

## *Original Paper*

# The Thought of Event and The Practice of Language—A Comparative Study of Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s Thoughts

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### **Abstract**

*Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein are two of the most important philosophers of twentieth-century philosophy, and their ideas became the founders of two major philosophical traditions (Continental Philosophy and Anglo-Saxon Philosophy). Their ideas were formed on the basis of a common problematic consciousness, i.e. a critique of the philosophy of subjectivity. So on this basis, it is possible to seek the intrinsic relationship between the two views, from which we can get a glimpse of the two philosophers’ different answers to the common problem and seek the possibility of mutual dialog.*

### **Keywords**

*Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, thoughts*

## **1. A Critique of the Philosophy of Subjectivity**

Heidegger and Wittgenstein belong to the two major philosophical traditions of 20th century philosophy, but they share the same sense of problem, that is, they both criticize the modern principle. This modern principle is the principle of subjectivity.

Hegel once realized that the so-called principle of modernity is the thinking of subjectivity, and he said: “The principle of the modern world requires that whatever is to be recognized by everyone must be seen by everyone as entitled to such recognition. “(Hegel, 1991, p. 355)

At the heart of this “freedom of subjectivity” is the idea that all beliefs need to undergo a subjective critique. That is to say, everything must be placed on the subject’s critique and recognition, and only then can the subject’s subjective recognition be satisfied. This also means that the principle of subjectivity requires “self-certification.” This principle of “self-confirmation” was once expressed by Kant as.

“The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me.” (Kant, 1999, p. 236) (B132)

The implication of this statement is that all appearances, as heterogeneous to the I, can only be recognized and “exist” through the corroboration of the “I think”, so that So, “I think” is not merely an epistemological principle; it has essentially risen to be an existential corroboration, and through the mediation of the “I”, all the “Not-I” outside of the I can be recognized as “I”. Through the mediation of the “I”, all the “Not-I” outside of the I can be corroborated by the “I”, and thus qualify for “existence”. Therefore, Kant declared that one should boldly use one’s own reason to criticize everything, and that neither religion nor the polity is exempt from criticism.

And this principle of subjectivity proclaims an era in which the demands of subjectivity and individuality need to be met, and it presents a flair for individual rationality. It essentially reflects the significance of the community and the individual in the modern context, where the individual is no longer bound by the community, but on the contrary, it is independent of the community, and has its own self-worth.

However, this is accompanied by the ambivalence of the notion of the “individual”. On the one hand, the “individual” becomes an “individual” only when it is recognized by the Other, and if it is not recognized as an “individual”, it is not recognized as an “individual”. On the one hand, it is only through the recognition of the Other that the “individual” becomes an “individual”; if the recognition of the Other is left, the “individual” becomes a natural, empty individual, and loses its “individuality” in the social sense. On the other hand, the individual seeks its own validation, and this very activity of validation expresses itself as the elimination of the heterogeneity of the “object”, transforming it into an “object” that belongs to me, and this very activity loses the richer dimension of possibility. On the contrary, such an activity is precisely an attempt to suffocate all possibilities in order to achieve absolute, perfect self-confirmation. But then, with the loss of possibilities, with the ultimate realization of self-certification, the self- death as an isolated monad, because the individual can plan himself only by possibility. Self-confirmation, therefore, is tantamount to a process of self-extinction.

In Descartes, such metaphors are presented in a philosophical way, and when Descartes seeks to doubt everything in order to obtain absolute certainty, the result of such an activity is nothing but an isolated monad. Descartes only through unconditional recognition of the existence of God can the “I” be recognized. This is the necessity of the Cartesian cycle. Otherwise, “I” as an isolated monad would be pure being and nothing, and it would be precisely empty. And such a process is precisely expressed in the inherent negativity of “self-certification”, which precisely negates itself.

Heidegger clearly realized the limitations of “philosophy of subjectivity”, and such limitations are precisely related to the problem, which is not only a philosophical problem, but also a problem of “existence”. This critique of subjectivity focuses on the critique of “technology”.

In the discussion of the abandonment by being in Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)), he reduces the problem of the philosophy of subjectivity to the problems of “Machination” and “Lived experience”.

He argues that in this philosophy of subjectivity,

“The abandonment of beings by being: the fact that being has withdrawn from beings, and beings have first of all (through Christianity) become mere things made by another being. The supreme being, as cause of all beings, took over the essence of being. These beings, formerly made by a creator God, then became the dominion of humanity, in as much as beings are now taken only in their objectivity and come under human domination. The beingness of beings thereby fades into a “logical form,” into what is thinkable by a thinking which is itself ungrounded.” (Heidegger, 2012, p. 111) (§53)

In the philosophy of subjectivity, the subject seeks his own validation, which is expressed in the asphyxiation of the heterogeneous, of the possible, so that he internalizes the homogeneous functioning of the self and realizes “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations,” which is essentially a process of control. This process, in essence, is a process of “control”, in which the state of existence of the Being fades into a purely “logical form”.

The so-called “control” is an attempt to describe the process of control of the subject over the object, which is realized with the process of “calculation”. The “control” and “calculation” here are not purely cognitive processes; on the contrary, they are also a state of existence.

Such a philosophy of subjectivity, such a system of planning, is precisely a “the lack of a sense of plight as the greatest plight,” because in the self-certifying logic of subjectivity, everything can be regarded as controllable and calculable, and there is no need to ask for a kind of “foundation” that is beyond oneself, and this is also a loss of the understanding of “being”. Heidegger points out:

“In the Middle Ages behind the *ordo* and the *analogia entis*, in modernity behind objectivity as the basic form of actuality and thus of beingness.” (Heidegger, 2012, p. 100) (§61)

“The self-certainty of no longer letting oneself be called; the obduracy against all intimations; the inability to wait; always only calculating.” (Heidegger, 2012, p. 94) (§56)

Accompanying the system is the “lived experience”.

What is “lived experience”? Experience is a product of the philosophy of subjectivity, which no longer focuses on the meditation of the event, but only on the lived experience of the phenomenon created by calculation, by control.

Heidegger’s “machination-lived experience” relationship is a philosophical-historical one, in which he sees seeking as the abandonment by being, but only in the Christian philosophical interpretation of being as “created being,” which is potentially embedded in it. This is the pure dichotomy between God and creation, with God appearing as an engineer to create something out of nothing, and creation as a purely dominated role by God.

Whereas in Descartes, “The step taken by Descartes is already a first consequence, the decisive one, the effective one, whereby machination comes into sovereignty as a transformed truth (correctness), i.e., as certainty.” (Heidegger, 2012, p. 104) (§67)

And similar to Heidegger, Wittgenstein’s thought presents the same critique of the philosophy of subjectivity. In Wittgenstein’s earlier and later thought, a structure of apparent opposition and substantive unity is presented.

In his early thought, he creates the idea of a logical “world”, and he takes Frege’s “first-order logic” as a criterion and uses it as an existential criterion to create a purely logical “world”. This is a way of “Procrustes” in order to create a logical world.

As he puts it:

“It portrays it logically.” (Wittgenstein, 1984, p. 8e)

“Now once more it looks as if all relations must be logical in order for their existence to be guaranteed by that of the sign.” (Wittgenstein, 1984, p. 8e)

And so it is with the relation of propositions to facts; propositions form a world by way of language. Here the relation between the world and language is reversed; it is not the world that creates language, but rather language that creates a “world”. This world is the propositionalized or logicalized world.

Therefore, we can say that Wittgenstein’s relationship between language and the world is precisely a continuation of the philosophy of subjectivity, that is, it is expressed as the subject’s localization of the world in order to control the world and to emasculate the richness and possibility of the world.

Thus *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* tries to show:

“1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.” (Wittgenstein, 2021, p. 58)

But if this were all, we might decide that Wittgenstein is the heir to the philosophy of subjectivity. But such a view would be one-sided, for Wittgenstein once bluntly stated that *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is a book of “ethics”.

The meaning of “ethics” here is that in the arrangement of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the “logic” of the main part is just a scaffolding, and Wittgenstein asks us to throw it away. Wittgenstein asks us to throw them away, but he has a positive attitude towards the transcendental mystical realm, which is regarded as “the unspeakable”. It includes aesthetics, ethics, traditional metaphysics, religion, and so on. These are not about “facts” but about the meaning of the world. And the meaning of the world concerns the “subject of will”. The proposal of the domain of mystery requires us to go beyond the logical analysis of the assertion of states of affairs and to see the world in the context of ourselves and the world as a whole, that is, to see the world from a timeless perspective.

But this alone does not allow us to say that Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the early period is beyond the realm of the “philosophy of subjectivity,” and that it is only in his transition to the later period that Wittgenstein’s philosophy really tries to break away from the philosophy of subjectivity.

However, in his later thought, there are many differences between the former and the latter, with the former emphasizing a logical view of the world, and the latter attempting to break free from the bounds of logic through forms of life and language games.

But in reality, there is still a unity. As early as in the early Wittgenstein, he once said:

“Isn’t this the reason why men to whom the meaning of life had become clear after long doubting could not say what this meaning consisted in?” (Monk, 1991, p. 142)

This means that the meaning of life is something that cannot be expressed logically; it is not a proposition, but on the contrary, it is a purely practical activity.

Because of this, it can be said that the idea of reinterpreting language in terms of “practice” was already embedded in earlier thought. The philosophy that begins with “practice” goes beyond the path of purely subjective philosophy.

This kind of philosophy beyond subjectivity is expressed in Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the following aspects:

1). Emphasizing the relative certainty of “signposts” to distinguish it from the absolute certainty of Descartes. Wittgenstein has a clear view that language practice is a “signpost”, that is to say, language practice does not seek absolute “truth”, but only obtains relative “reality”. The purpose of “signposts” is to show that our linguistic practice is always concrete, and that signposts guide us to new linguistic activities, and that signposts have relative stability rather than absolute order.

2). The denial of subjectivity for the tracing of sufficient reason. In Kant’s philosophy, Kant points out that the reason for the existence of the transcendental illusion is the infinite retrospection of reason, which seeks to lay the foundation of all the chains of conditions by an unconditioned person. And such unconditioned retrospection is essentially a search for absolute certainty. And Wittgenstein was adamantly opposed to such thinking, saying:

“In that case the explanation is never completed; so, I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!” (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 44e) (PI §87)

And Wittgenstein realizes that such infinite retrospection implies precisely the indeterminacy as well as the emptiness of the subject, saying:

“I believe our main reason for feeling like this was the following fact: that every time some new linguistic phenomenon occurred to us, it could retrospectively show that our previous explanation was unworkable. (We felt that language could always make new, and impossible, demands; and that this made all explanation futile.)” (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 30e)

The subject seeks absolute certainty to ground itself, to realize its own certainty. But Wittgenstein realized that to do so would be to use one’s own certainty against the fluidity of language, which would always make the subject appear to be in a state of denial, rendering all explanations useless, and depriving it of the certainty that it originally sought to achieve. This also hides the fact that the demand for adequate explanation implies a kind of “nihilism”.

3). Emphasize the decoupling of knowledge and certainty. Wittgenstein realized that knowledge is not the same as certainty, and that in the traditional epistemological tradition, the defense of certainty is the same as the defense of knowledge. The absolute certainty that Descartes sought to seek was precisely the possibility of seeking absolute knowledge. But in Wittgenstein's view, the two are fundamentally different. Knowledge is defended in the chain of reasons, and the fact that any knowledge has two possibilities, either true or false, declares that there can be no purely true knowledge. Certainty, on the contrary, is beyond truth and falsehood and is given on the basis of the community's form of life; it is a coercive force beyond the subject that obliges the subject to obey, and under which the truth or falsehood of knowledge is meaningful. Between different linguistic communities, "truth" and "falsehood" become absurd, and on the contrary, people can only condemn each other as infidels and fools. He said:

"611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic." (Wittgenstein, 1972, p. 81e)

It is thus clear that Wittgenstein seeks to go beyond the path of the philosophy of subjectivity to realize a critique of it.

And in the discussion of knowledge and certainty, a structure of intertwined monads and plurality is formed, where on the one hand the forms of life, as accumulated certainty, oblige obedience, and on the other hand within this community is the defense of reasons, which have the possibility of truth and falsehood, and so they are indeterminate again, with a plurality. So, the monism of irrationality and the plurality of rationality are skillfully hooked together.

## **2. Linguistic Practices, The Thoughts of Event, and Manifestation and Concealment Mechanisms**

### *2.1 The Thoughts of Event*

Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein made turns in their philosophical thought throughout their lives. Heidegger's earlier thought is represented by *Being and Time*, while his later thought is represented by *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. At the heart of the *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, in turn, has the word "Event" (Ereignis) as its central word.

But as Heidegger argues, "Event" is as untranslatable as the Greek  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron$  (logos) and the Chinese Tao (way).

This creates a great obstacle to our understanding of the concept. However, in the context of the whole idea of the *Essays on Philosophy*, "Event" is not completely unintelligible. Throughout the book there is a discussion of "Seynsgeschichte" (The History of Being). The central theme of the book is the difference between the first beginning and the other beginning.

The so-called the first beginning refers to the state of abandonment of being, or what Heidegger calls the existential difference of "forgotten being". The first beginning marks the misdirection of traditional metaphysics, that is,

“The more exclusively thinking turns toward beings and seeks for itself a foundation that is most eminently (cf. Descartes and the modern era), all the more decisively does philosophy withdraw from the truth of being.” (Heidegger, 2012, p. 134) (§83)

The leading question of the first beginning, in his view, is “What is Being? The question of the state of being, of existence”. Such an inquiry transforms the question of “being” (Sein) into a discussion of the “state of existence”. From the “state of existence” to the question of the so-called most existential Being, i.e., the question of God. In the modern philosophy of subjectivity, it is transformed into a discussion of the relationship between “object” and “subject”.

In this mode of discussion, philosophers have more often than not lost the understanding of “the truth of being,” and the discussion based on the direct pursuit of the revealed “state of being” is fundamentally different from the discussion based on the “the truth of being”. By directly pursuing the discussion based on the manifested “state of being,” one fundamentally forgets being.

On the other hand, the other beginning is to experience the truth of being, to inquire about existence, and to build a foundation for the essential nature of existence. In this process, “Da-sein” is needed as a special event for the essential appearance of existence, so that it can make a courageous leap into “nothing” and realize “nothingness”. The “no-sein” is a special event of the essential appearance of “existence,” which makes it take a brave leap into “nothing,” realizing the “occurrence of nothingness,” throwing itself into being, and realizing a kind of throwing-in-and-throwing-back movement.

In this process, this “Da” becomes the sheltering place where appear event, and the place where existence manifests itself. The manifestation of existence is a mechanism of the dual operation of existence that clarifies itself and obscures itself. In this mechanism, Da-sein is attributed to being, namely the essence of being.

The “interplay” from the “first beginning” to the “other beginning” of existence is the key point of the historicity of existence.

Compared with the earlier thought, in order not to be misunderstood as subjectivism (i.e., Being and Time is often misunderstood as a variant of the philosophy of subjectivity), the later Heidegger’s thought highlights the human being as the guardian of Being, and emphasizes that the human being is attributed to the essence of being, which Heidegger calls “the belonging to being”.

In Heidegger’s view, the traditional philosophy of subjectivity is still essentially discussed from the perspective of the totality of Being or the state of Being, whether it is the body, the mind, or the spirit, all pointing to the same point of view, that is, “all of this indicates the fact that something which is indeed the human being, but which nevertheless surpasses and reaches beyond the human being, comes into play each time for the determination of beings as such and as a whole.” (Heidegger, 2012, p. 248) (§193)

And this discussion of Being is a discussion of the manifestness of beings, which are the basis for building up a representation of being, where the seeking of being is a kind of correctness in the sense of

knowledge. The “correctness” here is exactly what traditional metaphysics tries to seek, the conformity between existence and concepts. And this correctness is precisely the popular conception of truth.

In the later Heideggerian thought, then, the central point is the discussion of the problem of “appearance and concealment” based on the “original thought”.

In the above popular view of truth, it is a philosophy of “manifestation”, and Heidegger analyzes this “manifestation” by taking Hegel’s philosophy as an example, and he says:

“Here truth becomes the certainty that develops into an unconditioned trust in spirit and so unfolds for the first time as spirit in its absolute-ness. Beings are completely transposed into objectivity, and objectivity is in no way overcome through “sublation”; on the contrary, objectivity extends to the representing I and to the relation of representing the object and representing the representation.” (Heidegger, 2012, p. 159)

In this description, Hegel’s dialectic realizes a description of manifoldness that incorporates all possibilities, Heidegger says:

“Machination as the basic character of beingness now lapses into the form of the subject-object dialectic, which, as absolute, plays out to their end and orders together all possibilities of every known realm of beings.” (Heidegger, 2012, p. 159)

In the dialectic there is no longer any hidden place, everything is revealed and everything is clarified by the concept, so that the concept illuminates everything as if it were light, which is the ultimate goal that rationalist philosophy tries to achieve.

When Hegel argues that consciousness no longer externally provides him with a measure, but that consciousness provides the measure for itself, it means that consciousness has a capacity to break through all darkness, all obscurity, and to achieve ultimate clarification.

Thus, when Hegel mocks Schelling, “all cows are black-this is cognition naively reduced to vacuity.” Hegel himself is caught in the predicament of “everything is white. Here all possibilities disappear, all uncertainty disappears, and there is only absolute self-certainty”.

And this is precisely what makes Hegel miss the “truth” that is more primordial than the truth of such appearances. The operation of the present is precisely “self-clarifying self-obscuring,” in which “obscuring” is more primordial than “clarifying.”

## 2.2 Linguistic Practices

Wittgenstein had similar thoughts to Heidegger’s deeper pursuit of the “hidden”. For the later Wittgenstein, he inverted the relationship between propositions and linguistic practices, and no longer used propositions to forcefully constrain language, but rather linguistic practices are more primordial. The originality of linguistic practices is rooted in the forms of our lives.

In his discussion of certainty, Wittgenstein seeks to distinguish the difference between the “defense of knowledge” and “certainty,” which is a hidden, coercive force on the basis of which our rational justification, the defense of knowledge, is possible. It is only on the basis of this compelling force that our rational justification, our intellectual defense, is possible.



He compares the logic-oriented rationalist tradition to the “crystal of purity,” saying:

“Thinking is surrounded by a nimbus. Its essence, logic, presents an order: namely, the a priori order of the world; that is, the order of possibilities, which the world and thinking must have in common” (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 49e) (PI §97)

He sees thought as the pure crystal that precedes and permeates all experience, the a priori order of the world, which becomes a super-order when we think in this way, and through which the philosopher believes that it is only by virtue of this clear, intelligible order that we can clarify the meaning of language.

In contrast to this “pure crystal,” everyday language is “rough ground,” and this rough ground is rough in relation to the “pure crystal,” and if one takes the “pure crystal” to be the “pure crystal,” then the “pure crystal” will be the “pure crystal,” and the “pure crystal” will be the “pure crystal. If “pure crystals” are regarded as “white”, then “rough ground” is precisely hidden from the rationalist thinker’s field of vision.

The “visible” side is the expression of language, the formalized system of symbols. The “hidden” side is the “practical” activity of man. Philosophers tend to seek the “obvious” and ignore the “hidden”, so they play the “obvious” to the extreme.

Wittgenstein once commented on a poem called “Count Eberhard’s Hawthorn”, in which he described the story of a soldier who took a leaf from a hawthorn bush in his hometown and went out to fight. Upon returning home he planted the branch in his family’s land. He remembers it under the hawthorn tree in his old age.

Wittgenstein read it and said:

“And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be unutterably contained in what has been uttered!” (Monk, 1991, p. 151)

This poem describes one’s existence, one’s life. If we try to “say” them, it may seem that we are making them more visible and clearer, but in fact we are losing what is inside them. And only if we do not say the unsayable, we will not lose anything.

In the poem, the author describes the experiences of a person’s life, and these experiences are about the meaning of life, which cannot be expressed through logical propositions, but can only be “lived” or “practiced” by the person. On the contrary, he can only “live” it through people, or “practice” it. Practice and propositions present a dual mechanism of hiddenness, whereby practice is a hidden activity in relation to rationalist philosophy, but it is in fact practice that reveals the language game of our propositions.

So, practice, the meaning of life, is precisely “blind”, “obscure” (in relation to the so-called pure crystalline logic), and it can only be invested blindly.

### 3. Heidegger's "The Last God" and Wittgenstein's "God"

#### 3.1 Heidegger's "The Last God"

In Contributions to Philosophy, "The Last God" ("Die Letzte Gott") is the shortest section, but the meaning is the richest. Heidegger has said:

"The god wholly other than past ones and especially other than the Christian one." (Heidegger, 2012, p. 319)

But in what sense is the "Christian God" spoken of here? Is it in the sense of faith, or in the sense of philosophical argument? But either way, "God" is understood as a supreme reality.

In Heidegger's view, God is the earliest ground of "existential-theology-logic", which becomes the ground of existence of all beings, and this ground also leads to the fact that "God" is nothing but a special kind of Being. The difference between existence and existence explored in traditional metaphysics is based on this difference, i.e., one side is the supreme ground of existence, and the other side is the created, limited existence. The tendency behind such a "God" is precisely nihilistic.

Heidegger's "last God" refers to the transcendence and uniqueness of "being" and the richness of its possibilities. God is not something outside of the here-and-now, but rather the last God must be presented as what is, that is, as what is. In Heidegger's view, it is impossible for human beings to kill God, and the retreat of the gods is the result of the hidden activity of existence, not the result of human beings killing God.

Therefore, the relationship between "the death of God" and "nihilism" is not that "the death of God" leads to "nihilism", rather it should be that "the death of God" leads to "nihilism", but that "the death of God" leads to "nihilism". "On the contrary, it should be that "the death of God" is a manifestation of nihilism.

The "last God" is the "existential-theological-logical" that escapes the traditional metaphysics, because the Christian God ultimately oriented the modern Enlightenment rationality and philosophy of subjectivity in the history of metaphysics, making the pursuit of absolute certainty of subjectivity become mainstream, and this certainty is realized through mathematics. became dominant, and this certainty was realized through mathematics, calculation, and scheming, and truth was completely suffocated in this operation.

The result of this is the flight of the gods. And there is an escape from all computation, because computation is the subject's relationship to the object's measurement. In "death" everything is dissolved, and all Being is denied. Only by understanding the meaning of death can we comprehend the hints given to us by the God of the end.

Therefore, Heidegger's "Last God" is closely related to "the original appearance of existence" and "the realization of existence". "As the primordial nothing, it is different from all existents, which have a grip and a base". However, when we are confronted with nothing, we are afraid of it, and we can realize existence only when we bravely leap into it. Therefore, it can be said that being are strange or bizarre.

And that is the silence through which the Last God passes. But the philosophers of the past have been eager to grasp existence, to “alienate” it into Being, and to create all sorts of philosophical categories.

The question here is, what is the relationship between man and the Last God? Is man unconditionally subordinate to the “last god”? Or does man use his own reason to measure the “last God”?

Here, Heidegger argues that we cannot define man in terms of the relationship between “man and animal” but can only understand man in terms of the relationship between “man and God”. Fundamentally, “Da-sein” is embedded in existence and becomes the foundation of its very being, making itself the abyssal ground (Abgrund). On the other hand, however, this “the abyssal ground” is precisely what empowers man to throw himself into nothingness, and it is in the process of Da-sein throwing itself away and beyond throwing itself back the “Da-sein” becomes the true “Da-sein”. This process is called “Da-sein essentially occurs only as belonging to the event”.

### 3.2 Wittgenstein's “God”

Similar to Heidegger's thinking about “the last God”, Wittgenstein also tried to balance the relationship between man and God. Wittgenstein showed an ambivalence towards Christianity, he was against the church and the system of Christianity as a theoretical doctrine, but he strongly identified with Christianity in the sense of faith.

Wittgenstein said in 1946:

“I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines all useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of your life.” (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 53e)

Wittgenstein tries to convey that faith can only be acquired through practice and not through any theoretical explanation.

Drury (1928) records a small incident in his book in which Wittgenstein said to him:

“The symbolism of Christianity is wonderful beyond words, but when people try to make a philosophical system out of it I find it disgusting.” (1984, p. 86)

And talked about Tolstoy, arguing that his novels were written for all people. And mentions his favorite story, The Three Hermits. And the story of the three hermits is highly metaphorical, a story that creates two characters, a bishop who expands on religious texts, and a hermit who is so silent that he even makes mistakes in the way he prays. But in the end the hermit becomes a saint. If we look at Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, it is easy to see why Wittgenstein loved this story. Here the chattering bishop symbolizes the philosopher who is good at constructing theoretical systems. The silent hermit, on the other hand, is a reflection of himself, i.e., the real linguistic activity (God) is not “sayable” (interpretable). For religion is unspeakable, just as everyday language only shows itself as it shows itself, and is not open to interpretation. He can only show itself in practice.

Here, Wittgenstein's “God” is similar to Heidegger's “Last God” in that neither of them can be logically stated or logically prescribed, but rather they are both in a state of obscurity.

In fact, the reason why thinking about God constitutes the common ground between the two great philosophers is that God, as the ultimate ground of rationalism, becomes the basis for understanding

reason. How to understand “God” becomes how to understand “reason,” “appearance,” and the entire metaphysical tradition.

In Heidegger’s view, “the last God” and “Da-sein” are two-way interactions, and the realization of “the last God” is precisely the courageous leap of Da-sein into nothingness, the realization of It is this brave leap into nothing, the realization of nothingness, the realization of the meaning of death, that leads to the realization of the God of subjectivity, the God who eliminates all calculation. In Wittgenstein’s case, the realization of “God” can only be achieved by blindly plunging into the Christian form of life and eliminating all rational thought about God.

If Heidegger tries to balance the relationship between “God” and “man” through the unfounded “man,” Wittgenstein tries to balance the relationship between “God” and “man” through an obligatory force (i.e., the form of life). Wittgenstein balances the relationship here through a compelling force (i.e., the form of life) of monism and a plurality under the form of life as a defense of knowledge.

The reason for the need to rebalance the relationship between “man” and “God” here is that in post-existentialism or post-metaphysics, it is not a regression to a medieval structure, but on the contrary, it explicitly criticizes the subjectivity while at the same time it needs to defend the significance of the subject, to better balance the subject and the Higher. better balance between the subject and the Higher. Their reflections are reflected in a similar philosophical program within the perspective of the problem of modernity, the transition from traditional philosophy to a post-philosophical path.

#### 4. Conclusion

In this paper, we discuss the similarities between Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s philosophies from three aspects, and their central problematic is their critique of the philosophy of subjectivity as it has developed in recent times. From this critique, we extend their discussion of the relationship between “appearing and concealing” and the relationship between “God” and “Human”, which ultimately leads to the discussion of the “Freedom”. Wittgenstein and Heidegger give two different philosophical programs to deal with the crisis of modernity brought about by the philosophy of subjectivity, but because they have the same problematic consciousness, they also have a basis for comparison.

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