reporters in November, 1946, and published an article in which he expressed his unwavering support for Kurusu"s sincere effort to avert the war ("Identified as Mediator," 1945, p. 4;Jones 1945, p. 610, 612). Judging from the sequence of questions and responses, it is nearly impossible to assume that the missing four pages of the Keenan-Kurusu interrogation contained "bombshell revelations" to implicate him or any others not yet indicted. As Keenan did not leave any memorandum on the objective of his meeting with Kurusu of that day or on his personal feelings about the interview, as he did regarding the first meeting in February, no one will ever know with certainty why Keenan invited Kurusu again in September of 1946 after his first interview seven months before.
The most likely explanation is that Keenan sought to use Kurusu one more time to verify the testimonies given by Oshima, Togo and Tojo among others, when the trial reached the examination of the Tripartite Pact stage on September 19, and for the final preparation for the upcoming examination

Conclusion
Kurusu"s fear of potential prosecution lingered long, perhaps because Webb accused him of wrongdoing, or because he had already been found guilty in the court of public opinion in the United States in absentia and expected due punishment as one of the most hated men in America. In the alternative, perhaps it was simply because he believed Keenan"s bluffing in the first interview in November again and again to defend himself. In an interview with the AP in December 1951, the ten-year anniversary of the day of infamy, he reiterated his side of the story: "The situation was very critical at that time. War was a possibility. But we saw a chance of mainlining peace. We tried everything possible but our efforts came too late. There were too may ifs. It was a great disappointment to me that our effort failed". He added: "I shall live the rest of my life quietly" (Huth, 1951). He kept his word and never returned to diplomacy again.
Although Yoshinobu Higurashi, the author of "Kisojyo seisaku no weiji katei," and a UP article in the Administration in Washington D.C. supporting such claims. It is more than likely that there were no bombshell revelations that changed the course of the IPS investigations or the prosecution of the Japanese defendants. Kurusu did not reveal anything more than what the IPS had already discovered by then.