Adverse Selection of Voluntary Health Insurance Scheme Proposed by the Hong Kong Government

Ka Kit Man


In response to increasing public heath expenditure, the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR Government) published a consultation document in October 2010 proposing a government-regulated “Voluntary Health Insurance Scheme”. The present study conducts game theoretic analysis and reveals that, under specific information structure, the implementation of such a proposal would result in adverse selection in medical insurance market, resulting in outcomes in opposition to the government’s intention.

Full Text:




  • There are currently no refbacks.

Copyright (c) 2017 Journal of Economics and Public Finance

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Copyright © SCHOLINK INC.   ISSN 2377-1038 (Print)    ISSN 2377-1046 (Online)