Between the Supreme Leader and the President: Understanding Wilayat al Faqih (Iranian) System of Governance

This paper is going to explain Wilayat al Faqih (Iranian) system of governance by looking at it from institutional and elite theory approach. The paper will try also to look at the so called “president dilemma” within Wilayat al Faqih system of governance, which is represented by the power struggle between the institution of the supreme leader and the institution of the president in public policy making. This power struggle revealed the weakness of the ideology and the institution of Wilayat al Faqih founded by the leader of the Iranian revolution, Khomeini. And became to open the door for many questions of whether or not the Wilayat al Faqih ideology and institution can lead to a constitutional crisis, if not what kind of future is held for both the institution of the supreme leader and the institution of the president under its system?

law. Thus, his revolutionary step helped to resolve the paradox surrounding "Shi'i jurisprudence which contains insignificant political provisions, against the revolutionary claim that Shi'i Islam is a total way of life and total ideology. Therefore, this insignificance was undoubtedly a consequence of the fact that the Shi'i Sacred Law had hitherto been a jurist's law and not the state law or "the law of the land" (Note 18). This however, does not mean that Khomeini's constitution is not based on an ideology or it is not an ideological constitution. As it is important to recall that "the embodiment of an Islamic ideology in a Shari'ah (Note 19)-based constitution was a major goal of the Islamic revolution in 1979" (Note 20).
The ideology is Wilayat al Faqih "Ruling of the Jurist", in which Khomeini saw fit in his vision of an Islamic rule. Thus, an ideological constitution, if it is to be more than a piece of paper, needs an organ or collective body to protect it. The critical function of nullifying all proposed and existing laws found inconsistent with the Shari'ah was given to the six clerical jurists of the Guardian Council (Majles syanat al distor). The Guardian Council was thus destined to become what Hans Kelsen (1928) in the late 1920s had called "the Guardian of the Constitution"; it has since then performed that function of protecting the ideological foundation of Iran's constitution (Note 21).
In short, Wilayat al Faqih (clerical rule) has been successfully institutionalized through the Islamic republic constitution and through the Council of Guardians. The regime also institutionalized the "right to make definitive interpretations through the principle of Wilayat al Faqih in the person of Ayatollah Khomeini. Thus, the regime and, in particular, its clerical members act with the assurance supplied through a firm sense of the sacred appropriateness of their own actions" (Note 22).
The constitutional crisis after the revolution has another dimension specific to the Wilayat al Faqih ideology, which has never been solved, and is still soaring over the Islamic Republic since Khomeini's death. Some scholars even believe that Khomeini and his clerical elite didn't yet institutionalize the principle of Wilayat al Faqih as there are number of issues that hinder it successful institutionalization.
The problem of marjai'yat as mentioned earlier, and the problem with the "Wilayat al faqih" which has a contradiction between its theoretical and its practical role. For example, Khamenei was supposed to reflect Khomeini's wishes and directives, but his title is the "leader" rather than Wali al Faqih Iran's future, is it practical or theoretical? For example, the former Majlis deputy and theologian from Qom, Azari Qomi, has advocated that Khamenei, as Khomeini's successor, is entitled to modify or even reverse the decisions made by Ayatollah Khomeini. The former Speaker of the Majlis, Mehdi Karroubi, however, has publicly criticized his view which theoretically confirms the principle of Wilayat al Faqih rather than in-validating it (Note 23). www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjssr World Journal of Social Science Research Vol. 6, No. 3, 2019 394 Published by SCHOLINK INC. Finally, other than the successorship problem that the post-revolutionary Iran is facing, the leadership and institutional crisis reflect the contradiction in the constitution of a high degree of autonomy of the Supreme Leader's office on the one hand and a small degree of autonomy of the president office on the other hand. Thus, it would be impossible in post-revolutionary Iran not to review the kind of autonomy that the constitution institutionalized for the Supreme Leader's office. This brings the researcher to the question of whether or not (with the challenges today between both offices' roles) the Wilayat al Faqih is successfully institutionalized?
In the 1989 constitutional amendments, the division of power wasn't on the expense of the supreme leader's power, as powers that have been given to "the president of the Republic by one hand, was taken from him by the other hand. And away from readings and subjective impressions, the political interactions created a reality that is not necessarily constrained by the constitutional texts. Hence the Council. It can be noted that from one Shura Council to another the differences of its roles appears in respect to the political composition inside the system, and the degree of compliance with the Expediency Council.
Although Khomeini installed his clerical institution in the Iranian system of governance this does not mean that the Republican institution is completely demolished. But, in order to defend its position the clerical institution started from the beginning to overpower the republican institution. Khomeini because of the existence of other forces within the revolution those who didn't want to have a theocratic state, made him accept that the state should have a republican wing. A unique state that didn't exist in his early writings. Also, "a reality that would, ironically, prove to save his type of government. In this way indeed the pre-revolutionary concentrations of power were integrated in the state, yet the state was not destroyed. Rather on the contrary the incorporation of the pre-revolutionary concentrations of power in the state could eventually strengthen the state" (Note 25).
Furthermore, it's important to note that the development of the Wilayat al Faqih system of governance was parallel to the formation of a new state based on a religious ideology. As it is can be seen that, Firstly, the emergence of different and new centers of power, outside the control of central government.
Secondly, the construction of (successful) top-down parallel institutions by a certain section of the post-revolutionary leadership to dominate government in the widest sense of the word. Thirdly, the maintaining of the majority of the old institutions and the attempt of certain factions to give them predominance on the emerging new elements, which provoked a harsh reaction of those trying to stabilize their parallel institutions. Finally, the incorporation, centralization and "mise au pas" of the new power centers when possible and the elimination of these when necessary by those factions that had most successfully created new power centers. What was left was an institutionalized dual power structure. One, republican and arguably pre-revolutionary, with preexisting institutions like parliament, government and the traditional armed forces, and one, "Islamic" or post-revolutionary, with parallel newly constructed institutions like the Supreme Leader's Office, the Council of Guardians, the IRP and the Sepah (Note 26).
A dual structure of governance resulted in a dual leadership: the duality of leadership power is between the office of the Supreme Leader and the President. The Shah's system of governance wasn't facing a dual structure of governance nor a dual leadership; the state power was a contested field between the Shah and the clergy. Khomeini's Wilayat al Faqih didn't start or was not created in essence as a dual leadership however, such issue started to evolve after Khomeini's death. But "since 1989, there has been to a certain extent some sharing of power between supreme leader and the president" (Note 27). In this struggle for power: the supreme leader stand as a representative of the institution of Wilayat al Faqih, while the president as a representative of the republican institution.
The Iranian constitution clearly shows through the authorities that have been given to the supreme leader that there is a conflict of power when it comes to public policy making with the office of the president. In fact The Wilayat al Faqih ideology in its essence has no place for the president but for the Imam. Thus, the "ideological mentality of the Iranian state is weakened, largely due to the discrepancy between the constant reiteration of the importance of ideology and the ideology's growing irrelevance to policy making or, worse, its transparent contradiction with social reality" (Note 28). Moreover, the issue of leadership in the Iranian system of governance is ill-defined. As there are different levels of the leadership mentality which resulted in some sort of tension in the system. Also, the issue of elite factionalism and contradiction in the constitution (having dual power) contributed to the issue of leadership diversity.
Furthermore, when it comes to elections, the constitution did not provide for the Leader of the state to be appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts, leaving the president being elected to serve a four-year term. The constitution of the Iranian state thus leaves different challenges that the Wilayat al Faqih system of governance is facing; one of the most important challenges is the "president dilemma". But it takes the form of a hidden power struggle in which Iran is suffering from and more importantly hampers the government's functioning.
The coming pages will briefly map out the most important centers of power in the Iranian system, presenting the functions of each institution and the struggle of power that it is facing.

Figure 1. Distribution of Power in the Constitution (Note 30)
Looking at Figure 1 it can be seen that that there is a duality of power structure between religious clearly seen when it comes to the function of each institution.

The Supreme Leader & the President
When looking at the formal political power structure of the IRI it shows that "it is composed of the Supreme Leader and three sets of institutions: 1) The religious supervisory bodies; 2) The republican institutions; 3) The religious foundations" (Note 31). The system has then three centers of powers, as it shows in Buchta's figure ( Figure 2). However, what must be noted is that the dual institutions (republican and religious) are under the complete supervision of the Supreme Leader's institution. The Wilayat al Faqih system of governance not only invested the powers of these institutions in the Supreme leader institutions but it also assert that "the position of the Supreme Leader is both the single most important position in the Islamic Republic the one that has changed most fundamentally since its inception…as the leader's legitimacy evolved from religious to politico-religious, (double legitimacy), though it can still hardly be called democratic" (Note 32).
For the Supreme leader's institution, Mehdi Khalaji put forward a different political term for it which is "Bayt Rahbar" (House of the Supreme Leader) (Note 33). It means that the supreme leader is not working alone as he meets in his home with thousands of employees between expert and consultant and manager in various disciplines. Therefore, all institutions such as religious political, economic, etc., follow the house of the supreme leader, as these institutions are managed by those who work in the Bayt Rahbar. The management of the supreme leader's home affairs means that the methodology of decision making is subject to complexities and entanglement, because many of those who work in the "home" have their links in the Ministry of Intelligence, the Revolutionary Guards, and economic institutions that such network of relationship intervention can affect the decision making process in the system of governance. Thus, the role of the supreme leader shouldn't be seen as the commander of the revolution, exercising power individually, but as an institution.   The root of the alliance between the "House Leader" and the Guards is not just because the Guards follow the latter by virtue of appointing them but because the Revolutionary Guards since their formation was an autonomous institution. It can be seen that, after the victory of the revolution such institution is not merely a follower but it is the first partner in the House power. Therefore, such alliance helped to protect the revolutionary institutions (Wilayat al Faqih Institutions), and to dispel the charm of the old alliance between clergy and the Bazaar. Iran's revolutionary Guards do not obtain only military power but also became one of the most powerful economic actors, which made them able to influence the political decisions of the government.
Khamenei assigned the Revolutionary Guards some heavy economic projects to execute, which was something that the guards desired to have. Entrusting the guards for the implementation of such projects like building dams and "the headquarters of the prophets" was well thought decision by the supreme leader. As such heavy projects require from its executer the creation of interdisciplinary engineering and multiple sciences, and the import of advanced technology from abroad. It also can achieve for its executer the reputation and control of being able to engage in other economic areas. It can also, cast popular consent because they bring benefits to the people, it produces electricity and Faqih system of governance. Also, like any system of governance, the alliance resort to media as an approach to increase its authority. Media information campaigns start to call for the absolute theory of "Wilayat al Faqih" in that its legitimacy and its legality are derived not from the people but from God according to the ruling coalition.

The Informal Power Structure
In order not to be lost in this informal structures and networks, as there are formal power structures outlined by the constitution, there are also, a number of informal power centers, all under the control of the Supreme Leader, that exert considerable power. In fact, these informal centers act as powerful instruments through which the Leader controls key institutions and/or resources within the system and, at the same time, guards against threats from within or from outside of the political establishment. As

Understanding Elites
Understanding the Iranian elites entails going back to the elite's historical background. It will help in looking at the historical power relationships between the Iranian elites and thus understanding the Thus, it's important to raise the question of "who are the elite?" Iran since the revolution witnessed a shift in the state and regime type that created a complex system of governance, which is classified as a hybrid regime. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that where transitology and modern elitist theories underline how elites make the system, theories of state formation underline how the system makes elites. It would be reductive to reduce differences between both to a simple voluntarist structuralist debate, yet there are undeniable parallels. Moreover, Attempting to systemize and understand the contemporary Iranian regime is a fruitless undertaking if one forgets the fundamental contributions not only of elitist theorizations, but also of the underlying structures and dynamics, both clearly situated in time and space (Note 48). Therefore, elitist together with state-formation theories have a considerable advantage on describing the emergence of the elites and their incorporation in the system and how they influence the system's structure of power. This is through defining historical forces which drive the elite and their actions, thus, where both transitology and monist-pluralist paradigms failed, historical sociology paradigm can succeed.
Furthermore, regarding the elite struggle for power, it should be noted that even before the disintegration of the Shah's regime there were historical centers of power which existed autonomously before the revolution, and invested their powers in the Islamic Republic state formation: the clergy institution in which they have a historical role. The Bazaar's role, which I will discuss in the coming pages, without giving an extended analysis of its characteristics but mostly on its relationship toward both the state (government) and the clergy. Finally, it is contemporary power elites who can be called "The new elites", and who came in after the Iranian revolution. In the history of the Iranian state and formation of the new state (Islamic Republic), it can be seen that not only the political powers of the clergy and the bazaar but also their alliance in influencing policymaking. However, the new elite in contemporary Iran helped to change the balance of power between the clergy and the bazaar and to influence the power of decision making in the regime.

The Clergy and the Bazaar
The Bazaaris were an important actor in Iran, as they "historically have translated their commercial centrality into political contestation" (Note 49). Furthermore, before the revolution, they made the Shah listen to their demands and protect their interests. They have an autonomous power from the state which made them not only able to mobilize people against state policies as they were supporting Mossadeq oil Nationalization Movement in 1951 and were against the 1953 CIA military coup. They also established an alliance with the clergy whenever they needed to confront state policies, they were also, able to play as independent actor from other social groups such as the clergy. They also participated in a number of historical events such as the constitutional revolution in 1906, the anti-white revolution protests in 1963, and the Islamic Revolution.
Although not all bazaaris were supporting the Islamic Revolution but a minority of bazaaris; Khomeini depended on such an alliance in the Islamic revolution, especially when it comes to financial aid.
However not all bazaaris supported him as since history, the Bazaar's interests do not always meet with the clergy's interests. Therefore in establishing the Islamic Republic, Khomeini granted the minority of Bazaaries privileges of political and economic power, as some were members of the parliament as a representative of the Moatlefah Party (Note 50). Also they were given positions in the Ministry of With their economic power shifted to the revolutionary Guards, the bazaar lost their influence or power in the political sphere. During the 2009 protests, known as the Green Movement, the attempt to topple the newly reelected Ahmadinejad regime, the bazaaris stood silent and couldn't make a strike against the regime, the reason for that is because: Today, the bazaar is on the verge of recession and bankruptcy; it is no longer a powerful and influential institution in the political arena of Iranian society. The emergence of various foundations and the entry of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) into the field of economic activities have broken the bazaar's back.
The cost of political activity in current conditions is much higher than in the Mossadeq era (Note 51).
Furthermore, today for the Islamic Republic the "Bazaar-Mosque alliance" lost its full meaning, and if there are any remaining of such an alliance it will be represented by The Society of Islamic Coalition (SIC, Jam-iyyat Mutakifh-i Islami) and its sister organization, the Society of Islamic Associations of

Guilds and Bazaars of Tehran (SIAGBI, Jami-ih-yi Anjumanah-yi Islami-yi Asnaf va Bazar-I Tihran),
which is referred to jointly as SIC-SIAGBT, and is considered to represent the interests and embody the will of the trading class.
Nevertheless, the SIAGBT doesn't reflect the sentiments nor the interests of bazaaris. As it can be seen, The new right has enjoyed electoral success and political power, it has become emboldened and sought greater independence from SIC and power in agenda setting.
For instance, a member of the Developers' Coalition of Islamic Iran, whose candidates were victorious in the 2003 municipal elections, claimed that SIC's support did not win them more than 1,000 votes, and therefore the coalition owed Therefore Khamenei application of IRGC "safeguarding the revolution" made him replace clerics with IRGC, in a number of positions and Ministries, thus, "within three decades, thousands of IRGC officers found their way into parliament, local government, the foreign office and more" (Note 57). In fact Khamenei, replacing the clerical elite in the system structure of power extended to empowering the "new elite" with political and economic power, which also impacted the bazaaris elite and made them less powerful economically therefore politically. Moreover, Khamenei transferring to the IRGC the "exercise of broad responsibility, has led to the gradual permeation of the organization's influence in all sectors of the Iranian state, including the areas of domestic security, ideological promotion, cultural work, industrial development, foreign engagements, and politics" (Note 58). It is important to note that there are factors pertaining to the IRGC place and work within the Iranian system of governance and society (Note 59), which are: the ideological nature of the organization and its commitment to it, its cultural and religious dimension which should not be ignored.
Furthermore, the consequence of Khamenei's action of empowering the IRGC is the militarization of Iranian politics. It can be seen that: The line between politics and the military in Iran has been seriously blurred. Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari has stated openly, in fact, that "before being a military organization, the [IRGC] is, first and foremost, a political-security organization".
According to the International Crisis Group, "Iranians generally view [the IRGC] as the most powerful (and intimidating) pillar of the Islamic Republic" (Note 60).
As the IRGC became centralized in the system, with its iron fists to protect the regime from any external or more importantly internal enemy, especially, after Khatami's rise to power, and the victory of the reformists, the IRGC new task is to block the clergy specifically reformists clergy outside the system of governance, leaving with no influence in regime or even public policy making. For them, the reformists taking power means not only the empowerment of the president and the parliament but also, weakening the institution of Wilayat al Faqih.
The IRGC blocking reformist clerics can be easily seen in the presidential and parliamentary elections.
As the IRGC "wants a president it can work with-and one who, above all else, won't get in its way"  Furthermore, other than being afraid of regime change the IRGC are afraid of reformists rise to power inside the system which would make them question oil revenues being in the hands of IRGC to use as their own income for their domestic and international projects. Also, regarding Iran's sanctions for enriching nuclear power, "the IRGC has a clear economic interest in a general sanctions regime, which has removed foreign direct investments in Iranian businesses and removed foreign competitors from the Iranian oil and natural gas market, thereby helping the IRGC expand its economic clout through the seizure of major projects, like various development phases of the South Pars oil and gas field" (Note 67). Thus, their hard stance on the nuclear issue and sanctions on regime made them become a significant player in the regime, which in turn weakened traditional players in politics such as the bazaar. As the bazaar retreat from the Iranian market, it became filled with IRGC, therefore they didn't gain only economic power but also political power.
The IRGC having such economic and political power means that they can influence public policy in Iran. For example, Rafsanjani criticized the IRGC (Sepah)'s influence in Iran to the degree of comparing their role during his presidency and today. He said that "Sepah's engineering combat corps during the time of war could be useful for the re-construction efforts, and we gave them projects to complete such as building roads. It was useful both for the country and for Sepah. But now, Sepah has taken economy, domestic and foreign policy in its hands, and it won't be satisfied with anything less than the entire country" (Note 68). With such an economic power the IRGC has the control over the political elite in the system, helping their ultraconservatives clergies in their challenge against reformists and political dissents. Therefore, the survival of the regime is no more in the hands of Khamenei and the clergy but mainly in the hands of the IRGC as the only unabated politico-industrial entity.

Factional Rivalries
Iran's elite factionalism has been a subject of tense. Nevertheless, focusing on elite factionalism entails the focus of micro politics, instead of macro politics, therefore Iranian factionalism serves as a blinder to Iran's institutional fracture. Since, it's Wilayat al Faqih system of governance, would it matter to have a factional elite or does the power scattered among the Supreme Leader's party, and supporters equal to those who are out of it? The question then here is not who's wining (as for any democratic system) but who has the lead?
The Wilayat al Faqih system of governance having different factions, holding different ideologies on Wilayat al Faqih and how the system or regime should be run made it difficult not to think of the system as Wilayat al Faqih democracy, that the regime will be led by different factions. Nevertheless, when taking a look at the stages that the regime went through and until now (especially governed with different factions of the elite), it's noted that although there were changes of ideologies in government, still such ideological shifts were inside a small group having one ball (governance), that is going Ahmadinejad's slogan perhaps was: "no for the Supreme Leader's absolute authority...entails no for the clergy rule"! This was a clear shift in his ideology from the first term, calling himself the "son of the Supreme Leader". However, lately he adopted in his speeches the ideology of nationalism, believing in the "Iranian school" and how it enriched both Islam and the world, more than adopting an Islamic ideology (Wilayat al Faqih) which would strengthen the support for a clergy rule.
Ahmadinejad came with the clergy support without believing in the absolute authority of the supreme leader, knowing the hierarchal structure of power in the system and the weight of the ultraconservatives, he wanted to win their support and eventually as their representative, he came into clash with the reformist's clergy. There were two important clerics against Ahmadinejad: Hashem Rafsanjani who warned Khamenei that supporting him would put the Islamic Republic in danger, while Montazeri issued a fatwa against the illegitimacy of Ahmadinejad's presidency, which was after the 2009 elections and civil protests. Such clash with clergy showed that there is a new debate brought by the Reformist clerics such as Montazari who joined Ali Sistani to strengthen the demand for reformism in the system thus with Montazeri's Fatwa which states that, "the idea of a superior spiritual leader that has political power is not in conformity with Islam,...It shows that there is a movement within the clerical www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjssr establishment that understands religion as going beyond and being independent from politics and that advocates for a secular state in which one clerical elite that bundles all political power would be unnecessary" (Note 78).
Ahmadinejad eventually turned the tables on both reformists and conservative clerics to assert his own way, which made him lose the support of both ultraconservatives like Mesbah Yazadi (Note 79) and the IRGC, which fully support Khamenei. This is evident from his last attitudes towards the clerics.
Ahmadinejad resembles the first Iranian president Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, as he was a rival to Khomeini's authority of leadership, thus Khomeini's being afraid of his popular support (which means the empowerment of the Republican institution), he was impeached in 1981 and fled to France. So, does the Wilayat al Faqih system of governance start to disintegrate? Such question started to loom over the Islamic Republic, to the degree that we found Khamenei's outspoken fears resembled in his willingness to remove the presidency office. Ahmadinejad not only put the office of the president in jeopardy but also, the Supreme leader office who supposed to be above factional politics struggle for power, and more importantly above electoral politics when he supported Ahmadinejad in the disputed June 2009 election. Khamenei was trying to teach Ahmadinejad a lesson when he wanted to expand his authorities, that in the Islamic Republic a president is not the supreme leader. Nevertheless, with such power of struggle between the President and the supreme leader the Wilayat al Faqih ideology remains until now the center of the Iranian System of Governance. The problem is now with the making and the planning of the Iranian public policy. How much it will be affected and whether or not the leaders of the Islamic Republic will not include their struggle in public policy making. Will public policy be paralyzed more by the duality of power more than factionalism?
In conclusion, in Wilayat al Faiqh system clerical institutions are overpowering the republican institutions. The supreme leader institution is limiting the president powers. This is making it difficult for the president whether or not he is among Khamenei's loyal follower, to bargain or even challenge the limits of the Iranian president power. Thus, when looking at policy making in the Iranian system of governance we will confront in terms of state structure the institutional question (who is, who, where) and in terms of concentrations of power, the decisional question (who decides). This all can be seen in terms of competition (between state structures) and within these state structures are elite competitions, those who have religious legitimacy and those who have popular legitimacy. Therefore, policymaking is not part of this struggle but at the center of this struggle as who or which institution has the power to make a policy!