

*Original Paper*

The Transformation and Innovation of China's Discipline  
Inspection and Supervision System from the Perspective of New  
Institutional Economics

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**Abstract**

*The theory of new institutional economics provides a powerful tool for analyzing the transformation and innovation of China's discipline inspection and supervision system. Changes in the discipline inspection and supervision system include induced and coercive transformations, with changes in interest patterns and power relationships having a significant impact on institutional change. Path dependence and institutional breakthrough mechanisms jointly influence the process of institutional change. Based on this, the paper also discusses the policy background and motivations for the innovation of the discipline inspection and supervision system, and proposes directions for institutional innovation, including strengthening the leadership of the Party, diversifying supervision, and expanding cooperation.*

**Keywords**

*Discipline inspection and supervision system, institutional change, path dependence, institutional innovation*

**1. Introduction**

During the construction of socialism in China, the discipline inspection and supervision system has always played a crucial role in upholding the Party's discipline, advancing the construction of a corruption-free and honest administration, and strengthening the fight against corruption. However, with the continuous development of the economy and society and the transformation of institutional mechanisms, the discipline inspection and supervision system is facing increasingly complex and severe challenges. The implementation of major strategic deployments such as comprehensive strict governance of the Party, deepening reforms and opening up, and the construction of a rule-of-law state

has made the responsibilities and tasks of the discipline inspection and supervision work more burdensome and complex. At the same time, the rapid development and constant changes in the economy and society have brought new situations and problems to the work of discipline inspection and supervision. Various forms of corruption and disciplinary violations still exist, new areas and new types of crimes continue to emerge, and the battle against corruption remains a long and arduous task. Traditional research methods in the study of discipline inspection and supervision have certain shortcomings. Firstly, traditional research methods are relatively singular, mainly focusing on policy interpretation and propaganda, and historical document review. Although this method can summarize and analyze the development history and practical experience of the discipline inspection and supervision system, it often lacks a deep exploration of the underlying mechanisms and laws behind the changes in the discipline inspection and supervision system. Secondly, traditional research methods in the field of discipline inspection and supervision are relatively outdated in theory construction and methodology, and have not fully integrated the theories and methods of related disciplines such as economics. Most legal researchers engaged in discipline inspection and supervision research remain at the level of legal doctrinal studies, overlooking the interdisciplinarity and complexity of the discipline inspection and supervision field, which limits their ability to understand and solve problems related to the discipline inspection and supervision system. Therefore, a deep study of the changes and innovations in the discipline inspection and supervision system, seeking reform paths and mechanisms for innovation that meet the needs of the times, has extremely important practical significance and profound theoretical value.

This study aims to use the theoretical analysis of new institutional economics to deeply explore the changes and innovations in the discipline inspection and supervision system, explore its developmental laws and mechanisms, and provide theoretical support and policy recommendations for advancing the reform of the discipline inspection and supervision system. Specific research content includes the evolutionary process of the discipline inspection and supervision system, the driving factors behind institutional changes, and innovative paths and practical experiences.

This study will utilize the basic theories and methods of new institutional economics, combined with the actual situation of China's discipline inspection and supervision system, to construct an analytical framework to deeply explore the issues of changes and innovations in the discipline inspection and supervision system. The research framework will revolve around institutional evolution, interest patterns, institutional path dependency and breakthroughs, etc., to comprehensively and systematically analyze the internal mechanisms and laws of changes and innovations in the discipline inspection and supervision system.

## **2. Overview of New Institutional Economics Theory**

### *2.1 Basic Concepts and Development of New Institutional Economics*

New Institutional Economics is an economic school that emerged in the 1980s. Its core view is that

human behavior is constrained by institutions. Douglass North defined institutions as the rules of the game in society, which are designed constraints that shape human interactions and provide incentives for exchanges (North, 2014, p. 3). In New Institutional Economics, institutions encompass not only laws and regulations but also organizations, norms, customs, and other rules and constraints. New Institutional Economics emphasizes the impact of institutions on economic efficiency and behavior, serving as an important supplement to traditional neoclassical economics. To some extent, Karl Marx can also be considered an institutional economist. Marxism emphasizes the impact of social institutions on economic development, particularly how the capitalist system affects the relations of production and productive forces. Marxism highlights the contradiction between the relations of production and the forces of production, arguing that private ownership of the means of production leads to class antagonisms and exploitation. Institutional economics also focuses on the evolution and change of economic relations but places more emphasis on the role of institutional rules and organizational structures in shaping market behavior and resource allocation. Both Marxism and institutional economics focus on the impact of social institutions on economic development.

As for its development, the rudiments of New Institutional Economics can be traced back to the research of scholars such as Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. Coase introduced the famous theory of transaction costs, emphasizing the role of institutions in resource allocation (Coase, 1960, pp. 1-44). Williamson made significant contributions to the field of institutional economics, introducing "transaction cost economics" and "transaction cost theory," which laid the foundation for New Institutional Economics.

### *2.2 Core Theories of New Institutionalism and Their Application in Discipline Inspection and Supervision Systems*

New Institutionalism emphasizes the importance of institutions in social organization and economic activities, particularly in the distribution of power and supervision. Its core theories include institutional lock-in, institutional environments, and path dependency.

In the application to the discipline inspection and supervision system, New Institutionalism provides a deep perspective for understanding the operating mechanisms of the discipline inspection and supervision system. It highlights that the establishment of a supervision system needs to consider the real pattern of interests, power relations, and various norms and constraints. Moreover, New Institutionalism also offers a corresponding analytical framework for ensuring clarity of responsibilities and perfection of rules within the supervision system.

### *2.3 New Institutional Economics' Explanation and Analysis Methods for Institutional Change and Innovation*

New Institutional Economics offers several key methods and theories for explaining and analyzing institutional change and innovation, including path dependency theory and institutional evolution theory. Path dependency theory posits that the development of institutions is dependent on historical trajectories, meaning past institutional choices can significantly impact future outcomes. As Douglass

North stated, History matters. Without retracing history, one cannot understand the choices of today (North, 2014, p. 118). On the other hand, institutional evolution theory emphasizes the dynamic process of institutional evolution. By analyzing the mechanisms of institutional evolution, one can better understand the pathways of institutional change and innovation. These two theories are not contradictory; in fact, path dependency is a mode of institutional evolution, with the latter theory highlighting the dynamic aspect of the process.

The analytical methods of New Institutional Economics provide powerful tools for studying the changes and innovations in discipline inspection and supervision systems, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of the development trajectory and patterns of these systems.

### **3. Historical Evolution of the Discipline Inspection and Supervision System**

#### *3.1 The Development History of China's Discipline Inspection and Supervision System*

The development of China's discipline inspection and supervision system can be traced back to ancient times, but the formation of the contemporary system can be divided into four stages: the period of the New Democratic Revolution, from the founding of New China to before the Reform and Opening-up, from the early stage of the Reform and Opening-up to before the new era, and since the new era.

During the New Democratic Revolution period: In 1927, the 5th National Congress of the CPC established the Central Supervisory Committee, the precursor to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission. In 1928, the 6th National Congress converted the Supervisory Committee into the Examination Committee and elected Liu Shaoqi as its secretary.

From the establishment of New China to before the Reform and Opening-up: In 1949, the People's Republic of China was established, and the People's Supervisory Committee of the State Council was set up. In 1954, the People's Supervisory Committee of the State Council was transformed into the Ministry of Supervision of the State Council. In 1969, the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China adopted the "Constitution of the Communist Party of China," which abolished the provisions related to the Party's supervisory bodies and dissolved the Central Supervisory Commission. The 11th National Congress in 1977 restored the provisions for the Party's Discipline Inspection Committee.

From the early stage of the Reform and Opening-up to before the new era: The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1978 elected a new CPC Central Discipline Inspection Commission. The 12th National Congress in 1982 stipulated that the discipline inspection committees at all levels of the party were to be elected by the party congresses at the same level. In 1986, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress decided to establish the Ministry of Supervision, which was officially inaugurated in 1987 ([https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgkn/lsyg/202212/t20221216\\_236863.html](https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgkn/lsyg/202212/t20221216_236863.html)).

Since the new era: The 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013 adopted the "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms," which specifically called for strengthening the system of checks and balances on the

exercise of power and the supervision system. It emphasized forming an effective power restraint and coordination mechanism, strengthening anti-corruption institutional innovations and institutional guarantees, and improving the anti-corruption and integrity-building regulatory system ([https://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2013-11/15/content\\_2528179.html](https://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2013-11/15/content_2528179.html)). In 2018, the National Supervision Commission of the People's Republic of China was established. The Chinese discipline inspection and supervision system has undergone a series of significant changes and developments, gradually establishing a supervision system centered on party discipline and national laws, forming an institutional framework where party regulations and national laws complement and support each other.

### *3.2 Problems and Challenges in the System's Evolution*

Several problems and challenges have emerged during the evolution of the discipline inspection and supervision system. Firstly, despite ongoing reforms, there are still some weak links and loopholes in the discipline inspection and supervision work, with issues such as excessive concentration of supervisory power and an imperfect supervision mechanism yet to be resolved. Secondly, as the economy and society develop, corruption in emerging areas and the forms of anti-corruption are becoming increasingly diverse, requiring continuous innovation and improvement of the discipline inspection and supervision system to adapt to the new needs of supervision work. Lastly, the implementation of the discipline inspection and supervision system at local and grassroots levels faces issues such as insufficient enforcement and uneven quality of officials, necessitating further strengthening of system implementation and team building.

The historical evolution of the discipline inspection and supervision system not only reflects the progress of China's socio-political and economic development but also highlights the problems and challenges in institutional reform. Addressing these issues and challenges requires a comprehensive application of theories and methods from New Institutional Economics to conduct in-depth research and analysis on the changes and innovations in the discipline inspection and supervision system, to better adapt it to the needs of the new era.

## **4. Analysis of the Evolution of Discipline Inspection and Supervision System from the Perspective of New Institutional Economics**

### *4.1 Two Modes of Change in the Discipline Inspection and Supervision System*

The transformation of the discipline inspection and supervision system is an important part of the legal system with Chinese characteristics. In this evolution process, the modes of change can be divided into two major categories: induced change and coercive change (Note 1). These two represent different paths in the evolution of the discipline inspection and supervision system, as well as the dynamics of formation and development.

#### **(1) Induced Change in the Discipline Inspection and Supervision System**

Induced change refers to the gradual formation and development of the discipline inspection and supervision system in practice, mainly influenced by the actual needs and experience summaries of

grassroots discipline inspection and supervision organizations and personnel. This type of change is usually bottom-up, where specific case operations and practices of grassroots discipline inspection agencies gradually accumulate experience to form an effective management system.

In this model, discipline inspection and supervision personnel accumulate effective management methods through practice, gradually forming certain norms and procedures. This may include optimized procedures for case handling, construction of information management systems, and training of cadre teams. These positive explorations constitute a bottom-up induced change, providing new ideas for the work of discipline inspection and supervision.

The management experience accumulated by grassroots organizations in practice is consolidated and developed through the mutual exchange and inheritance of knowledge among cadres. Innovative ideas and practical experiences continuously emerge in this process, forming a spontaneous, practice-based discipline inspection and supervision order.

### (2) Coercive Change in the Discipline Inspection and Supervision System

In contrast to induced change, coercive change refers to the process where changes in the discipline inspection and supervision system, or innovations, are driven by central or higher-level discipline inspection and supervision authorities. This method emphasizes centralized management and guidance from the center to ensure consistency and efficiency of the discipline inspection and supervision system.

Under this model, central or higher authorities implement new discipline inspection and supervision systems by issuing policies and regulations, mandating requirements on case handling procedures, information system constructions, and cadre team management standards.

The push for this type of change is usually aimed at addressing widespread issues across the country or driving the entire system towards a specific direction. By enforcing change coercively, the center can more easily achieve consistency and standardization in a short period.

### (3) Comparison between Induced and Coercive Change

The comparison of these two types focuses on several aspects:

Firstly, *Adaptability and Efficiency*: Induced change emphasizes adaptation to local differences and actual needs of cadres, allowing for tailor-made solutions, but there may be some inefficiencies. Conversely, coercive change facilitates consistency and efficiency across the system but may overlook local differences and practical experiences.

Secondly, *Participation and Acceptance*: Induced change emphasizes the involvement of grassroots organizations and personnel, which facilitates better understanding and acceptance. However, coercive change might trigger resistance at the grassroots level, affecting the implementation of the system.

Thirdly, *Innovation and Stability*: Induced change is more likely to inspire innovation in management, but it may also lead to significant variations among different discipline inspection and supervision organizations. Coercive change, on the other hand, promotes uniformity within the entire judicial system but may limit the space for innovation.

The evolution of the discipline inspection and supervision system can be a gradual process of induced change or a centralized push of coercive change. Each mode has its advantages and disadvantages, depending on the overall control of the discipline inspection and supervision system and understanding of local realities. In future changes to the discipline inspection and supervision system, we may continue to see an alternating operation of these two methods to better adapt to the development of society and the needs of the discipline inspection and supervision system.

#### (4) Complementarity of the Two Modes of Change

Induced change and coercive change are not diametrically opposed but can promote and complement each other.

Induced change can provide experience and a basis for coercive change. The experience and wisdom accumulated by grassroots discipline inspection and supervision agencies in practice can serve as references for higher or central authorities when formulating policies and regulations, enhancing the success rate of coercive changes.

Coercive change can provide a systemic framework and guarantee for induced change. Policies and regulations established by higher authorities can provide norms and guidance for grassroots management practices, promoting the development of induced changes in the right direction. Overall, the evolution of our country's discipline inspection and supervision system is still predominantly driven by coercive change.

#### *4.2 Analysis of Changes in Interest Structures and Power Relations in Institutional Change*

During the process of institutional change, the transformation of interest structures and power relations is a significant influencing factor. In the context of the evolution of the discipline inspection and supervision system, power struggles and conflicts of interest among different stakeholders frequently occur, significantly affecting the course and direction of institutional change. This can be analyzed from several perspectives, including the relationship between party and government, the relationship between the subjects of supervision and the supervisory institutions, and the distribution of interests among discipline inspection and supervision cadres. Particularly since the reform and opening up, with the development of the market economy and the reform of the national governance system, the interest structure and power relations within the discipline inspection and supervision system have undergone profound changes. Understanding and responding to these changes has become a crucial topic of current research.

#### (1) Changes in Interest Structures

Institutional change often accompanies the reshaping of interest structures. In the process of changing the discipline inspection and supervision system, the interest structure is reflected in several aspects:

First, Party-Government Relations: The evolution of the discipline inspection and supervision system involves adjustments in the methods and scope of the party's supervision over state power. At different times, the tightness of party-government relations directly affects the implementation of discipline inspection and supervision work.

Second, Relationship between the Supervised and the Supervisory Institutions: Changes in the discipline inspection and supervision system have altered the power relations between the supervised subjects and supervisory institutions. As the supervision system reform deepens, the independence of supervisory institutions is strengthened, and their supervisory intensity is continuously increased.

Third, Interest Distribution among Discipline Inspection and Supervision Cadres: The distribution of interests among discipline inspection and supervision cadres also changes with institutional transitions. At different times, differences in their authority, compensation, and promotion mechanisms affect their interest demands and work motivation.

## (2) Changes in Power Relations

Institutional change also brings adjustments in power relations. In the evolution of the discipline inspection and supervision system, power relations are mainly reflected in several aspects:

First, Relationship between Internal Party Supervision and External Supervision: Changes in the discipline inspection and supervision system involve the demarcation of boundaries and the allocation of responsibilities between internal party supervision and external supervision. At different times, the emphasis on internal versus external supervision varies, impacting the execution of discipline inspection and supervision work.

Second, Relationship between the Discipline Inspection Commission and the Supervision Commission: The integration of the Discipline Inspection Commission and the Supervision Commission is a significant hallmark of the evolution of the discipline inspection and supervision system. After integration, the power relationship between these bodies changes, and the authority and power of the Supervision Commission are strengthened.

Third, Relationship between Discipline Inspection and Supervision Bodies and Other Law Enforcement Agencies: Changes in the discipline inspection and supervision system affect the division of power and cooperation mechanisms between discipline inspection and supervision bodies and other law enforcement agencies. At different times, the boundaries of responsibility between these bodies differ, affecting law enforcement efficiency and public credibility.

## (3) Changes since the Reform and Opening Up

Since the reform and opening up, with the development of the market economy and reforms in the state governance system, the interest structure and power relations in the discipline inspection and supervision system have undergone profound changes:

First, Diversification of Interest Structures: The development of the market economy has spawned new interest entities and demands, and the discipline inspection and supervision system needs to accommodate the interests of different stakeholders.

Second, Balancing of Power Relations: Reforms in the national governance system emphasize checks and balances and supervision, making the power relations in the discipline inspection and supervision system more balanced, which helps prevent the abuse of power.

Third, Innovation in Supervision Methods: The development of information technology provides new



tools for discipline inspection and supervision work, making the methods of supervision more diverse and efficient.

Understanding and responding to these changes is a crucial topic in current research on the discipline inspection and supervision system. By deeply analyzing the changes in interest structures and power relations, we can better grasp the laws of institutional change in discipline inspection and supervision, providing theoretical support and practical guidance for improving the system and enhancing its effectiveness.

#### *4.3 Analysis of Institutional Path Dependence and Breakthrough Mechanisms*

Institutional path dependence and institutional breakthroughs are two key concepts in the process of institutional change. Path dependence refers to the phenomenon where historical institutional choices continue to affect the current and future development of institutions. On the other hand, an institutional breakthrough refers to the process of breaking through path dependence under specific conditions through institutional innovation and reform, achieving a transition and transformation of the system. In analyzing the changes in the discipline inspection and supervision system, it is essential to conduct a thorough analysis of the mechanisms of path dependence and institutional breakthroughs. By interpreting path dependence, we can better understand the current state and development trends of the discipline inspection and supervision system; whereas analyzing the mechanisms of institutional breakthroughs provides crucial ideas and methods for proposing feasible paths for institutional innovation and reform.

Through the analyses above, we can comprehensively and deeply understand various aspects of the changes in the discipline inspection and supervision system, including its historical trajectory, changes in interest structures and power relations, and the mechanisms of institutional path dependence and breakthroughs. This understanding provides theoretical support and policy recommendations for further exploring innovations and reforms in the discipline inspection and supervision system.

## **5. Exploration of Innovation in Discipline Inspection and Supervision System**

In the work of discipline inspection and supervision, system innovation is an inevitable requirement to adapt to the development of the times and promote the improvement of work quality and efficiency. This section will discuss the policy background, driving forces, and main directions of innovation in the discipline inspection and supervision system.

### *5.1 Policy Background and Driving Forces of System Innovation*

The policy background and driving forces for innovation in the discipline inspection and supervision system mainly include the following aspects:

First, The need to modernize the national governance system and governance capacity. With the continuous advancement of China's socialist modernization drive, modernizing the national governance system and governance capacity has become an urgent need for the development of the times. As an important part of the national supervision system, the discipline inspection and supervision system

needs to be constantly innovated and improved to adapt to the requirements of the modernization of the national governance system.

Second, The in-depth advancement of the fight against corruption. General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that corruption is the biggest threat facing our Party, and the fight against corruption is a long and arduous task. Innovation in the discipline inspection and supervision system is an important guarantee for promoting the in-depth development of the fight against corruption. It is necessary to continuously strengthen the supervision system and intensify punishment to ensure that the construction of Party conduct and clean government always advances in the right direction.

Third, The need to comprehensively govern the country according to law. The Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core attaches great importance to comprehensively governing the country according to law, and strengthening innovation in the discipline inspection and supervision system is also an important measure to implement the comprehensive rule of law. By improving laws and regulations, strengthening law enforcement supervision, and strengthening judicial guarantees, we will continuously improve the legal system of discipline inspection and supervision, and provide a strong guarantee for comprehensively governing the country according to law.

### *5.2 Direction of Innovation in the Discipline Inspection and Supervision System*

Innovation in the discipline inspection and supervision system is of great significance to the construction of Party conduct and clean government and the fight against corruption. In the context of the new era, the discipline inspection and supervision system needs to continuously adapt to the requirements of social development, and constantly innovate and improve to better play its role. This section will discuss the innovation of the discipline inspection and supervision system from three aspects: further strengthening the Party's leadership, diversification of supervision, and expansion of cooperation.

#### *5.2.1 Further Strengthening the Party's Leadership*

The Party's leadership is the fundamental guarantee for the achievements of discipline inspection and supervision work, and it is also an important foundation for the stable operation of the discipline inspection and supervision system. In the process of the transformation of the discipline inspection and supervision system, it is necessary to further strengthen the Party's leadership and ensure that the Party always holds the leadership and dominance over the work of discipline inspection and supervision. Specifically, the Party's leadership can be strengthened from the following aspects:

First, Strengthen the Party Committee's leadership responsibility system. Establish and improve the leadership responsibility system for discipline inspection and supervision work in Party committees at all levels, clarify the leadership responsibilities and work requirements of Party committees for discipline inspection and supervision work, and ensure that Party committees fulfill their leadership responsibilities and be responsible and effective.

Second, Strengthen coordination and cooperation between Party committee leadership and discipline inspection and supervision agencies. As the leading core of discipline inspection and supervision work,

the Party committee needs to work closely with the discipline inspection and supervision agencies to form a joint force. Strengthen communication and coordination between the Party committee and the discipline inspection and supervision agencies, form a united front, and jointly promote the development of discipline inspection and supervision work.

Third, Strengthen Party building. Party building is an important guarantee for strengthening the Party's leadership. It is necessary to strengthen the construction of the Party's grassroots organizations, improve the Party spirit and discipline awareness of Party members and cadres, and enhance the Party organization's combat effectiveness and cohesion.

### 5.2.2 Diversification of Supervision

The supervision methods of the discipline inspection and supervision system need to be diversified. It is necessary to strengthen both internal supervision and expand external supervision to make supervision more comprehensive, in-depth, and effective. Specifically, the diversification of supervision can be expanded from the following aspects:

#### (1) Strengthen the construction of internal supervision mechanisms

Since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, discipline inspection and supervision agencies at all levels have made remarkable achievements in system building, but they still need to continuously improve and strengthen self-supervision. As an important part of public power, discipline inspection and supervision agencies are responsible for the special responsibility of Party and state supervision, and shoulder important political responsibilities. General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that supervisors should be supervised even more. Discipline inspection and supervision agencies must clarify the boundaries of power, strictly control internal mechanisms, tighten the cage of the system for weak links in their own power operation mechanisms and management and supervision systems, and resolutely prevent "darkness under the light." ([https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowenn/202112/t20211216\\_159237.html](https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowenn/202112/t20211216_159237.html))

Internal supervision of discipline inspection and supervision agencies is an important means to ensure the standardized, honest, and efficient operation of power within the agency. To this end, it is necessary to adhere to problem-oriented and goal-oriented approaches, focus on the use of power, establish a full-process control and early warning and prevention mechanism, and effectively prevent the abuse of power and the risk of power alienation. In daily work, discipline inspection and supervision agencies should focus on all links and areas of the operation of power, promptly correct problems found, strengthen the comprehensive supervision and control of the operation of power.

Focusing on the process of using power is also an important aspect of internal supervision. Improving the supervision mechanism for handling cases in accordance with regulations, disciplines, laws, safety, and civilization is a key measure to prevent the risks of violations of regulations, dereliction of duty, and out-of-control. Discipline inspection and supervision agencies should strengthen supervision over the process of handling cases, ensure strict law enforcement and civilized law enforcement in the process of handling cases, put an end to the occurrence of irregular operations and abuse of power, and

safeguard judicial justice and social stability.

In addition, focusing on personnel who use power is also an important part of internal supervision. Improving the education, management, accountability, and exit mechanisms for discipline inspection and supervision cadres is an effective way to prevent the risks of passive performance of duties and abuse of power for personal gain. Discipline inspection and supervision agencies should strengthen the education and training of cadres, strengthen the Party spirit and legal awareness of cadres, standardize the behavior of cadres, prevent the occurrence of abuse of power for personal gain and violations of regulations and disciplines, and ensure that the cadre team is honest and law-abiding.

(2) Adhering to both self-supervision and external supervision is an effective way to ensure that discipline inspection and supervision agencies fulfill their responsibilities. The main subjects of external supervision include people's congresses, procuratorates, news media, social organizations, etc., and they play an important role in supervising the performance of duties by discipline inspection and supervision agencies.

First, as the highest organ of state power, the National People's Congress has the power to supervise discipline inspection and supervision agencies. Deputies to the National People's Congress can supervise and hold accountable the work of discipline inspection and supervision agencies through proposals, suggestions, inquiries, etc., to ensure that they perform their duties according to law and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the people.

Second, as a legal supervision agency, the procuratorate also supervises discipline inspection and supervision agencies. Procuratorial organs can investigate and deal with violations of law and discipline by discipline inspection and supervision agencies according to law, safeguard the dignity and authority of the law, and ensure judicial justice and social fairness.

Third, as an important force for public opinion supervision, the news media reports on and supervises the work of discipline inspection and supervision agencies. Through media exposure and public opinion supervision, it is possible to guide social public opinion, urge discipline inspection and supervision agencies to perform their duties according to law, and improve work transparency and credibility.

Finally, as an important part of social supervision, social organizations also supervise the work of discipline inspection and supervision agencies. Various social organizations can represent specific interest groups, put forward opinions and suggestions on the work of discipline inspection and supervision agencies, and promote them to improve their working methods and service levels.

Adhering to both self-supervision and external supervision is an important guarantee for ensuring that discipline inspection and supervision agencies fulfill their responsibilities. Discipline inspection and supervision agencies should consciously accept supervision from all parties, continuously strengthen their own construction, improve work quality and efficiency, and make greater contributions to the construction of Party conduct and clean government and the fight against corruption.

(3) Strengthen the guidance and standardization of external supervisory forces

For external supervisory forces, it is necessary to strengthen guidance and standardization to ensure that their supervisory behavior is legal, reasonable, and effective. At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen communication and coordination with external supervisory forces, form a joint force for supervision, and promote better results in discipline inspection and supervision work.

### 5.2.3 Expanding Collaboration

Zhao Leji (2021) emphasized the importance of establishing a collaborative and efficient supervision mechanism. Disciplinary inspection and supervision are comprehensive and systematic tasks, requiring joint efforts from all parties to form a cohesive force. In the process of transforming the disciplinary inspection and supervision system, it is necessary to further expand the scope and depth of collaboration and strengthen coordination and cooperation among various entities. Specifically, collaboration can be expanded in the following aspects:

#### (1) Realizing Collaboration between Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Organs and Procuratorates

This is a crucial measure to promote the more effective fulfillment of duties by legal supervision organs. As legal supervision organs stipulated by the Constitution, procuratorates are responsible and empowered to supervise judicial activities and ensure the implementation of laws. On the other hand, disciplinary inspection and supervision organs are mainly responsible for Party conduct, clean governance, and anti-corruption efforts. The responsibilities and tasks of the two overlap and complement each other to a certain extent. Therefore, strengthening collaboration between disciplinary inspection and supervision organs and procuratorates not only helps enhance the effectiveness of legal supervision but also promotes the in-depth development of anti-corruption efforts.

Firstly, disciplinary inspection and supervision organs and procuratorates can strengthen information sharing and coordination. Procuratorates have accumulated rich experience and intelligence in investigating and handling corruption and duty-related crime cases. At the same time, the judicial field possesses professionalism and authority. Both sides can establish information exchange mechanisms and case transfer mechanisms, share relevant information and case leads, strengthen collaboration, and enhance the efficiency and quality of case investigation and handling.

Secondly, disciplinary inspection and supervision organs and procuratorates can carry out joint law enforcement and supervision. For major corruption cases and violations of discipline and law involving Party members and cadres, both sides can jointly conduct law enforcement actions, forming a joint force to combat corruption. At the same time, during the supervision of law enforcement, they can supervise and cooperate with each other to ensure the legality of law enforcement procedures and the fairness of law enforcement outcomes.

Furthermore, disciplinary inspection and supervision organs and procuratorates can also strengthen exchanges, learning, and professional training. By carrying out regular exchange seminars, special lectures, and on-site observation activities, both sides can learn from each other's experiences and improve their work levels and capabilities. At the same time, they can also carry out joint training and

professional skills training to strengthen the training of disciplinary inspection and supervision cadres and procuratorial cadres, improving their professional qualities and legal awareness.

In conclusion, realizing collaboration between disciplinary inspection and supervision organs and procuratorates helps strengthen the legal supervision system and promote the in-depth development of anti-corruption work. Both sides should strengthen communication and coordination, establish a close cooperative relationship, and work together to uphold Party discipline and state laws, ensuring the realization of national rule of law and social fairness and justice.

## (2) Promoting Collaboration between Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Organs and Audit Institutions at All Levels

Promoting collaboration between disciplinary inspection and supervision organs and audit institutions at all levels is an important measure to deepen the reform of the supervision system and enhance the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts and Party conduct and clean governance. Audit institutions have professional auditors and rich auditing experience, enabling them to provide unique auditing perspectives and professional technical support, thus providing strong support for the supervision work of disciplinary inspection and supervision organs.

Firstly, it is crucial to promote information sharing and collaboration between disciplinary inspection and supervision organs and audit institutions. By establishing regular information exchange mechanisms and joint meeting mechanisms, both sides can share relevant information and case leads in a timely manner, strengthen collaboration, and improve the efficiency and quality of supervision work.

Secondly, it is essential to leverage the comparative advantages of audit institutions to achieve win-win cooperation. Audit institutions have relatively rich experience and advantages in resource allocation, information collection and analysis, and risk assessment. They can provide professional technical support and decision-making references for disciplinary inspection and supervision organs, achieving synergistic effects.

Simultaneously, it is necessary to strengthen personnel exchanges and cooperative training between disciplinary inspection and supervision organs and audit institutions to enhance the work levels and capabilities of both sides. This can be achieved by organizing joint training programs, holding seminars, and other means to strengthen communication and interaction between personnel from both sides, promoting experience sharing and mutual improvement.

Lastly, it is crucial to fully leverage the empowering role of audit institutions in auditing to provide comprehensive support and assistance to disciplinary inspection and supervision organs. Audit institutions can conduct comprehensive audits, special audits, and other means to delve deep into problem clues, identify and prevent various violations of discipline and law, providing strong support for disciplinary inspection and supervision work.

Promoting collaboration between disciplinary inspection and supervision organs and audit institutions, fully leveraging the comparative advantages of audit institutions, and achieving the goal of empowering supervision through auditing are of great significance for strengthening Party conduct and

clean governance and achieving greater victories in the fight against corruption. Both sides should strengthen communication and coordination, establish a close cooperative relationship, and work together to achieve comprehensive, precise, and effective supervision.

### (3) Strengthening Collaboration between Party Committees and Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Organs

The relationship between Party committees and disciplinary inspection and supervision organs is not simply one of leadership and being led. From the perspective of division of labor and cooperation, Party committees and disciplinary inspection and supervision organs are the leadership core and implementing bodies of disciplinary inspection and supervision work. It is essential to strengthen close cooperation between Party committees and disciplinary inspection and supervision organs, forming a joint force to jointly promote the development of disciplinary inspection and supervision work.

In conclusion, further strengthening the leadership of the Party, diversifying supervision, and expanding collaboration are important directions for the transformation of the disciplinary inspection and supervision system. Only by continuously strengthening and improving these aspects can the role of the disciplinary inspection and supervision system be better leveraged, promoting greater victories in building a clean and honest Party and government and the fight against corruption.

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**Note 1.** Lin Yifu argues that induced institutional change refers to the spontaneous changes undertaken by a group of people in response to profit opportunities arising from institutional imbalances; coercive institutional change refers to changes brought about by government decrees.

Source: Lin, Yifu. "Induced Institutional Change and Coercive Institutional Change." In *Modern Institutional Economics* (Vol. 2), edited by Sheng Hong. 2009, p. 269.