Post Mugabe Era and Feasibility of Regime Change in Zimbabwe

Barely a year after Zimbabwe’s long serving President Robert Mugabe was ousted through a military coup which replaced him with his erstwhile trusted ally and vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa, the army shot six civilians caught up in the crossfire of protestors alleging ZANU PF electoral theft of the 2018 July 30 polls. Although the military has always been in the background of Zimbabwe’s politics in general and the ruling ZANU PF affairs in particular, the shooting of protestors incident which occurred on the 1 of August 2018 left the world shell-shocked on the prospects of any peaceful change of government or even transfer of power, confirming to all and sundry that Mugabe could have exited the political stage, but the system he presided over for 37 years is still intact, if not even more perfected in the aftermath. This has since rekindled debates on the feasibility of regime change in Zimbabwe and in that context the validity and essence of having an election in the first place if any outcome unfavourable to ZANU PF and its candidate is likely to witness the unleashing of armed soldiers and the subsequent killing of citizens in the process. With the security sector involved in politics in contrast to the old adage that politics lead the gun, it thus comes as a paradox that for the umpteenth time, regime change in Zimbabwe shall remain an elusive dream.


Introduction
On 13 November 2017, the then Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces General Constantino Chiwenga called for a press conference whose central objective was denouncing President Robert Mugabe's sacking of his vice president and long-time confidant Emmerson Mnangagwa. Events of the unfolding week finally pressed Mugabe to announce his resignation following the impeachment proceedings that had started early morning of November 21. The whole political process took Zimbabwe and the world by surprise and occurred in the context of 'democratic fatigue' where all attempts to unseat and or remove Mugabe and his ZANU PF party had proved to be a pipe dream for the opposition. The main opposition of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was in massive disarray, financially constrained and had dismally failed to morph a unified coalition that could dethrone ZANU PF in the forthcoming 2018 harmonised elections later held on July 30. It is against this background that there is need to interrogate the feasibility of regime, which in essence occupies the attic on the menu of the socio-economic and political problems bedevilling Zimbabwe. With the visible military-ZANU PF conflation now the new political order, toppling ZANU PF from power in the immediate, precisely in the aftermath of the ZANU PF 2018 electoral victory is to a greater extent proving to be an elusive dream.

Background
On 3 August 2013, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) declared Robert Gabriel Mugabe winner of the July 31 st harmonised elections with his party Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) having swept a two thirds majority in parliament (Note 1). Mugabe retained the throne he has held since 1980, months after Zimbabwe's independence from Britain following the protracted liberation struggle and negotiations that culminated into the Lancaster House Agreement.
The Lancaster House Agreement gave birth to a constitution whose longevity was only terminated in 2013 after a new constitution was crafted by the three parties which were then in a coalition government (Note 2) comprising of ZANU PF led by Mugabe, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) led by Mugabe's main challenger Morgan Tsvangirai as well as a splinter MDC group led by Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M) (Note 3). Despite romping into victory and successfully decimating the Opposition, no-one ever predicted a scenario where Mugabe would be toppled through a military coup, four years after, ironically before finishing his term as what later ensured. The concept of regime change has been a hotly contested issue in Zimbabwe since the attainment of the country's independence from Britain in 1980. Regime change can occur through voting a government out of power, conquest by a foreign power, revolution, coup de tat or reconstruction following the failure of a state. Trajectory of the feasibility of regime change in Zimbabwe can best be understood in the socio-economic and political upheavals bedevilling Zimbabwe since 1980. Prior to this development, signs of civil rejection of the government had already been laid when in 1990 one of the founding members of ZANU PF, Edgar Tekere heavily resisted the party's proposals of a One-Party State and after being expelled from the party went on to form the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) that contested ZANU PF in the 1990 general elections. ZUM gained its strength from the disclosure of widespread corruption scandals, the deteriorating economy and increasing unemployment, which mobilised against ZANU PF, the very people Mugabe had proclaimed as favoured by the government, particularly students and trade unions in the urban areas (Cowen & Laasko, 2002). Thus, the 1990 elections, with ZUM fielding up candidates throughout the country, provided people with an opportunity to vote against the ruling party and its plans to establish a One Party State (Ibid). ZUM's attempts to hold public rallies were almost always systematically rejected.

The Genesis of Regime Change Rhetoric
Although the lifespan of ZUM was short-lived, it laid the foundation of challenging ZANU PF's monotheistic hegemony (Cowen & Laasko, 2002 In 2008, harmonised elections were held and the presidential race had three contesters who were Robert Mugabe of ZANU PF, Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC as well as Simba Makoni who stood as an independent candidate after his defection from ZANU PF. The elections were inconclusive because in the first round Mugabe was defeated by Tsvangirai but the opposition leader did not garner enough votes amounting to 51 percent as stipulated by the Constitution so as to form a government (Note 8).
This paved way for a run-off slated for June 27, 2008, but citing persecution of his supporters, Tsvangirai pulled out of the race (Note 9). The Africa Union (AU) and Southern Africa Development Governmental ministries were shared under agreed proportions stipulated in the GPA (Note 10).

The Rationale for the Feasibility of Regime Change Study
Zimbabwe's political strife has largely been inconclusive. Five years after unveiling of the GPA, the agreement largely remained on paper as it was never fully implemented. The security sector consisting of the Army, the Air Force, the Police, the Intelligence and the Prisons had on several counts backdating to 2002 maintained it would never cast its allegiance and or obedience to any one whose We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organisations will only stand in support of those political leaders who will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in the pursuit of Zimbabwe's hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a strait jacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will therefore not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty (Note 11).
The statement which was perceived as a direct aim at Tsvangirai, who did not participate in has come to an end in its current form (Note 12). Indeed this is so given the fact that the political economic power base of the MDC or any other political party has gradually changed over the past decade and a half and even regionally, SADC saw 2013 elections outcome as an opportunity for the regional body to shift away its focus from the decade-long concern of the Zimbabwean crisis Raftopolous (2013 arrest which eventually forced him to resign of 21 November 2017. Mugabe was replaced by Mnangagwa as president who upon his inauguration promised political and economic reforms and announced that elections would be held as per the constitution the following year in 2018.

The Concept of Regime Change in the Pre-colonial Context
The Regime Change Agenda is not a new phenomenon in the political discourse of Zimbabwe. As long as political power was contested regime change was always a hotly contested issue. In the pre-colonial era, as accorded by Needham et al (1984), the legendary Nyatsimba Mutota had to defect from Great Zimbabwe State, with a few followers, following alleged leadership and succession disputes. The grievance subsequently gave birth to the formation of a new regime-the Mutapa State. In the Ndebele State, historians allege that its founder Mzilikazi executed his own son, Nkulumane, who was also heir to the throne after Nkulumane's botched coup. The military conquests and blood wars fought by colonial agents were all quests in pursuit of usurpation of power, Needham et al (1984).

Regime Change in the Post-colonial Context
Genesis

Internal Factors of Regime Change in Zimbabwe
The United States Peace Institute Special Report of 2009 postulates that since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the ruling ZANU PF government has used its anti-colonial legacy and its role in the war of liberation to build a nationalist platform with a stated commitment to rectify colonial injustices-a theme that garners support from many leaders in developing countries and Zimbabwe's rural populace (Note 14 leaders pushing for a de jure one-party state, a move ultimately made unnecessary by ZANU-PF's easy de facto dominance at the polls. The regime grew increasingly intolerant of dissent and ever more willing to use violence as a campaign tool. The failure by Mugabe's regime had more to do with the lack of commitment, corruption and the absence of fiscal discipline on the part of his government. The above situation resulted in excessive borrowings, which fuels inflation and poverty in a country. Bratton and Masunungure (2011)

Whither Regime Change in Zimbabwe?
When the MDC entered into Zimbabwe's political arena in 1999 they could have underestimated and at times fantasised on the feasibility of regime change. When they started dining and wining with ZANU PF through a coalition government and tasted the trinkets and junkets of power, they lost focus and became part of the problem that they purported to solve-that is getting rid of ZANU PF's modus operandi of governance. MDC did not fully and exclusively pushed for electoral and political reforms which could have at least levelled the contesting field during their tenure in the GNU. Five years after Zimbabwe entered into a new political dispensation of the GNU; the arrangement largely remained on paper and was highly inconclusive by the time of going for the harmonised elections in July 2013.
Feasibility of regime in the contemporary political context of Zimbabwe from the researchers' point of view has proved to be a façade and an ideological illusion of the opposition's MDC. Whilst ZANU PF, party in authority since 1980 has been riddled with escalating factionalism, as well as a world record of governance failure, it has successfully remained tactful in confronting external threat and political challenge poised to dislodge it from power. Prospects for a united front of the MDC remained bleak and by the time of the 2018 polls, the MDC had failed to charm all political players and form a grand coalition that would dislodge ZANU PF.

Conclusion
Our conclusion is that prospects of regime change appear to be farfetched. On 1 August 2018, the military unleashed bullets to fleeing protestors who were questioning ZEC's "delay" in announcing the elections results and accused the electoral body of sinister agenda to rig the elections in favour of ZANU PF. The incident which was widely condemned by all election observer groups did not do anything meaningful to stop the militarisation of Zimbabwe's politics and electoral context. After the