Tax Avoidance and M&A
Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between tax avoidance and M&A efficiency in the sample of 243 completed M&As in Korea. I find a negative relationship between tax avoidance and M&A returns. This result suggests that tax avoidance increases information asymmetry between shareholders and managers because it increases corporate opacity. It makes shareholders unable to monitor and control even if managers make opportunistic M&A decisions.
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PDFDOI: https://doi.org/10.22158/rem.v5n3p142
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