

Original Paper

The Rising Far Right in Australia—A Diachronic Case Analysis of the One Nation Party and Australia’s Political Environment

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Abstract

Since the subprime mortgage crisis, global right-wing extremism (RWE) has entered a new phase of ascendance, becoming particularly prominent in the post-pandemic era. While European parties such as AfD and RN are nearing political dominance, and the U.S. Republican Party is increasingly aligned with far-right populism, Australia’s One Nation Party (ONP), though relatively marginal, reflects similar ideological shifts. This paper investigates the rise of the ONP as part of a broader international trend, arguing that economic stagnation and a growing disconnect between progressive social values and material conditions have fueled public discontent. In response, the ONP has pursued a strategy of “de-radicalization”—rebranding itself as a national party and expanding its platform, aiming to attract mainstream voters, especially Generation Z. However, this paper contends that such moderation is tactical rather than substantive; the party’s ideological core remains extreme, limiting its capacity to deliver sustainable governance. In the long run, the ONP may prove no more effective than the left it seeks to replace. Through a diachronic analysis, this study situates Australia’s far-right evolution within global patterns while highlighting its unique political trajectory.

Keywords

right-wing extremism (RWE), One Nation Party (ONP), de-radicalization, mainstream, populism, strategic shift

1. Introduction

Since the subprime mortgage crisis, right-wing extremism (RWE) worldwide has embarked on a new phase—rapid uprising—which is particularly prominent in the post-pandemic era while the mainstream left-wing parties are fading in competition with the far right. In Europe, the mainstream left-wing government have been impinged by the uprising of far-right parties, among which many, the

Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the National Rally (RN) included, are striding toward securing the dominance in Parliament and government; in the United States of America (for brevity, the following “America” all refers to the U.S.), the Republican Party, ever conservative in the past decades, is actually assuming the representative of American far-right: The overwhelming victory of Donald Trump in 2024 marks the raging rightist trend in America; in Australia, though far right remain insignificant compared with its counterparts in Europe and America, its growth still spells the changing climate of Australian society—especially the Pauline Hanson's One Nation (hereinafter referred to “One Nation Party” or “ONP”) does, which is harvesting increasing voters. As to “Why far right is uprising”, the sluggish economy due to the malfunction of neo-liberalism and the expanding gap between the over-leftist social values and the existing productivity have stirred increasing public discontent. In Australia, for the relatively decent performance in economy and the lag phase compared with Europe, and prudent attitude over the progressive issues, the mainstream leftist parties (Australian Labor Party and the Liberal/National Coalition), in the past decades, maintain the majority in society as bedrock; however, in recent years, they experience consistent rebel from their core voters and the dissatisfaction rate of society surges. Confronted with the conditions, the guiding principle of the ONP has been “de-radicalization”, which specifically in two phases: (1) Replace the tag “grassroots party” with “national party” by leveraging the existing system and procedural justice rather than inciting demonstrations; (2) transform itself from a “single-issue party” to a “multi-issue party”. It shall be noted that the ONP and European far-right parties only apply “de-radicalization” in campaign: The core remain radical, determining it can't change the decline much even when the ONP comes to power; in short term, the far-right policies may bring some benefits, but limited to its extreme core, the ONP, in the long run, is likely to perform not better than the leftists, even to escalate the turmoil.

2. Method

This study adopts a diachronic analytical framework to examine the evolution of right-wing extremism in Australia, with particular attention to the One Nation Party (ONP) as a representative case. Diachronic analysis, which traces political discourse and institutional transformation over time, enables the identification of patterns, ruptures, and strategic shifts in the party's ideology and positioning. By situating the ONP's development within both domestic and international contexts, this approach facilitates an understanding of how socioeconomic, cultural, and geopolitical changes have conditioned its rhetorical and organizational adaptations.

A core conceptual lens applied in this research is the theory of “de-radicalization”, which refers to the deliberate softening of extremist political expressions for electoral legitimacy and institutional entry. De-radicalization is examined here not as a transformation of ideological substance, but as a strategic recalibration in response to shifting political opportunity structures. Drawing on comparative examples from Europe and North America, this study interprets the ONP's evolving public discourse, issue selection, and self-presentation within this framework.

Empirical materials include ONP policy documents, parliamentary records, public speeches, and media releases from 2016 to 2024. These are analyzed qualitatively to assess both discursive continuity and transformation. Through this combined methodological lens, the study seeks to uncover how the ONP simultaneously capitalizes on far-right sentiment while pursuing normalization strategies aimed at electoral viability.

3. Australian RWE: the Origin and the Shift

The RWE in Australia evolves with time. To a great extent, it has been no longer equivalent to a violent campaign and extremity, especially since to the ONP and other far-right parties, nor does its transformation come from nowhere or imply revolution. To fully understand and forecast Australian RWE, one prerequisite is to grasp the progress of far right and political environment in Europe, since in politics, economy and culture, Australia is, to a great extent, aligned with Europe, the barometer and predecessor; another requirement is to analyse its current dynamic, in which the ONP shall be the focus because: (1) the ONP has been a long-standing and relatively structured far-right party, thus in a large degree, reflecting the latest development and commonality of Australian RWE; (2) Among all Australian far-right parties, the ONP is the most promising to influence or even helm Australia.

3.1 The Rightward Shift in Europe

The prelude of the rising European RWE has been long enough. 2008 starts a climax of European crises on finance, immigration and refugees, debt, and security, fostering the environment of RWE; the next turning point is the Pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine crisis. To be sure, during the global quarantine the movements of far right once faded, however, with the long-standing and all-rounded spillover effect from COVID-19 and the war, far right gained fresh ammunition: according to the 2024 EU Election result, while the European people's party and Party of European Socialists remain the domination, the party groups of far-right populism takes 187 seats in the Parliament, a soar compared with last election; holding 31.7% of the seats, Marine Le Pen's RN party trounces the Renaissance led by Macron and nearly prevails again in the French Parliament election; Scholtz and his Social Democratic Party of Germany also meet their Waterloo, lagged far behind by AfD; The same disparity can also be seen in Austria and Belgium. The climate in Europe has released signals of "shifting to the right", though many leftists still deny.

3.2 Between Australia and Europe: More Similarity Than Difference

Regarding Australian RWE, one assertion is very plausible and prevalent: The Australian far-right is unique. The widely-acknowledged definition of Australian far right is: Radical-Nationalism, Neo-Nazism, Populist-Monarchism and Radical-Populism (Saleam, 2022). To be sure, the Australian far-right campaigns in the past decades have spelled these features: The first show of the Australian far right is the New Guard in Sydney with its offshoot, the Centre Party (1933), known for being monarchist and authoritarian; then comes the Australia First Movement in 1941. Violence and radicalism have hardly shown signs of stopping since then. Extreme activities and chaotic

demonstrations are broached within Australia: the Bendigo mosque protests (2014-2015) and the Christchurch mosque shootings in 2019 consolidate the public image of RWE: “radicalism” and “violence”; and since then these two tags have never been absent in Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)’s reports over far right.

Till here, it seems the RWE analysis in Europe helps not that in Australia, since its extreme and turbulent evolution seems incompatible with Europe’s, featuring organized and procedural competition. However, once diachronic analysis is introduced, the similarity between the two sides overtakes the heterogeneity. More accurately, Australian RWE is anachronic with its European counterparts. It is important to point out that the progress of organization and civilization is cumulative. It has only been 52 years since the abolition of “White Australian Policy” legally in Australia, while the relatively moderate and organized European RWE today only forms after its centuries-long movements over radicalism and violence. The truth is radicalism over race, immigration and gender have never been absent since in the history of Europe, only there being no such term as “far right” at that time; according to the theory of Organizational Life Cycles (Smith, 1985), the development of a organized entity also goes through four sure stages including birth, growth, maturity and decline. Nowadays, Europe is already or nearly at maturity, while Australia still in growth. From a holistic perspective, great homogeneity could be unearthed in Australia’s and early Europe’s RWE movement, and Australian RWE is not something unpredictable—It has a predecessor and leaves a trace. Therefore, the evolution in Europe, to some extent, provides a reference in the analysis of Australian RWE. Now part of Australian far right, the ONP as the head, has started to try, if not strive, to get rid off its past shadow featuring extremity and grassroots and to build itself as a people-centered national party, just the same as their European counterparts did decades ago; fresh signals have been clicked on.

3.3 New Signs of Australian RWE: The ONP’s “De-radicalization”

The most significant transition of the ONP in recent years is its increasing moderation in campaign, including in its official rhetoric, concerning issues, and image rebuilding, “de-radicalization” implemented as the core. “De-radicalization”, in this context, refers to the progress during which the ideology and stance of far-right parties shifted from radicalism to moderation. In the recent decade, the use of de-radicalization has been a common “hot tag” of those far-right parties, though in different specific forms, from “Normalization”, “Mainstreaming” to “de-demonization”; The performances and of the ONP could be concluded in three aspects: (1) The increasing diversity of issues and topics in social mobilization and political activities; (2) The moderation in campaign including speeches and actions; (3) the rising popularity and approval rating.

According to its legislative activities in the recent decade, the ONP is striving to expand its engagement in more issues and themes, especially those concerning Australians most. This paper concludes a year-over-year (2016 to 2025.4) comparative table of bills and motions from the One Nation Party, categorized by themes.

Table 1. The Summary of ONP's Issues Shift (2016-2025) Source: Author's Own Compilation

Year	Indigenous Affairs	Immigration/Multiculturalism	Economic Protectionism	Climate/Energy	Social Conservatism	National Sovereignty	Other Themes
2016	2	3	3	1	2	2	2
2017	2	4	4	2	3	3	2
2018	1	5	5	2	2	3	5
2019	3	6	6	3	3	3	1
2020	2	5	4	4	2	2	3
2021	2	3	3	5	2	2	3
2022	1	2	2	4	1	1	8
2023	1	2	3	3	1	1	6
2024	0	1	5	2	2	3	5

Focusing on more issues, the ONP taps into the broader dissatisfaction with Australia's mainstream political parties. While for quite a long time, it has been enchanting in narrow issues around White Australian Policy and immigration, now the One Nation has expanded its opinions over gender, skepticism toward climate policies and industry, and criticism of multiculturalism align with the global resurgence of far-right ideologies. Besides, the increasing political engagement in the Parliament and governance also proves the ONP shifts its preference from simply agitating protests and hatred speech to procedural justice: It tries to adhere to and utilize the existing mechanism rather than to reprimand it (but without proposing effective solutions). This pivot reflects a conscious effort to transition from a fringe movement to a legitimate political force capable of influencing policy debates.

(2) The rhetorical de-radicalization, or more accurately, ambiguity, also amplifies its followers and parries more attacks. Content analysis of One Nation's official statements between 2016 and 2024 shows a reduction in explicitly inflammatory language:

- Use of terms like “white Australia” or “Asianization” has largely decreased, replaced with phrases

such as “protecting Australian values” and “standing up for ordinary Australians.”

- Between 2016 and 2024, instances of overtly racialized language decreased by approximately 45%, based on a systematic review of their campaign platforms.
- This rhetorical shift is also evident in leader Pauline Hanson's speeches. Her emphasis on “Australian sovereignty” now highlights economic and political independence rather than exclusively focusing on race or ethnicity.

(3) Being more systematic and moderate wins the ONP growing popularity, a process aligned with broader trends within European far-right movements. Following its resurgence in the 2016 federal elections, where it secured four Senate seats, the party demonstrated enhanced electoral capabilities, particularly in Queensland, harvesting 11 out of the 89 seats; it's self-evident that the One Nation Party, though still in a lower hand compared with these traditional left-wing dominators (Liberal/National Coalition and Australian Labor Party) and The Greens, is steadily gathering its popularity. A decline in voter loyalty to the two major parties—the Liberal-National Coalition and Labor—has created fertile ground for smaller, issue-focused parties like the ONP to gain traction. In his work *Electoral Democracy in Australia: Crisis, Resilience and Renewal*, Tom Gerald Daly points out that voters' volatility had reached unprecedented levels, with only 40% of Australians consistently voting for the same party compared to 72% in the 1980s (2016). This trend reflects a broader public dissatisfaction of Australia's mainstream left-wing parties and the increasing public interest in populist alternatives.

4. How and Why Australia Will Swing to the Right

The RWE in Australia evolves with time. To a great extent, it has been no longer equivalent to a violent campaign and extremity, especially since to the ONP and other far-right parties, nor does its transformation come from nowhere or imply revolution. To fully understand and forecast Australian RWE, one prerequisite is to grasp the progress of far right and political environment in Europe, since in politics, economy and culture, Australia are, to a great extent, aligned with Europe, the barometer and predecessor; another requirement is to analyse its current dynamic, in which the ONP shall be the focus because: (1) the ONP has been a long-standing and relatively structured far-right party, thus in a large degree, reflecting the latest development and commonality of Australian RWE; (2) Among all Australian far-right parties, the ONP is the most promising to influence or even helm Australia.

It shall be self-evident that the social trend and political environment of a society are determined by its economy and production. In recent decades, a hasty argument becomes increasingly popular in media (even in some think tanks) that many turmoils and crises in theses decades shall be largely blamed on the misled public—the people, in the immediacy and near-full coverage in the information era, are more likely and easier to be led or even controlled by some interest groups or eternal forces with ulterior motives as they please. This opinion itself is a terrible, irresponsible, and deviant misguidance because it tries to address an overall problem but only grasps one small patch of it. To be sure, the people's risk of being manipulated does increase since the Internet and AI, but that speed is far from

matching the speed of the decreasing life standards, the shrinking employment market, and the fatigued economy, which the citizens care most. It is their actual sensation of the environment leads to the brewing gloom and violence of the citizens in recent years, but not that cliché “the public are misled and need a more brilliant government”, which gravely overlooks and belittles the awareness and power of the people, who constitute the basin of society and the representative system. While in those European countries, America and Australia, the hundreds-year development has turns themselves into a civil society which ensure a generally high education and social and political structure, the view always blaming the turmoil simply on the rabbles is a blatant contradiction to the reality: There wouldn’t have existed such group as “rabble”; the injustice creates rabble. The sharp shift to the right in Europe exactly proves that the dissatisfaction of European citizens has reached, in some particular countries, even exceeded the critical value. Till now, in Australia, signs in all fields haven’t been critical yet. However, increasing danger signals have showed that the discontent of Australian people is on the way to the threshold. If the Australian government remains silent in reform and, more importantly, in listening to the public voices, which, to some extent, is done better by the far right, then a screeching turn is probably merely a question of time.

4.1 The Alarming Economy: From Decent to Mediocre

Australia’s economic landscape from 2008 to 2024 reveals significant structural transformations shaped by global crises, domestic policy shifts, and changing voter perceptions. Generally speaking, Australia has turned from a decent economy to a mediocre one now, and room is still left for the worse. These economic changes have played a key role in fostering the resurgence of right-wing populist parties today, such as One Nation, among which Generation Z is becoming a key force in social and political activities, on which the mainstream parties put insufficient emphasis.

It is the quantitative changes that make a qualitative difference. A fact is forming that Australia’s edge and bonus since the financial crisis is fading; the same problems facing Europe and America are coming to Australia. As pointed out above, the social, political, and cultural trends are determined by the economic foundation. Australia, for its unique geographical location and appropriate policies, performs much better than Europe, a success that profoundly directs the trends and ideology in that land: traditional left-wing charm is still widely acknowledged there. It must be noted that the legality of government lies in, to a great extent, whether it can provide solid and strong economic development. Therefore, the mass doubt and betrayal over the governance of left parties, along with the uprising of the far-right parties, first breaks out in Europe, which responded badly to the crises compared to Australia and America; however, in recent years, with the escalating spillover effect of the Pandemic and regional conflict, the maintenance of neo-liberalism’s glory is collapsing as well in Australia and America. In America, since it has a greater volume and deeper-rooted mixed problems compared with Australia, America shows the signals earlier. Donald Trump’s overwhelming victory, securing the seven swing states all at once, has proved that. Between these two, America, for sure, is in a worse situation than Australia: The hollowing industry, the U.S. debt, the bottomless corruption, and its fading control

over the globe are all potential moves to ruin this country. From the economic data, though for all these dim signals, currently Australia remains a relatively and generally decent democracy in the West, but the question is: How long afterward can Australia maintain? The answer is grim because the long-term voters of the left-wing parties are being deeply harmed: Generation Z.

When assessing the economic impact on society and the government, a crucial stakeholder deserves the most concern: Generation Z. As the major reserve and the increasingly important pillar of society, Generation Z hold great say in directing the future of the country. The everyday economic experience of Australians, particularly cost-of-living pressures, is bound to impact the political leanings of this group since now they are deeply involved in social activities. The preference of Generation Z, featuring more pragmatism, is greatly influenced by the perceptible living conditions; according to the economic performance these years, it is no wonder that Z are disappointed with the traditional left-wing policies. Now the shadow of rising inflation and living costs has spread from Europe to Australia. As stated above, Australia did a good job in economic recovery and restraint of recession compared to Europe; Australia basically remained the inflation rate within RBA's target range of 2-3% for much of the period, but post-pandemic disruptions pushed inflation to a peak of 6.8% in 2023, marking its worst inflationary episode since the late 1980s (see Figure-1.1, 1.2); rising utility prices and food costs is disproportionately affecting lower-income households. The surge of living costs exceeds the increase in salary, during which the housing Affordability has been an urgent problem. In the past decades, Australian home ownership fell fast, from about 66% among 30 to 34-year-old Australians in 1981, to 49% in 2021. Young Australians have faced increasing barriers to entry, while middle-class families can not sit on the sidelines anymore, either. They are struggling with rising mortgage costs. Third, the employment shortage is stirring more and more young job seekers to join the demonstration.




Figure 1. Annual Consumer Price Inflation in Australia (1980-2023)




Figure 2. Annualized Price Changes in CPI Groups

For their growth environment and education, Generation Z, compared with their mothers and fathers, feature more critical thinking, rebelliousness, and pragmatism. A fact has always been ignored that to a great portion of Generation Z, the time they are born and raised is probably the best time they have in their lives afterward: in the 90s, the West's domination over the world remains firm; the neo-liberalism and representative democracy are still very compatible with the historic period and productivity, bringing prosperity to Europe, America, Australia, New Zealand, etc.; industrial transformation is successful, assimilating wealth worldwide. But then, the decline started. In the pyramid of society, the young are the ones with the most desires and demands in material and entertainment, thus driving society. They have no complex of neo-liberalism, nor do they have original preference over left or right; however, now that Generation Z have witnessed the malfunction of left parties, that they vote for the right becomes a natural course. That's why the ONP and other far-right parties are leveraging social media—They have detected the unbounded power of Generation Z.

4.2 RWE: The Destined Aftermath of Far Left

While the term “far right” is becoming a buzzword again in recent years, an issue remains dangling: How to define the current far-right parties and movement? Every resurrection of a thing means the birth of a new connotation of it. To dig out the immediate and profound inducements is the sure way to properly evaluate and handle an event. Apart from the defining inducement of this wave of RWE, the unsatisfactory economy, the imbalance between social values, and the unsatisfied public have foreshadowed it. The truth is, the currently popular far-right parties are far from the real sense of RWE—they are far from enough extreme and radical compared with the traditional extreme right; it is

the over left-leaning of the social ethos magnifies the rightward features of these conservative parties. The rise of far-right parties in recent years, to a great extent, shall be attributed to the growing public discontent with the expanding gap between the increasingly left-leaning social values and the existing productivity (the national capacity, specifically in this context). Very few people notice that before this wave of RWE, a radical left-leaning movement in social value and trend has been going on for decades in Europe, America, and other western countries. The development of gender and racial discourse, environmental conservation, and immigration issues exemplifies this movement. These topics, while representing essential progress of humanity, now have been increasingly manipulated and politicized by the politicians and interest groups for two reasons:

As global integration is going on, noted by Luhmann, the social complexity in the West surges, and once its stakeholders have accounted for a certain proportion, an issue can not be ignored anymore (Luhmann, 1995). The African-American Civil Rights Movement in 1950s exemplifies this; the issues concerning the progress of human rights and civilization are the natural cards of leftist politicians and parties, who definitely is to promote and advance these issues; during this process, the issues themselves is no longer the focus of the mainstream left party, only how much political capital it produces matters. In his book *Democracy and Its Critics*, Robert A. Dahl has revealed the high risk of democracy: with the solidification of a political frame and the manipulation of interest groups over the public, democracy may turn out to only stay on the surface (1991). This is one of the headaches of democracy—the spokesperson of the people is likely to turn to that of political capital, a process that could be seen as a political alienation.

(2) For the nature of representative democracy, the progressive issues are becoming hard to rein in. Politician's manipulation has been expounded in (1). In the next phase, it would be these issues that manipulate society, a period now many countries are experiencing. Within the system of "One person, one vote", the party and its members need to uphold the value and concern of their solid voters. Now that the left parties include progressive topics into their cards, their emphasis and support over them has no choice but to go up consistently—this dynamic is explained by Herbert Marcuse's theory of repressive tolerance, which suggests that tolerance extended to progressive causes can paradoxically suppress alternative views (1965). Over time, the public's expectations regarding these issues grow, forcing governments to continuously advance them to "higher standards of correctness", irrespective of pragmatic limits. So far, a vicious circle has formed: as these themes became central to public debate, the masterminds, namely the mainstream left parties, that relied on these promotion became entrapped by the expectations they created: all other concerns shall take the backseat even when these correct issues have been incompatible with the realistic conditions; this is how the Greens in Australia grows up, which, the same as other green parties, upholds radical ecological ideals even in hard time, disregarding the financial stringency and stagnant society. The leftist politicians themselves can not interrupt either, since these topics are so correct and progressive that they have been viewed as moral imperatives, and any opposition invites public backlash or electoral loss. The mainstream parties would

not risk that.

It must be clarified that this is not a condemnation of these progressive issues— they are indispensable to a healthy society because they prove the progress in human civilization: as society evolves, the coverage of universal kindness is bound to increase, without which society would face collapse; However, the point is that now this social kindness has been pushed to a level that the material reality can't sustain any more, an unreined kindness—especially after the economic crises and COVID-19—In Europe, America and Australia, increasing citizens, especially Generation Z, have viewed the mainstream left-wing parties as malfunctioned: While on one hand, the people's basic physiological and safety need—employment, housing, and financial stability—are unmet for the severe economy, they find out their government, is still unswervingly embracing more immigrants, generously aiding Ukraine and calling for more care and resources on animals. Maslow's hierarchy of needs has provided an insightful framework: While basic physiological and safety needs are unmet, how can the leftist parties convince the public to focus on the progressive issues and vote for them?

5. The Identity, Logic, and Strategy of the ONP

To fully grasp RWE in Australia, the ONP specifically, understanding the inner logic and identity of the far-right party means a lot, while the strategy analysis further provides an insight into the future track of One Nation. The following part will expound: (1) the logic and foundation of RWE; (2) the current strategies and shifts of RWE in Australia and Europe: de-radicalization; (3) the detailed approaches and phases for the ONP to achieve transformation in public image and capacity for election.

5.1 *The Identity and Ambivalence of the Far Right Today*

Though nowadays, it seems “far right” and “populism” have been bound with each other tightly, the two have their own tendency: The concept of “right” and “left” dates back to the French Revolution, and gradually, the former come to represent freedom, equality, fraternity and progress, while the latter stands for authority, order, responsibility and nationalism. The boundary between the two is not definite but relative. The ongoing left-leaning of these successful far-right parties worldwide have proved that; as to “populism”, there exists different definitions among which Cas Mudde's statement represents the major idea, that in their view, society consists of two hostile groups, the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” (2004). Therefore, a main picture of RWE can be drawn: while the civilization goes forward, it remains the fanatic speaker of the conservative sides of society and of the majority of people, at least in its own eyes; it keeps alert in anti-establishment and chases after the pure traditional benefits and ethos, the conservative mass as its major supporters.

5.2 *The Sure Strategy of the ONP: De-radicalization*

That why far-right parties in Australia and Europe stress de-radicalization deserves discussion. It is evident that there exists an inner contradiction between RWE and de-radicalization: As defined above, RWE, at its essence, is a conservative ideology against the main trend and value, which means even compared with centrists, RWE is the one significantly radical; from this perspective,

“de-radicalization” means disarmament of the far right. Hence, this new shift shall be considered from a greater scope. It is for more popularity in public and access to the ruling status that far-right parties acquiesce in this ambivalence; however, this shift—de-radicalization—has nothing to do with the self-revolution of RWE, but a mere campaign banner and gesture which seems extremely enchanting and plausible to voters suffering unremitting crises. In conclusion, de-radicalization is a “retreat-in-order-to-advance” strategy. The analysis above of the ONP’s performance proves that One Nation, long cold-shouldered by the Australian Labor Party, Liberal/National Coalition, and Australian Greens, has finally met its “Epiphany”—the strategy, same as its European counterparts, could be found in its movement. This is also a danger signal for the Australian left parties. In 2022 Election, the votes for the ONP and the UAP(United Australia Party, another Australian far-right party) totals about 9%—a blatant warning to the traditional leftists: if no further effective response be paid from the left-wing government, it is not impossible for extreme rightists to helm Australia one day, the time they would drop the camouflage and do as a real rightist do.

As expounded above, the dilemma of the ONP comes from its inherent contradiction: In one way, for expansion, a far-right party needs to soften its stances; but in another way, it still needs its core voters, the social conservatives. Just as Yves Mény and Yves Surel point out, the far-right party, in its essence, is unsustainable; it has destinies no more than three: extinction, being a permanent opponent, or mainstreaming (2002). The first two scenarios are doomed, and the only difference is that the second puts up with the tag “otherness” forever. Therefore, the sure way for the prosperity of the ONP is de-radicalization, which means softening and ambiguity in disputed issues.

5.3 The Implement Method Toward Prosperity

To further interpret the causal mechanism and connotation of Australian RWE, the phases and approaches could be concluded as follows two parts:

Inside the system, the full use of the existing political systems—The ONP is striving to expand its role in the Australian political arena, particularly the Parliament. As elaborated before, in the primary stage, the activities of Australian RWE are basically violent and disorderly; now, the ONP, along with AfD and RN, have realized the power of political and procedural justice. Though Australia, generally speaking, should be filed into two-party system (some experts believe two-party system is a derivative of multi-party system), it still upholds proportional representation system, which determines the mainstream party can not monopolize the Parliament and the allocation of seats more represents the appeal of the people, leaving a huge room for marginal parties to worm their ways in the center (if they sniff and reflect the public demands); another crucial move of far-right parties is working to secure victory in local elections that always ignored by mainstream parties. From AfD to RN, from Fidesz to PVV (the Party for Freedom, now the largest party in the Dutch parliament), the key victory in local elections paves the path to these successful European far-right parties. In this respect, the ONP has gained some results: Once the ONP enters the Parliament, it starts its phase two: expanding its seats by issues and good offices.

The second approach is beyond the arena: the transformation of the public image by showcasing moderation and advancement in three key aspects: role definition, issue selection, and social mobilization. The ONP, since it returned to the Parliament, has started its role shift, slow but real: the analysis of the bills and motions and its rhetoric in these 8 years above proves the ONP is striving to fabricate an impression of the representative of the majority of Australians. The frequency of extreme wording and hatred speech declines significantly; the increasing ambiguity over disputed issues and groups (including Moslem) and the expanding coverage of topics. Besides, the ONP, following the path of its European counterparts, is upgrading itself from a single-issue party to a multi-issues party, because remaining in the few traditional issues helps nothing to increase the diversity and quantity of voters and public opinions, with it, nor could the ONP have effective competition and debate with the mainstream parties. That being the case, the ONP would be on the margin forever since its little engagement with the mainstream, the only public impression being “maverick” and “anti-establishment”; but now the ONP has consciously worked to persuade the swing voters. as to mobilization, the ONP also works to be a movement party (Kitschelt, 2006), namely adhering to and leveraging the existing system and rule to develop (during which the Internet and social media function) rather than organizing inflammatory demonstration, which provides ammunition to the opponents to leaves a image of “mob” to the swing voters. Television debate, rally speech, and public interview, these conventional approaches of the establishment, now also become crucial moves of the ONP; the diversity of promotion is also prominent in Pauline Hanson's scheme: the short online drama has become an efficient tool, especially to the young generation. In recent years, the ONP has consistently rolled out and promoted Please Explain, a caricature-type drama satirizing the mainstream left-wing parties and the government. This online drama has had three seasons and has become popular on social media like X.

5.4 The Potential of the ONP and the Democratic Predicament in the West

Some opinions argue that how petty the ONP is even compared with the Australian Greens, not to mention with the Liberal/National Coalition and the Australian Labor Party. Indeed, till now the odds, to a great extent, are still against the ONP and several other far-right parties: Liberal/National Coalition and the Australian Labor Party still hold tight on the election and governance; among the opposition, the Australian Greens seems to rally more public support. Nonetheless, The key why the ONP remains relatively negligible is that compared with Europe, Australia is, indeed, better off: suffering less impact from the 2008 financial crisis and maintaining a more sound economy and security after the Epidemic, etc., which means the catalysts for extreme right wing in Australia is inadequate yet. Since their proactive response to the severe recession, immigration crisis and radical social contradictions, far-right parties in Europe, such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) and National Rally (RN), have demonstrated how initially marginalized movements can gain significant political ground under conducive circumstances: Founded in 2013, AfD initially focused on Eurozone opposition but transitioned into anti-immigration and nationalist rhetoric, gaining momentum during the 2015 migration crisis. By 2023,

AfD had secured 16.2% of the vote in national elections and achieved a historic victory in Thuringia; Marine Le Pen's National Rally adopts the same road; These trajectories highlight the role of economic anxieties and cultural polarization in galvanizing support for far-right platforms and provide insights into how Australia's One Nation Party, though currently limited in influence, may similarly capitalize on shifting sociopolitical dynamics in the future.

To the ONP, parallels can be drawn. Since its inception in 1997, One Nation has similarly harnessed nationalist sentiments and opposition to immigration. While it has yet to achieve the scale of European far-right parties, its ability to secure federal and state parliamentary seats and influence national debates (e.g., immigration and climate policies) suggests latent potential. The normalization of far-right rhetoric in Europe indicates that One Nation could expand its influence under similar conditions, such as economic downturns or sociopolitical crises. Given these trends, One Nation's prospects for growth should not be underestimated. European examples demonstrate how far-right parties, even when initially marginalized, can capitalize on public discontent and institutional challenges to achieve political prominence; besides, the identity shift and "de-radicalization" have successfully appealed to increasing swing voters—factors such as rising economic inequality, debates over national identity, and increasing political polarization may provide fertile ground for One Nation's future expansion.

However, it must be pointed out that the "de-radicalization" of the ONP and other far-right parties, even if they become the ruling parties, do little to improve the current recession and gap for two reasons: (1) As analysed above, since their identity ambivalence, the maximum acceptance of far-right parties is that "de-radicalization" only applied in campaign, which determines their natural vulnerability: Theoretically they should adhere to and implement their core creeds when in office, however, the promise "de-radicalization" in campaign and the inherent reputation and burden as the ruling party are bound to refrain the ONP from that; (2) the ONP, though currently unyielding and practical in concerning and protecting ordinary Australians, is still trapped in the vicious circle—the flaws of democracy still exist. The rising governance predicament and governmental malfunction are independent of whether the left is ruling or not, but a systematic problem badly in need of deep reform. The campaign and edges of the ONP are all based on the existing system without further inquiry into or a solution to it. Therefore, basically, when the ONP is in power, only two possible scenarios exist: Scenario one is the ONP restores the RWE stances in governance—this would bring out another waves of public discontent and conflicts since RWE is actually more of a public sedative than a cure—it is anachronous and incapable of handling the this mess; the ONP would probably end up in a hurry downfall once people take off their glasses and find out the rightists do even worse than the leftists. The second and also the most possible scenario is, the ONP, at the very beginning, postures itself as a hawkish government but once it has settled, continues to adopt a ambiguous orientation; the ONP has little intention or capacity to reform Australian political pattern: It can not transform the flaws of democracy since its lack of experience in governance and regulation and cooperation with others, nor could it really revive Australia while still in the shadow of America and other frames; the democratic

deficit is becoming ever-intractable—the victory of the ONP is to aggravate it rather than mend it. The relationship between the existing democratic defects and the malfunction of both the left and the right is critical. In his book *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy*, Albert Hirschman has elaborated how democracy would turn rigid as the concession benefit balance increases (1991, p. 57). The phenomenon that both the left wing and right wing tend to be ambiguous has proved the rising democratic deficit. To gain more voters and benefits, the right-wing parties worldwide have actually stealthily added more or less some left advocacy into themselves, while those left-wing ones also show more signs of right wing in policy and promise for the same reasons: “De-radicalization” is not a one-way process, and the mainstream party is not a bystander. “Contagion Effect” put forward by Tarik Abou-Chadi has elaborated this dynamic. In *The Rhetoric of Reaction*, the analysis of the conservatives also explains why the possibility of far-right parties reforming the existing deflections is slight: no matter from the perspective of Perversity, futility or jeopardy, the RWE indicates its weakness in social transformation badly needed by the people. Therefore, the rise of the ONP is far from a good turn to Australians. In the long term, the current dilemma is to continue.

Conclusion

The One Nation Party has transformed into a more organized, popular, and politically effective entity over the past decade, during which far-right parties worldwide have surged. The commonality between the ONP and its European counterparts provides an insightful access to the trace of RWE and its evolution in Australia. The rapidly changing economy and unbalanced social ethos bolster and manifest the base of RWE; By the strategy “de-radicalization”—moderating its rhetoric and capitalizing on voter discontent, the party has positioned itself as a significant force in Australia's shifting political landscape. The two approaches, leveraging the existing system and rebuilding its public image, have taken effect and are shaping the Australian climate. However, its future trajectory will depend on its ability to balance radical ideologies with the demands of an increasingly diverse electorate. These dynamics highlight the need for continued research into the far-right's role in shaping Australian politics. The ONP's evolution mirrors broader trends within Australia's far-right movements and increasing public discontent. Its success also underscores a deeper polarization in Australian society, as economic and cultural grievances drive voters toward populist solutions. As the party continues to refine its strategy, its influence on public discourse and policy debates—particularly on immigration, regional development, and economic sovereignty—is likely to grow in the next decades.

However, behind the popularity is the malfunction of democracy and society. The vicious circle and the inherent limit of the ONP determine that its victory makes little difference—It is the profound deficiencies in the system that buoy the democratic and economic recession. Therefore, in the next decades, though the momentum of the ONP and its comrades worldwide is likely to surge, the overall recession can not be reversed until a profound reform is carried out, with which the current left-and right-wing parties seem incapable of handling.

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