Freedom in Terms of the Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis: Bibliography

Concepts such as freedom cannot be measured and give material measurable results. Freedom is not measured. It leaves its philosophical imprint on independent thought. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Note 1), it recedes only to leave room for political freedom The supposed absolute freedom based on the quantity of material goods and choices actually leads to the commitment of individualism. Because it is difficult to change this relationship between materialism and individualism, we focus on philosophical freedom through self-knowledge that will answer the triple question (1) what is best for me, (2) what is best for you, (3) what is best for community in which we negotiate a win-win-win reasoning for everyone who negotiates with another in the community Thus arises a win-win-win inner freedom with an immeasurable result, which at its limit is identified with the complete independence of the soul and the spirit.

citizen by removing the impediments to its realization such as unfavorable political institutions, lack of moral and intellectual education, and insufficient material resources (Note 6).
Aristotle"s Conception of Freedom MOIRA M. WALSH That human being is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another"s. (Metaphysics, 1. INTRODUCTION THERE IS NO PLACE in the Nicomachean Ethics, or the Politics, where Aristotle provides us with an explicit definition of freedom. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean Aristotle"s notion of freedom from a series of passages in the Politics, in which Aristotle discusses such matters as the existence of the natural slave, and the understanding of freedom underlying certain forms of democracy. This effort is useful insofar as it not only helps us to understand Aristotle, but also presents us with a conception of freedom interestingly different from many contemporary versions and perhaps worth our consideration. ~ The reader will notice that I deliberately retain, for the most part, the generic use of "man" and of masculine pronouns in translating and commentingon Aristotle, a practice which cannot go without explanationin this day and age. Such terms in English convey just the same ambiguity as Aristode"s Greek does when, for instance, he uses the masculine adjectives eleutheros or agathos as generic terms-that is, they leave the reader uncertain as to whether women are considered capable of freedom or goodness in the same way that men are, with the suspicion that they are not. I do not share the opinion, apparently held by Aristotle, that members of my gender are intellectually inferior to members of the opposite gender; but I have tried here to present his conception of freedom without begging any questions as to whether he thought women capable of it or not. My project in this paper, then, is different from that of, e.g., Roderick T. Long, "Aristotle"s Conception of Freedom", Review of Metaphysics 49/4 (1996): 775-8o~, whose efforts could roughly be said to represent an attempt to ascertain what Aristotle would have thought of contemporary conceptions of freedom, rather than to ascertain how Aristotle himself conceived of it. [495] 496 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:4 OCTOBER 199 7 I will focus in this paper on Aristotle's use of the term eleutheria, and its cognates. Eieutheria, usually translated as "liberty" or "freedom", is conceived by Aristotle in terms more moral and political than metaphysical, i.e., he considers tyranny and slavery, rather than determinism, to be its principal contraries. Self-direction, rather than bare spontaneity, is the crucial characteristic of the free person. In this respect, Aristotle is similar to many political philosophers of our time. As we will see, however, there is an important difference: while many contemporary theorists think of freedom as simply the capacity to guide one"s own actions, without reference to the object or objects sought through action, Aristotle conceives of freedom as the capacity to direct oneself to those ends which one"s reason rightly recognizes as choice worthy. This concept of freedom as rational self-direction can be found underlying Aristotle"s discussions of natural slavery and democracy. FREEDOM AND SLAVERY Book I of the Politics contains an analysis of the relationships among the individual, the household, and the polls. In Chapters ~ and 5 of this book, Aristotle presents an interpretation of one of the relations within the household, namely, that of master and slave. He there makes a distinction between the political status of slavery, and the naturally slavish condition which alone can make this political status legitimate. Aristotle"s discussion of the difference between the man who is naturally suited for slavery and the man naturally suited for freedom gives us a basis upon which we may build a definition of freedom as a condition of soul, rather than as a conventionally granted civil status. Our first clue is found in Chapter ~, in which the master-slave relationship is first discussed: "For that which can foresee with the mind [to dunamenon tel dianoiai prooran] is the naturally ruling and naturally mastering element, What other contemporary philosophers sometimes mean by "freedom", namely, the bare ability to choose between alternatives, corresponds more closely to Aristotle"s notion of the capacity to perform acts that are hek0us/a, or voluntary (Note 7).
The two watchwords of ancient Greece democracy were "freedom" and "equality". Aristotle is sharply critical of the democratic understanding of both terms but, as a champion of true aristocracy, does not wish to surrender such rhetorically charged words to his ideological opponents. He thus tries to preserve a portion of the concepts signified by each of these terms for his favored political system.
With respect to equality he is explicit. He distinguishes proportional equality from numerical equality and associates the former with aristocracy and the latter with democracy. With respect to freedom he is not so explicit. Although he often uses the term "free" (eleutheros) and its cognates in the Politics to signify a freedom that is more robust than democratic freedom, he never discusses or analyses such a concept. But by using a general analysis of freedom as a triadic relation involving an agent, a goal, and an (obstructing or disabling) obstacle, one can piece together Aristotle"s understanding of "true", or aristocratic, freedom. It thus turns out that "freedom" and "equality" can be watchwords, not only of democracy, but of true aristocracy as well (Note 8).

Thomas Hobbes-Leviathan, 1651
The Social Contract Theory has been espoused by many writers from Plato in Crito to modern day writers such as Ayn Rand and John Rawls. However, for English writers Thomas Hobbes undoubtedly holds a certain status as the paradigm of a social contractarian, his work in Leviathan was described as the "greatest, perhaps the sole, masterpiece of political philosophy in the English language". Another leading writer was Jean Jacques Rousseau, his fame owing a lot to do with the French Revolution and subsequent events, and it is on these two writers that this work will focus.
The Social Contract Theory is of importance to all legal scholars because it is a theoretical discourse which attempts to legitimise the coercive and invasive nature of law on naturally free persons.
Undoubtedly there are a number of competing concerns that intersect with the Social Contract Theory, such as liberalism, which we must beware also place constraints on this rationale. One of the most appealing attributes of the Social Contract Theory is its ability to delineate the natural from the artificial, the ability to comprehend society as an artificial construction created in order to restrain and improve upon the natural state of things. In that sense Law is much like Technological Engineering, i.e., the improvement of the pre-existing by use of the artificial.
One intersecting concern is the use of the paradigm of a contract between the governed and the governing, as we shall see when we discuss the respective views of Hobbes and Rousseau, which may have a similar premise in the abstract but mask a more fundamental difference in the approach of the writers, and begs the question of whether the social contract is a "simple exchange" or whether it masks something more complex. The Social Contract Theory is what is called a meta-narrative by post-modernist writers in that it attempts to give an overarching explanation of law"s legitimacy which makes a number of assumptions about human nature, the structure that law ought to take and what the social contract agrees upon. It is these criteria which we will be evaluating in the work.
Thomas Hobbes published his magnus opus Leviathan in 1651 and over three centuries later the work is still the subject of academic debate and controversy. Hobbes was largely influenced by a number of his contemporaries such as Galileo and Francis Bacon and his writings distinctly exhibit a post-enlightenment thought which moves away from basing law on principles of natural justice. I will outline Hobbes" thoughts on the social contract theory and present a number of its most classical criticisms and flaws; we will then move onto compare this to the exchange contemplated by Rousseau.
Published by SCHOLINK INC. because to do so would be insane furthermore for the reasons given about force they cannot be forced into slavery by a conqueror. Rousseau, distinctly to Hobbes, seems tube saying that every person, in their natural state, doesn"t have a right to everything because certain things are naturally inviolable, shoe would disagree with Hobbes that anybody ever has the right to take the life of another person .
The Social Contract is thus a way of establishing a society of people, however they may be governed, which resembles a corporate body or as Rousseau calls it the "body politic". Every person in a society completely alienates their individual rights to the community however, unlike Hobbes; the sovereign is not a beneficiary who retains the whole ambit of rights. The fundamental aspect of this social contract which is distinct from Hobbes is that: "each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right ashes yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has". In Rousseau"s schema then that community may for whatever reason decide to subjugate itself to a particular ruler but fundamentally before a "people" may be formed there must be a social contract between the individuals that make up that people. Thus for Rousseau it is not correct to imagine the social contract as a true contract of exchange between the ruler and ruled where one exchanges freedom for security.
It is widely accepted that Rousseau"s normative version of the Social Contract was a response to his perceived subjective version which waste perpetuation of class divides through those in societies with property and power forming together to create a government. Thus the Social Contract as envisioned by Rousseau was hardly practicable because it required an extremely strong form of communitarian democracy whereby all people came together regularly to make decisions. Thus a state was envisioned as being small in geographic terms perhaps limited to a province or a large city. An individual thus had power over all the rest as a member of the body politic and was subject as an individual to the body politic. Whilst like Hobbes the sovereign was a supreme being, the state was made up of all the individuals and those individuals gave up their rights on the guarantee of involvement in the governing of their lives not simply for security of body and goods.
It is still fairly uncommon for book length critical assessments of Rousseau"s work to concentrate on one theme or notion in his thinking rather than taking a broader canvas, but the gains in detail of assessment and depth of analysis are often significant. Simpson"s book certainly bears this out, even though it is comparatively brief. The title of the book slightly misleads; although it is called Rousseau"s Theory of Freedom its purpose, Simpson says, is in fact "to explain the theory of freedom developed by is plausible to hold that this is so given Rousseau"s own famous formulation of the "problem" to which the social contract is the solution, which says that the members of the political community must "remain as free as before". However, there is something slightly odd in how this claim comports with several of the remarks Simpson makes later on in the book. For instance, he writes in the Conclusion (Chapter 6) Another important feature of his [Rousseau"s] theory of freedom is that the people he described entering the social pact do not do so in order to be free, at least not in the usual sense of the word… The three forms of freedom that he discussed are a kind of happy consequence of the terms of the social pact; but they are neither the citizens" motivation for entering the contract nor the purpose of the contract itself (110-111, and there are several other remarks to the same effect).
Whilst there is no real inconsistency here, his initial statement of what the "central topic" is generates a somewhat misleading expectation about the form his assessment of the main structure of the argument of The Social Contract will take. What is really in the driver"s seat is the account of the basis for and the nature and consequences of the social pact (contract) itself: that "each alienates all under the direction of the common benefit" as he succinctly puts it at one point (105). And, as indicated in the previous quotation, the freedoms that emerge are "happy consequences" of this.
Simpson"s discussion thus begins, in Chapter 1, with a treatment of the state of nature as Rousseau conceives of it, this providing "a theory of human nature and human motivation, which served as the basis of his account of the social contract" (7). He notes, quite rightly, that the text of The Social Contract itself says very little about the conditions under which the contract is made, and he turns, again in my estimation quite rightly, to Rousseau"s Second Discourse to supplement this, carefully (almost too much so) considering the legitimacy of doing so. He takes from the Second Discourse the view that the state of nature as Rousseau deploys this in the argument of The Social Contract does not comprise the simple life of independent "savages" but involves men driven by amour-propre (which he translates, not altogether convincingly, as "vanity") with the consequent ambition, greed and the desire to do others down, leading to violence and conflict. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that humanity does not leave the "general" state of nature (as opposed to the simpler "pure" state of nature) even when "moral relations such as families or commerce" obtain but only when it enters political society (17). I shall return to this point towards the end of this review.
In Chapter 2 Simpson discusses the social pact which institutes political society.
The basic question of The Social Contract concerns the terms under which such a union [of persons for the purpose of peace and mutual aid] would be rational for people of this kind in the conditions stipulated That is, people in a condition of sustained conflict who seek a way to remedy the drawbacks to their the criterion that it is (potentially) applicable to every society in order to measure freedom (see Jack man, 1985, for the issue of comparability).
When referring to the "negative" understanding of freedom, scholars plead for restrictions of governmental actions in order to minimize the probabilities of action constraints upon citizens. In contrast to this, adherents of "positive" freedom accept governmental intervention in order to enable people to act according to their own will (given that the people are able to behave in a self-determined way). The different "camps" emphasize different aspects of the freely acting person. Scholars preferring the negative understanding of liberty focus on the degree by which actors or groups face obstruction from external forces (such as a government imposing restrictions); scholars who like the positive understanding of freedom bring more attention to the degree by which actors or groups act autonomously, even if there is a third party that enables them to act.
The biggest theoretical gap between these camps emerges from the assumption that the understanding of negative freedom implies the incapability of a third party (such as the state) of procuring positive freedom. For scholars adhering to the positive liberty camp, the state is able to create conditions for citizens that result in positive liberty, even if there are inherent problems with action rights (Gartner & Lawson, 2003, p. 407). If, for instance, all people have the same "positive right" to do something, such as get a medical treatment, then a third party or another person or group that granted this right can be held responsible for procuring it. This is contradictory to the rationale of scholars belonging to the negative freedom camp who say that people or groups are only in charge of their own actions and are not allowed to coerce others (which would mean a violation of their freedom, accordingly). In a strict interpretation of negative freedom, "invasive" rights are therefore considered as not being compatible with the ideas of this concept.
Since both approaches refer to different facets of human life, to obstructing actions or fulfilling self-determination, many attempts have been made in the literature to reconcile these contradicting ideas. McCullum (1967) made the most prominent effort to do so; he argued that both dimensions of freedom are part of each situation in which freedom is considered. If, for example, one desires to do something, then it is necessary that he or she has the freedom to do it without being obstructed. In this vein, aspects of freedom refer to the absence of prevention measures on the possible actions of a person.
However, freedom is only conceivable for people if they have the opportunity to act according to their will, regardless of any obstruction that may get in the way. Therefore, even if the approaches of negative and positive freedom differ substantially in their political and social consequences, their weaknesses can be partly mended in theory, provided they are combined with each other. According to McCullum, scholars from the two different camps differ from each other to the degree by which they stress the three variables: "actor", "freedom preventing conditions", and "action opportunities".
In the (philosophical) literature that deals with the general distinction between positive and negative freedoms, recent publications and attempts to measure freedom still distinguish between the objective element of (non-) liberties, such as legal restrictions, and cognitive (partly "psychological") elements such as attitudes. However, measurement ideas that refer to positive freedom are usually developed and applied in accordance with Social Choice Theory. Those authors call attention to both McCullum"s integrative view and to postulations by Sen (1988Sen ( , 1991. This literature deals with axiomatic measures of the availability of choices and seeks to find ranking scores for individual liberties while at the same time making use of measurement issues for negative freedom. Babette, for instance, applied that the measures used in the freedom of choice literature consist of many dimensions of liberty (such as availability of choices or autonomy) and suffer from a lack of validity, accordingly. His main criticism is directed toward the measurement of individual freedom: "In each and all cases constraints are defined in terms of unavailability of the relevant opportunities. In the literature, they do not provide independent information about how a measure of freedom of choice should be constructed" (Babette, 2004, p. 47). Adherents of Social Choice Theory focus on a person"s capability, which identifies the person"s freedom to be useful and create useful things.

The Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model as a Tool towards the Freedom
It is argued that the win-win-win papakonstantinidis concept supports a strong philosophical theoretical infrastructure of independent thought, which is contrasted with one of a bound and measurable material freedom.
According to Peter Graeff (Note 15) valid and reliable tool to measure freedom must reveal congruence between the theoretical ideas and their measurement, even if the analyzed construct is rather broad and general.
We do not agree with the whole view: Concepts such as freedom cannot be measured and give material measurable results. Freedom is not measured. It leaves its philosophical imprint on independent thought. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Note 16), it recedes only to leave room for political freedom.
Obviously, the supposed freedom of material gain is far from philosophical freedom. The supposed absolute freedom based on the quantity of material goods and choices actually leads to the commitment of individualism.
Αs it is difficult to change this relationship between materialism and individualism, we focus on philosophical freedom through self-knowledge that will answer the triple question (1) what is best for me (2) what is best for you (3) what is best for community in which we negotiate a win-win-win reasoning for everyone who negotiates with another in the community.
Thus arises the "freedom" "bound" by individualism and the "unbound" freedom based on self-knowledge and the socialization of the individual within the community.
Win-win-win papakonstantinidis helps you to think socially beyond individualism. It connects freedom with an internal process, the empathy that motivates you to take the place of the other. This is true philosophical freedom, beyond individual commitments.
Empathy is defined as the emotional identification with another person"s mental state, and the understanding of his or her behavior and motivations. Empathy is the ability to recognize, understand, and share the thoughts and feelings of another person, animal, or fictional character. Developing empathy is crucial for establishing relationships and behaving compassionately. It involves experiencing another person"s point of view, rather than just one"s own, and enables prosocial or helping behaviors that come from within, rather than being forced. Empathy helps us cooperate with others, build friendships, make moral decisions, and intervene when we see others being bullied.
Humans begin to show signs of empathy in infancy and the trait develops steadily through childhood and adolescence. Still, most people are likely to feel greater empathy for people like themselves and may feel less empathy for those outside their family, community, ethnicity, or race (Note 17). Since empathy involves understanding the emotional states of other people, the way it is characterized is derived from the way emotions themselves are characterized. If, for example, emotions are taken to be centrally characterized by bodily feelings, then grasping the bodily feelings of another will be central to empathy. On the other hand, if emotions are more centrally characterized by a combination of beliefs and desires, then grasping these beliefs and desires will be more essential to empathy. The ability to imagine oneself as another person is a sophisticated imaginative process. However, the basic capacity to recognize emotions is probably innate and may be achieved unconsciously. Yet it can be trained and achieved with various degrees of intensity or accuracy.
Empathy necessarily has a "more or less" quality. The paradigm case of an empathic interaction, however, involves a person communicating an accurate recognition of the significance of another person's ongoing intentional actions, associated emotional states, and personal characteristics in a manner that the recognized person can tolerate. Recognitions that are both accurate and tolerable are central features of empathy.
The human capacity to recognize the bodily feelings of another is related to one"s imitative capacities, and seems to be grounded in an innate capacity to associate the bodily movements and facial expressions one sees in another with the proprioceptive feelings of producing those corresponding movements or expressions oneself. Humans seem to make the same immediate connection between the tone of voice and other vocal expressions and inner feeling.

Distinctions between Empathy and Related Concepts
Compassion and sympathy are terms associated with empathy. Definitions vary, contributing to the challenge of defining empathy. Compassion is often defined as an emotion people feel when others are in need, which motivates people to help them. Sympathy is a feeling of care and understanding for someone in need. Some include in sympathy an empathic concern, a feeling of concern for another, in which some scholars include the wish to see them better off or happier.
Empathy is distinct also from pity and emotional contagion. Pity is a feeling that one feels towards others that might be in trouble or in need of help as they cannot fix their problems themselves, often described as "feeling sorry" for someone. Emotional contagion is when a person (especially an infant or a member of a mob) imitatively "catches" the emotions that others are showing without necessarily recognizing this is happening (Note 19).
In any case, we have to choose between theory and its measurement in material goods or the equivalent between independence and dependent-predetermined freedom.
Empathy is the philosophical concept that is not measured in material gain. It is that inner impulse that allows you to think about the other person's position, his worries and his dreams.
It is also an element of independent thought that is not imposed by an external factor, it is an internal element.
Empathy is the heart of the model, in the sense that it allows man to triple reasoning, i.e., (1) what is best for me (2) what is best for you (3) what is best for community in which we negotiate, that is a win-win-win reasoning for everyone who negotiates with another in the community.
Thus arises a win-win-win inner freedom with an immeasurable result, which at its limit is identified with the complete independence of the soul and the spirit.
The above are reflected in the two equivalent equations ( )