

## Original Paper

# Two Wars in the Order of Time: Cyprus, 1974, Ukraine, 2022

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Received: May 29, 2022

Accepted: June 12, 2022

Online Published: June 17, 2022

doi:10.22158/jrph.v5n3p21

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/jrph.v5n3p21>

### Abstract

*Two cases are studied, the first being the invasion of Cyprus by Turkiye in 1974, when the Greek-Cypriot community wanted to integrate the island into mainland Greece, threatening the rise of Turkish Cypriots. The government of Turkiye invaded the island, conquering a portion of the territory for its supporters, believing to resolve the issue culminating in decades of conflict between their communities whose past dreams do not coincide with the present. The second event is Vladimir Putin's Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, motivated by the irreversible process of the dissolution of the former USSR and the attraction of Ukrainians to the western orbit. From a notion of the strangeness of contemporaneity, anchored in a glorious but unattainable past, events that erupt in contemporaneity are simultaneously current and anachronistic. Based on a premise of the past and defending ethnic Russians, Putin recovers the fantasy of a Russian empire encompassing tsarist, communist, and orthodox religion from the past. In Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriots dreamed of integration into the respective motherland, but in both cases, contemporary and historic irruption of the past possess the unbeatable force of a cosmic event.*

### Keywords

*history, contemporaneity, past, invasion, war, culture, economic sanctions*

### 1. Introduction

We discussed the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 and that of Cyprus by Turkiye in 1974, correlating military operations, old motivations, and current consequences.

Roland Barthes (2017), as cited in Agamben, wrote that the “contemporary is untimely,” and the same Giorgio Agamben (2017) adds that this untimeliness is due to his dualism. As also cited in Agamben, Nietzsche completes by saying that belonging to the present does not entirely coincide. The present has one foot in an exhilarating and nostalgic past that will never be fulfilled. This unique relationship with time, which cannot escape the nostalgic past or the incongruous present, produces a sudden irruption.

For François Hartog, past, present and future are a dark, unknown, and uncertain tunnel, advocating a disaster that may avoid or may not be. The march of events cannot stop. In this regard, the Greek playwright Aeschylus (525-456) wrote in his play, *Agamemnon*: “Now things are where they are. And will end where they are destined to end.” (2009)

The Ukrainian conflict surprised analysts when, after a month of military operations, the Russians made slow progress in the face of growing Ukrainian resistance. In the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, similarly baffled analysts watched the Turkish military plan complex operations slowly progress. In the Russian and Turkish cases, the end of military operations resulted in a narrative reconfiguration different from the Western-Cartesian logic, mediating the proposed objectives with the results achieved. (Lindsey, 2001)

## **2. Case Study I: The Battle for Cyprus**

The Ottoman Empire dominated the Greek island of Cyprus from 1571 until 1878, when Egypt and Sudan became English protectorates, upsetting the Turkish Power. After the conflict, England annexed the island, protecting the Turkish community from the threat of enosis.

Cypriot communities have coped well with possible outbursts of violence. In the 20th century, the replacement of the Ottoman empire by the secular state of Kemal Atatürk led Turkish-Cypriots to desire Taksim accession to the Turkish homeland.

The Greek-Cypriots wanted enosis, the incorporation of the island into mainland Greece. Cyprus' key position for British rule in the Middle East made its administration encourage an ethnic division between communities. The Turkish-Cypriot minority was protected by the British, while Greek-Cypriots founded the EOKA in the 1950s, fighting Britain. (Holland, 1998) Orthodox Archbishop Makarios III was elected president, and his deputy was Turkish Cypriot Fazıl Kutsiok. Interethnic conflicts did not end with the peace guarantees agreement signed in 1959. (Holland, 1998) For Western authorities, Makarios was a controversial entity because of his religious and political beliefs and left-leaning toward libertarian and communist regimes. (Borowiec, 2000)

The Cypriot Republic was born in 1960 under the suspicion of the communities. As Makarios approached the USSR, it was harassed by the Turkish Cypriots while the Greek Cypriots reduced the political power of their neighbors, spreading violence (Wenzke & Lindley, 2009). Concerned about the escalation, Turkey unleashed a media campaign calling for military intervention. The right-wing Greek military junta deposed Papadopoulos and enthroned Brigadier Ioannides. Repressing the left and its opponents, he encouraged Cypriot enosis but feared fighting the Turks. On July 15, 1974, EOKA B, supported by the Greek junta, deposed the Makarios government, instituting enosis. Türkiye sent decided to invade Cyprus. (Erickson & Mesut, 2020)

The island passed into the American orbit during the Cold War, whose diplomacy with Henry Kissinger succeeded in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, failing to pacify Cyprus. Some analysts develop conspiracy theories to explain the failure. Others consider them “omission rather than a sin of commission.” (Wenzke & Lindley, 2009). Britain and the United States limited Cyprus' independence to protect their

regional interests. Despite the ethnic conflict, the island continued to be a NATO and US Government, a military bastion against communism. (O'Malley & Craig, 2001)

The fall of the Greek military dictatorship brought democracy back. However, the Karamanlis government refused the war option against Türkiye, which decided to invade Cyprus in Operation *Attila*, which they called "intervention" or "second peace operation." However, for the Greek Cypriots, it was an invasion. (Lindsey, 2001)

### **3.The Turkish Invasion**

In a complex operation on July 20, 1974, well-equipped Turkish troops landed on Cyprus, defeating the Greeks with little heavy weaponry with some difficulty. The Turks violated the ceasefire mandated by the UN Security Council by consolidating their beachhead with air support. However, the Greek defense hindered their progression by taking advantage of the mountainous terrain and the dispersion of the attackers (Erickson & Mesut, 2020). In the end, the Turks controlled 1/3 of the territory of Cyprus and held it back. The fragility of the peacekeepers failed to enforce an effective ceasefire. (Fortna, 2004)

Western observers criticized the Turks' slow tactic of violently expelling the Greek population or out of fear of reprisals claiming self-defense. The mass of dispossessed refugees pressed on the Greek-Cypriot side, resulting in massacres and deprivation for innocent Turks. (Hemsel, 2016)

#### *3.1 Consequences for the Civilian Population*

Turkey sent Turkish settlers to Cyprus, avoiding annexing it to its territory, thus avoiding more significant international disapproval. Turkish Cypriots realized Türkiye's instability created in 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, whose recognition was denied by the EU and the UN despite being recognized by Türkiye. It was condemned in 1996 by the European Court of Human Rights as an "occupying power in Cyprus," and the EU and the UN ordered the withdrawal of Turkish troops and settlers, the return of Greek territories and goods.

In 1971 Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot population was 80%, while the Turkish-Cypriot population was 20%. In 2001, the percentages of the Ukrainian and Russian population approached the Cypriot population in 1974. If Ukrainians constituted 77.8% of the total population, ethnic Russians were 17.3%. (Borowiec, 2000)

According to a UN report, Türkiye sent settlers from Anatolia to Cyprus, claiming that colonization is not a state policy but an individual decision of each settler. However, the report confirms the existence of a Turkish legal apparatus supporting these people (UHHRU). After the Russian occupation, Crimea received large numbers of Russian immigrants residing in strategic urban centers such as Simferopol, supported by Russian legislation that favors place of residence. (UHHRU, 2015)

#### 4. Case Study 2 Ukraine: Invasive Peace Operation

In 1948, a secret CIA report informed that Europe weakened after the world conflict and would be easy prey for an invasion of the fierce Red Army, supported by the local communist parties. In the context of the Truman Doctrine, NATO emerged in 1948 as a western military barrier defending Europe against invasion (Kaplan & Morris, 2007). With the dismantling of the Moscow regime in 1988-1989 under Western pressure and the massive failures of the regime, NATO was supported by European and North American interests. Its communist counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, closed its doors. (Plokh, 2014)

Vladimir Putin's rise to power in Russia has revived the symbols of Russian national pride. It was a robust regime supported by the Russian Orthodox Church. Some films, such as *Vikings*, 2016, showing the exploits of Prince (and Russian saint) Vladimir, endorse the Great Russian nationalist and chauvinist narrative. In an article, Vladimir Putin glorified the imperialism of Czar Alexander III, conqueror of Crimea:

He always felt a tremendous personal responsibility for the country's destiny: he fought for Russia on battlefields, and after becoming the ruler, he did everything possible for the progress and strengthening of the nation, to protect it from turmoil, internal and external threats. (Moss, 2019)

The end of the USSR threw many republics out of Russian orbit. In 1991, tensions between Ukraine and Russia prompted Boris Yeltsin to threaten to amputate Crimea and Ukraine's Donbas, which Putin would carry out years later. With Western support, the overthrow of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich on February 22, 2014, led to a de-communization of Ukraine that distanced itself from Russia. (Challis, 2016)

The government of President Volodymyr Zelensky, elected with an anti-corruption platform (although cited in the Pandora Papers), called for the country's urgent membership in NATO for military coverage (The Guardian, 2016). Putin annexed Crimea maintaining a war of attrition in Donbas, and, in 2021, has concentrated troops on the border with Ukraine. As an escalation of the issue, the Biden administration threatened the Russians with an economic war. Armed with data from American intelligence services, he warned of the imminent Russian invasion while Ukraine minimized the danger by receiving Western weaponry. On February 21, 2022, Ukrainian resistance stubborn against Russia, which invaded Ukraine in a slow advance. The Russian strategy to minimize losses was to level cities as in previous wars. A strategic decision that disturbs Western observation is Russian planning to leave open Ukraine's western borders through which refugees leave and Western supplies and volunteers enter.

The Putin government has banned the term war in Ukraine. It referred to the hostilities as a "special operation" and "peacekeeping," claiming, like the Turks in 1974, to protect resident Russians from threats of ethnic cleansing. The Russian censor, Roskomnadzor, banned the expressions invasion, attack, or declaration of war, punishing those who did so. (Al Jazeera, 28/03-2022)

## 5. URSS, Cyprus and War Crimes

The USSR preferred that Cyprus and the government of Archbishop Makarios remain in line. There were many strategic reasons to fear an alignment with NATO or that it would invade the island. Cyprus in 1956 was the base from which France and Britain attacked Egypt defending their imperial interests in the Suez Canal. The USSR wanted to prevent Cyprus in a strategic Mediterranean position, supported by the West, from threatening Russian navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the straits, and the Black Sea. The plans were threatened by violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities backed by the interests of the Greek and Turkish States on the island.

On June 5, 1964, the US government of President Lyndon Johnson warned Türkiye that an invasion of the island would not be tolerated. However, Türkiye decided to use military force to resolve the Cypriot issue. American maneuvers lost strength in the face of Ankara's firm *desideratum*. The failed attempt at the Acheson plan called for partitioning the island, or double enosis, a solution that did not satisfy either side. He divided the Cypriot territory between the two communities (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013). The independence of Cyprus, ruled by the moderate Archbishop Makarios, was vital for the USSR. Between 1971 and 1973, it reinforced the leader's security, a target of Turkish extremists and Greeks such as Nicolas Sampson. The 1967 military coup in Athens started an allied US military dictatorship by politically isolating Archbishop Makarios. His moderate and non-aligned policy led Greek generals to accuse him of treason to Hellenism.

On the other hand, the Turkish economy was modeled by the West, having significant economic dependence on the United States. In the 1960s, American aid dwindled, and the Turkish government turned its attention to the USSR. For Sakkas and Zhukova, Henry Kissinger decided to appease Türkiye, an important ally. Furthermore, he reluctantly gave the go-ahead for the invasion. In the words of President Gerald Ford, there was no American reason to stop Turkey from conquering a third of Cyprus (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013)

In the invasion of Cyprus, as in Ukraine, war crimes occurred on both sides, both by official military forces and civilians from both communities in struggle. The Ukrainian and Cypriot civilian population was the target of brutal reprisals. The former Geneva Convince 147 defines *war crimes* as "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including ... willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person".

(<https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml>)

The killing of imprisoned hostages in the Cyprus war is considered a war crime. However, the collective memory of both communities always refers to the reprisals they carried out as initiated by the other side. (Bryant & Papadakis, 2012)

## 6. Embargo and sanctions against Turkiye.

An international economic embargo determined by the UN applied against the Republic of Northern Cyprus consists of measures determined by the European Union and supported by the European Court of Justice in 1994. (Wikipedia) The persistent economic crisis plaguing the country results from its association with the weak Turkish economy. For Guncavdi and Kucukciftci, the country's economy that only Turkiye recognizes was hit hard by the sanctions, especially those on-air connections. If suspended, they would have an immediate beneficial effect. Income from tourism would raise per capita income. The resulting sustainable growth would attract robust foreign investment to the isolated country.

The embargo in the military field was a severe logistical blow for the Turkish armed forces. Their maintenance depended on the supply of American spare parts. The result was that one in two Turkish military aircraft cannibalized while keeping the other operational. The country sought new suppliers by raising defense spending. The economic embargo was supposed to lead the Turkish government to collaborate with the Cypriot central government, which it did not. Its effects alienated Turkiye, a staunch US ally, whose position on NATO's southern flank was vital to the institution's security. Despite the United States lifting the embargo in 1978, Turkish resentment against Washington persisted. (Mahmut, 2014)

## 7. Embargoes and Sanctions: Drugs or Placebos?

Embargoes and sanctions are complex and often contradictory policies in a globalized world. The connected world economies with financial mechanisms that an action against a powerful one like Russia provokes unpredictable reactions in the others. (Galbert, 2015)

For some analysts, there are differences between the US-led bloc. Integrated by GB, Canada, Japan, and Australia is cohesive around the economic embargo. Unlike some European countries that condemn Russian actions, they oscillate between repelling the fait accompli of the invasion and antagonizing Russia. The results could be disastrous for their complex economies, shaken by the Covid 19 pandemic and dependent on Russian oil and gas.

The economic sanctions adopted by the Obama administration against Russia in 2014 on the Crimea issue lasted until 2022 as the best option. The measures employed by the Biden administration, on the one hand, severely hit the Russian economy. On the other hand, they threaten European stability. In 2015 alone, Europeans lost 30 billion euros in exports to Russia in the wake of the Crimean invasion.

In 2022, after successive transatlantic economic measures, the Russian desire to conquer or destabilize Ukraine remains unchanged. The weaker economies that suffered embargoes, such as Iran and North Korea or Turkiye, did not have any perverse effect on the implementing countries, such as the USA or members of the EU.

The Russian ruble was worth less than 1 US cent, or 0.007 rubles, in March. Now, at the end of May 2022, it is one of the world's most valued currencies, something around 15% against the US currency.

Measures such as banning Russian citizens from selling rubles to buy Anthony Blinken saw foreign currency as “currency manipulation.” The freezing of foreign exchange reserves at a crucial moment was decisive in overcoming the exodus of capital and in financing military actions. Despite the severe obstacles that hit the Russian economy, the high price of commodities such as oil, now paid in rubles, favors Russia. However, sanctions still cause significant damage. (BBCNews, May 31, 2022).

## **8. Russia and Its Tradition of Resilience**

The sanctions applied to the Ukrainian issue, according to Galbert, shook the Russian economy and caused significant losses. However, the resulting collateral damage to European economies is not tiny. Like the sanctions applied in 1974 against Turkiye, the objective is to bring Russia to the negotiating table, which seems to be a goal still far from being achieved. (Galbert, 2015)

The first Russian internal reactions to Western sanctions, in addition to rising inflation and a sense of panic, for in 2016, the ruble returned to being stable, and in 2017 the World Bank reported that the perverse effects were over.

The Russian sectors most affected by the sanctions were defense, finance, oil, and gas. A few months after being hit by the sanctions, they were operating normally. For many analysts, these indicators demonstrated, for those unfamiliar with Russian and USSR history, the remarkable ability of its people to withstand a significant crisis and adapt and overcome it (Connely, 2018). Russian resilience has been proverbial at various times, and its history of defeating invaders is more leathery than the Biden administration.

During WWII or the Great Patriotic War, extreme policies such as the scorched earth were adopted, annihilating all economic achievements since 1917 to defeat the Nazi invader. Finally, the extreme measure is transporting the Russian West’s industrial park beyond the Ural Mountains. A measure unparalleled in modern history, factories and workers’ homes were all constructed in the full rigor of Russian winter. (Werth, 1964)

The strategies comprise what Connelly called “tools” and Russian resources, which faced the sanctions of 2014 and certainly those of 2022. For Laura Smith-Park, as sanctions hit the Russian economy hard and Western companies retreated, an era of hybrid ended. (CNN, March, 14/2022) Companies like Macdonald’s and others like Ikea, Zara, and Starbuck, installed in the country post-communist era, represented an earthquake of western customs and culture. According to Reuters’ journalist O’Donnell, Russia is preparing new legislation granting powers to intervene in certain foreign companies. Companies supposedly threaten Russian jobs and industries, making it difficult for “hostile” Western companies to “disentangle themselves quickly unless they are prepared to take a big financial hit.” The law comes as the Russian economy plunges into recession and double-digit inflation. (O’Donnell, May 26, 2022)

By withdrawing, they will cut ties with the Russian people and likely be replaced by other companies. As in politics and power, the economy also does not admit voids. McDonalds sold its stores to Siberian

oligarch Alexander Govor, and they will operate under another name. Russia continued to sell its crude oil, breaking sales records in April 2022. (Hish, 2022) Despite Russia being under attack by economic sanctions, one should wait and see who wins. It is too early to sell bear skin. He must capture the animal first. (Elliot, 2022)

## 9. Conclusion

Both Russia in 2014 and 2022 and Turkiye in 1974 were subject to embargoes and sanctions. These hit harder than the fighters. The US Congress embargoed arms supplies to Turkiye because the equipment used in Cypriot operations was US origin. Turkiye has developed its own autonomous arms industry with its reduced defense capacity. Pragmatically did not conquer all of Cyprus, and, indeed, Russia will not capture all of Ukraine to date by holding onto a portion of the territory.

Each contender analyzed in the case studies will manufacture their narratives far from Western and Cartesian logic.

Decades after the invasion for some Turkish and Greek Cypriots, they live in peace, each on their side. A forced reunification would be a disaster. Others believe there is only one social or political way out of reunification, especially northern Cyprus, occupied by Turkiye, which is economically stagnant. Greek Cypriots think it is possible, despite the 200,000 refugees, that a political solution will bring economic progress, jobs, restoring Cyprus' unity. For Turkiye, the economic burden of military occupation is heavy and an impediment to the country's entry into the EU.

The ancient USSR and Russia have a long tradition of resilience and obstinacy in the face of the threat represented by potent antagonists such as the Tatar Golden Horde, the Teutonic Knights, Napoleon Bonaparte, foreign intervention in the Civil War, and, finally, the Nazi invasion of 1941. It happened with Turkiye, a faithful ally of the United States, which placed its historical interests and national sovereignty above strategic alliances. He paid to see and invaded Cyprus.

The Russian economy is more powerful and globalized. It resisted 2014 the impacts of sanctions on account of the invasion of Crimea, employing its instruments and resources overcame the harmful effects. The sanctions are much stronger and more annihilating. However, in 1941 just as the scorched earth policy of no step back and the transfer of factories to those behind the Ural Mountains led to successful counter-offensives, one should not neglect the ability to outsmart one's opponents.

Both countries are proud of their histories and greatness in a distant imperial past. Carthage refused to be destroyed by Rome, an envious and vengeful antagonist on the eve of the Third Punic War (149-146 BC).



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