

Original Paper

Research on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment

Cheng Wang¹

¹ Shihezi University, Shihezi, China

Received: May 29, 2026

Accepted: July 02, 2026

Online Published: July 27, 2026

doi:10.22158/assc.v8n4p11

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/assc.v8n4p11>

Abstract

New Forms of Employment Have Emerged with the rapid development of the Internet platform economy. Food delivery workers, ride-hailing drivers and other workers in the gig economy have gradually joined the ranks of employed people and are now subjects of labour protection. A considerable number of workers are still not covered by mandatory social insurance, lack adequate protection for workplace injuries and old-age support, and have not been included in labour relationships due to ambiguous criteria. Legally speaking, the main problems include institutional deficiencies in regulations for social insurance coverage, working hours and minimum wage standards, as well as an absence of comprehensive high-level laws. Enforcement policies do not meet the actual demands of implementation, regulatory supervision fails to reach the required level, and different criteria for recognizing labour relationships lead to inconsistent judicial decisions in similar cases. In response to the problems listed above, a categorized legal system with specialised protection will be developed; a new type of “special labour relationship” will be introduced, and a three-tier assessment system based on the degree of dependency will be established. Strengthen platform accountability and algorithm governance, clarify joint liability, build an open-source system for auditing algorithms, and apply a reversal of the burden of proof rule. Mobile social insurance accounts and independent insurance funds not linked to employment models should also be established, and all-encompassing improvements to occupational injury protection are necessary. Build a rational legal system to promote the development of the platform economy and safeguard the rights of labour.

Keywords

New forms of employment, labour relations, rights protection, legal system, platform-based employment

1. Introduction

With the development of the Internet platform economy, new types of employment have emerged, such as efficient, flexible, and low-entry-barrier forms of work. Although it provides employment for many people, this model of labour does not meet all the requirements of labour protection and has drawn criticism. A severe problem in social governance has arisen: many platform workers, due to the design of labour-less relationship, lack adequate safety guarantees, are highly vulnerable to risks, and are not covered by workers' injury insurance.

The system of social insurance under standardised labour relations is not suitable for the demands of flexible employment from a legal standpoint. Given the "de-labour-relationalisation" feature of platform work, applying the "subordination" standard in labour law and social security legislation is proving difficult. Algorithms and contracts are used by platforms to reduce employer liability, and the issue of worker classification is thus further complicated. Thus, it fails to provide effective legal supervision; the institutional system is out of step with changes in the industry, and social security equity cannot be achieved.

One of the current institutional problems in the area of labour rule of law is how to protect the innovative momentum of the platform economy and build a rights protection system for workers in new forms of employment through legal means. From a legal standpoint, this paper systematically studies the actual difficulties in protecting workers' rights under the new employment model and their institutional roots, examines relevant domestic and foreign laws and practical experience, explores paths for developing a social security legal system suitable for these new business models, and hopes to provide some references for strengthening labour governance and promoting fairness and justice.

2. Practical Context and Theoretical Foundation for Protecting the Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment

2.1 Definition and Feature Analysis of New Forms of Employment

Deep integration of digital technology and the platform economy has given rise to a new type of employment, a new form of work, that deviates from the traditional stable nine-to-five model. This new form is based on the Internet for task distribution, matching and delivery. Workers are no longer bound to a single place of work or a fixed schedule; they can choose their own working time and amount of work freely according to their own situations. Food delivery riders, ride-hailing drivers, live-streaming hosts, remote programmers and professionals in the e-commerce industry are typical cases. With the continuous expansion of the digital economy, this new type of employment has gradually been incorporated into the absorption of labour and is now a core component of social stability at an increasing rate.

The phrase "new forms of employment" first appeared in the 2015 proposal for the 13th Five-Year Plan. All of these designations, such as "new employment groups", "workers in new business models", and "eight specific categories", refer to the same group but are based on different angles. The new form of

employment for workers has different types of employment (Note 1). The category of “workers in new business models” refers to individuals employed under the new form of internet-based economic structure; however, staff members such as administrative staff or technical specialists in these enterprises do not meet the criteria for workers under the new employment forms because of their traditional employment arrangements. A typical case is that of crowdsourced delivery riders and ride-hailing drivers who perform work for the platform without a formal employment contract, as well as those employed by freight logistics platforms. The official title for this group is now “workers in new forms of employment”.

The new forms of employment have shown very complicated structures in terms of their features, and the relationships among employees are also rather ambiguous. Under the pretext of concepts such as “cooperation”, “contracting” or “information services”, platform companies create legal links with workers and deliberately avoid the traditional employer liability system of labour law. The algorithm of the work process ranks employees, allocates tasks according to the algorithm, and applies reward-and-punishment rules to realise implicit scheduling and behavioural constraints for the workers. Although the workers are nominally autonomous, they are still under the control of these systems (Note 2). Income levels fluctuate greatly and are not stable guarantees; they vary according to how much work is finished. Most workers cannot obtain the legal social insurance benefits for work injuries, pensions, and unemployment, and their career development paths are also uncertain. The special attributes of these workers have reduced their risk resistance and created serious deficiencies in the protection of their rights; thus, a new problem for the current social security system has arisen.

2.2 Theoretical Basis for Strengthening the Protection of Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment

The structural contradictions in the current labour protection system stem from the platform economy model of employment. Therefore, protecting the rights of workers under new forms of employment is an urgent problem for theoretical research, and it should not be regarded as a conflict between “new forms and the old system”; instead, this contradiction is multi-faceted and involves demands at all levels of the institution.

In terms of new models for labour organisation, platform-based employment has disrupted the traditional “one-to-one”, face-to-face system of employment relationships and replaced it with a flexible “one-to-many”, contactless connection model (Note 3). In the context of the platform economy, dispersed urban areas have taken the place of fixed workshops as workers’ workplaces, and abstract algorithmic systems have replaced physical management staff to issue work instructions. The Divisions among the parties to the labour dispute have also been reduced. Although a labour protection system has been built around the factory model, this organisational change has generated serious problems in identifying the employer because labour activities no longer occur at a particular time and place. Currently, the institutional system has failed to answer basic questions such as “who is responsible for providing protection” and “what constitutes protection”. Strengthened safeguards for workers in new

employment forms can be seen as both an institutional response to changes in labour organisation and a fundamental requirement for transitioning to a “socially oriented” system of protection from the old “unit-based” model.

Given the structural problems, workers in new forms of employment face high mobility, weak protection and high risks. Platform workers are not the same as traditional employees; they lack the safety net of occupational health and social security and their income fluctuates with the number of orders. This is a system-level problem: The platforms have treated the workers as partners and shirked responsibility; in order to earn a living, these workers have been forced to work longer hours and undertake high-risk orders. The reason for the change in social conflicts to structural risks is a lack of workers’ rights across the board. Reinforcement of rights protection is to protect the common good and reduce social risks.

The Legal System needs to keep up with changes in society and the economy. The development of labour protection mechanisms shows that every change in the mode of production requires an adjustment in the scope and approach of labour law regulation, and thus, from agricultural workshops to industrial plants and from manufacturing assembly lines to fragmented service operations, legislation has consistently sought a dynamic balance between adaptation to changing production patterns and the protection of workers’ rights. The changes in the structure of employment due to industrial revolutions have been as profound as those caused by digital technology; therefore, all-encompassing reforms of the legal system are required to protect the basic rights of workers. Therefore, the reforms of labour governance should cover algorithmic management, extend social insurance coverage to flexible workers, and build an all-encompassing system of rights protection that no longer operates in two sections. These modifications are due to the continuous improvements in the system of labour laws and will adapt to changes in society at any time.

3. Legal Challenges in Protecting the Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment

3.1 Legislative Gap: Structural Lag in Supply Regulation

The main reason for the failure to protect the rights of workers in new forms of employment is that the legal system has not been reformed in time. The reason for this gap is not a defect in any specific law, but rather a fundamental inconsistency between the organisational model of platform-based employment and the design concept of the entire labour protection system; as a result, this situation has occurred. Serious problems currently exist in the protection of workers’ rights under these circumstances, and the main reasons are as follows: there is a lack of a comprehensive legal system.

Barriers in the institutional channel have restricted people’s access to social insurance at the start. Some platform companies, employers and workers in new forms of employment do not fall under the traditional definition of an employment relationship, and labour contracts are often not signed due to a lack of clear provisions in unified national laws or administrative regulations. The present Social

Insurance Law does not cover the participation of these workers in the basic employee pension insurance system; therefore, work-related injury insurance is also not available for them. As a result, many platform-based workers have been excluded from the statutory social security system, are exposed to serious risks of occupational injury and lack retirement security, and this is largely due to an unclear and insufficient legal system.

There are considerable institutional deficiencies in the regulatory system for overtime work. Some workers in new forms of employment have worked more than 10 hours a day and many have worked more than 8 hours per day. Currently, the regulations on working hours, overtime payment calculation and compensatory leave provisions in labour laws all assume a standard labour relationship. Overtime work under the flexible employment model is not subject to the same legal regulations; platforms have introduced mechanisms such as algorithmic task distribution and incentive systems to indirectly encourage long working hours, but workers have often not been paid fairly or granted sufficient rest after working overtime, and protection measures have not been effectively implemented.

The Scope of application for the minimum wage system is not clear. Although most workers in the new form of employment earn more than the local minimum wage each month, some groups are still financially stressed and earn very little because of problems such as too high platform commission rates and irregular order volumes. Under the non-labour relationship arrangements of the platform economy, current laws do not explicitly stipulate whether and how the minimum wage system should be implemented; therefore, these workers lack a basic income security net.

Due to the lack of a legal system, problems such as the digital power of platform algorithms and insufficient training for new employees have not been effectively solved. A lack of rights protection at a low level and continuous high-intensity labour in the development of new employment models have become persistent, systemic problems. To a certain extent, the reasons for this are the rapid changes in the employment model and the failure of institutional provisions in legal and administrative law to adapt in time. Therefore, at the level of laws and regulations, the central government will introduce relevant adjustments to close the existing deficiencies and provide specific, consistent, and effective legal guarantees for protecting the rights and interests of workers under new forms of employment.

3.2 Weak Law Enforcement: Insufficient Adaptability of Governance Capacity

The current regulatory system cannot keep pace with the changes in business model governance, so enforcement has been difficult; at the same time, the delay in introducing new rules is also a problem that legislators have not addressed. Generally speaking, the two kinds of parties in the traditional model of labour supervision are employers and employees; its purpose is to manage labour disputes and violations, ensure compliance with laws and regulations, etc., and it has many deficiencies in the era of platform labour.

The other is the absence of regulatory objects. Under the traditional employment model, the employer has a clear legal entity and can be identified by business registration for jurisdiction by labour inspection authorities. However, in the platform economy, employment chains are intentionally

extended by all parties involved, such as platform companies, crowdsourcing service providers, labour dispatch agencies and partners, to form a complex system of responsibility sharing. When workers' rights are violated, the current laws do not specify which party is primarily liable and which party bears secondary liability; therefore, the priority of enforcement is unclear due to uncertain regulatory boundaries, and implementation efficiency is reduced. In the event of a serious work injury to a worker, the amount covered by the commercial insurance or its timely disbursement may be inadequate. Many workers in new forms of employment are at higher risk of injury or illness during work due to policy gaps that fail to address the deficiencies in rights protection effectively.

At the same time, the law enforcement authorities need to increase their daily supervision of the platform company. Some regulatory departments for the new-business model sector have not yet adapted, lacking proactive service orientation and facing a shortage of enforcement resources. At present, there are no particular mechanisms for handling labour disputes related to wages and benefits, working hours and standards of algorithmic management. In the early days of the dispute, administrative guidance or mediation may not be suitable; only when the conflict is serious or has developed into a serious case will enforcement departments step in. This will increase the cost of high-definition display equipment and may reduce the public's trust in the rule of law, allowing some platform enterprises to avoid accountability. Objectively speaking, this is due to a lack of supervision in the implementation stage and is thus ineffective.

3.3 Judicial Discrepancies: Internal Divisions in Adjudication Standards

Generally speaking, the problems in judicial practice can be divided into two categories: regional and case-by-case differences in the standards for determining whether a labor relationship exists, and inherent conflicts in current regulations during their application to scenarios of platform-based employment. A typical manifestation of this problem is frequent judicial errors of "different judgments for similar cases". At the regulatory level, the main reference for defining a labor relationship is the 2005 Notice on Establishing Labor Relationship Criteria issued by the former Ministry of Labour and Social Security, which has created a system based on the three main factors: "compliance with regulations, submission to management, and business structure". Although this system is very suitable for traditional employment circumstances, there are interpretation difficulties in its application to platform-based situations, especially regarding the scope of "management oversight"; that is, platform operators do not exercise control over workers through traditional means such as attendance monitoring or direct instructions, but rather through algorithmic rules. The courts have issued conflicting rulings on whether such "flexible control" constitutes legal "labor supervision", and it is unclear whether employees' work falls under the scope of the platform's "business composition" when only "information matching services" are offered.

According to judicial practice, when dealing with cases on the determination of labour relations under new forms of employment (Note 4), courts frequently switch between "substantive assessment" and "formal review". Some courts use contractual documents as the primary reference for determining the

nature of legal relations, respect the contracts or cooperation agreements signed by the parties, and thus conclude that no labour relationship exists. Other courts have paid more attention to the actual employment conditions and, disregarding the form of the contract, examined the degree of control exerted by the platform over the workers to determine whether a labour relationship existed. The difference in the direction of judicial application is due to the lack of a precise standard system for platform labour, so either the old standards can be fully abandoned and replaced, or they can be directly applied; thus, a compromise between the two is needed.

The 42nd batch of guiding cases issued by the Supreme People's Court has introduced the concept of "dominant labour management" and provided a reference for standardising judicial practice. Based on actual employment circumstances, this idea will generally consider three factors: the economic dependence of platform workers on the platform, how much the platform regulates the work process of these workers, and whether workers have the choice to set transaction prices and work arrangements. For all courts at various levels to implement the same judicial model, a longer adjustment period will be needed after these leading cases are released. The stability of the right-protection system for workers under new forms of employment will be affected by differences in judicial interpretation, and this problem is unlikely to be resolved.

4. Recommendations for Protecting the Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment

4.1 Reconstructing the Logical Framework of Legal Safeguards

Given the problems in protecting the rights of workers under new forms of employment, the "dualistic view of labour relations" should be abandoned and the institutional system for rights protection redesigned. The problem with the current system is not the quantity of protection, but rather a faulty distribution mechanism that focuses all protective resources on the "labor relationship" as the single entry point and thus fails to protect many workers who are actually in need of such safeguards.

The Direction of institutional reform should change from "identity-oriented" to "behaviour-oriented". In other words, the sole condition for providing protection should no longer be whether a relationship is a labour relationship (Note 5); instead, according to the actual degree of subordination and control of practitioners by platforms, corresponding levels of protection should be determined. This way has a long history of development in comparative law, such as Germany's "quasi-employee" system, Britain's idea of the "worker", and Spain's "riding method", all of which have expanded the scope of protection from "employees" to "economically dependent workers" to some extent. The concept of "circumstances not fully meeting the criteria for establishing a labor relationship" proposed in Document No.56 of China's Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security represents a preliminary exploration along this line, but it requires further development into a formal legal framework.

Specifically, it is recommended to establish a "tiered protection" framework within the revision of the Labor Law or through specialized legislation. The first tier would provide comprehensive labor law

protections for workers who meet traditional employment relationship criteria, with platforms assuming employer responsibilities. The second tier would grant core rights—including minimum wage guarantees, occupational injury coverage, and collective bargaining rights—to workers who partially meet employment standards but exhibit economic dependence, with platforms fulfilling corresponding contribution obligations. The third tier would safeguard self-employed individuals with strong autonomy through flexible social insurance enrollment channels and public service support. The key to this tiered approach lies in clear classification criteria based on three core factors: the degree of platform control over work processes, income concentration levels, and employees' ability to independently determine transaction prices. Legislative efforts should adopt a dual strategy combining specialized legislation with complementary amendments. Priority should be given to drafting a “Law on Rights Protection for Workers in New Employment Forms” to address critical issues such as tiered employment identification standards, diversified social insurance enrollment pathways, and clarified platform liability boundaries. Concurrently, relevant provisions in the Labor Law, Labor Contract Law, and Social Insurance Law should be revised to resolve conflicts between specialized legislation and existing laws. Local legislation should refine operational standards and implementation procedures within the national legal framework, tailored to regional realities of emerging employment models.

4.2 Strengthening Platform Responsibilities and Algorithm Governance

The effective protection of rights for workers in new forms of employment relies on a clear definition of platform companies' legal responsibilities and robust regulation of their algorithmic management practices (Note 7). Altering this landscape requires a systematic overhaul across three dimensions: identification of responsible entities, delineation of liability specifics, and establishment of accountability mechanisms.

At the level of identifying responsible entities, the platform's status as the “primary responsible entity” should be established. Regardless of how the platform assigns tasks to practitioners through commercial arrangements—whether via direct contracting, labor dispatch, business outsourcing, or crowdsourcing partnerships—as long as practitioners' work ultimately serves the platform's commercial operations and is subject to its rules, the platform bears the primary responsibility for safeguarding practitioners' fundamental rights. For multi-tiered subcontracting scenarios, the “first-responsibility system” adopted in food safety can be referenced: practitioners have the right to assert their claims against the platform, which may then seek reimbursement from the actual employing party after fulfilling its obligations. This framework not only facilitates practitioners' rights protection but also maintains flexibility in allocating responsibilities within the platform.

At the level of defining responsibility content, a differentiated responsibility system matching the respective protection tiers should be established. For practitioners engaged in formal employment relationships, the platform assumes full employer responsibilities. For those in “incomplete employment relationships,” the platform is required to fulfill core obligations such as contributing to occupational injury insurance, ensuring minimum (Note 7) wage compliance, and providing

compensation for overtime work; however, it may be exempted from obligations closely tied to stable employment relationships, such as economic compensation and paid annual leave. For independent practitioners, the platform primarily bears governance responsibilities including information transparency, fair transactions, and algorithmic compliance. This differentiated allocation of responsibilities not only embodies the legal principle of “alignment between authority and responsibility” but also prevents excessive liability from stifling the vitality of the platform economy.

At the level of responsibility implementation mechanisms, algorithmic accountability must be strengthened. Platform operations involving task assignment, pricing (Note 8), performance evaluation, and reward/punishment mechanisms based on algorithms should be regarded as part of their management functions and subject to legal review. Specifically, it is recommended to establish an algorithm impact assessment system requiring platforms to evaluate potential effects on user rights before implementing algorithmic rules and file such assessments; implement an algorithm interpretation mechanism ensuring users have the right to reasonable explanations for algorithmic decisions affecting their interests; and introduce algorithmic proof requirements in labor dispute resolution, with platforms bearing the burden of proving the rationality and non-discrimination nature of their algorithms.

4.3 Optimizing Occupational Injury Protection and Services

Workers in new forms of employment face higher risks of occupational injuries, while the current work-related injury insurance system is closely tied to labor relationships, leaving a large number of platform workers excluded from coverage. Even when platform companies voluntarily pay work-related injury insurance premiums (Note 9) for their employees, existing regulations still require them to bear multiple payment obligations—including wage continuation benefits during work suspension, disability allowances, and one-time disability employment subsidies—which significantly increase labor costs and objectively discourages platforms from enrolling workers. Therefore, it is essential to establish an occupational injury protection system independent of labor relationships and tailored to the characteristics of flexible employment.

The insurance system is decoupled from labor relationships. The establishment of a labor relationship is no longer a prerequisite for enrollment; instead, “employment activity” serves as the trigger condition for coverage – the protection mechanism can be activated whenever an employee suffers injury while accepting orders and performing tasks on the platform. Second, contributions correspond directly to benefits. Following the principle of “who benefits, who pays,” the platform bears the primary contribution responsibility, with employees contributing proportionally, while the government provides policy support and fund guarantees. Contribution rates are linked to employees’ income levels or order volumes, ensuring benefit levels match contribution amounts. Third, administration and services are socialized. This is no longer the traditional model of work-related injury insurance under social security; now, commercial insurers are also involved in operations by applying their expertise in actuarial pricing, claims handling and risk management to build a multi-party governance system that features

“government leadership, market-driven operation and societal participation”.

Regarding the specific institutional arrangement, it is proposed that the standardised system building upon the existing pilot program for occupational injury protection be established promptly. For enrollment, the platform enterprise needs to require employee enrollment; promptly after receiving an order, it should be enrolled automatically and automatically disenrolled when the payment is suspended to keep the coverage status consistent with employment at all times. In determining entitlements, simplify the process and use “work cause” among the three criteria of work time, workplace, and work cause as the principal standard to meet the features of new employment models with mobile workplaces and fragmented working hours. The first three basic rights under benefits are to receive medical treatment, disability compensation and death benefits; the standards for these benefits will be in line with those of work-related injury insurance, and adjustments may be made according to the fund’s capacity.

In addition, it is recommended to develop the mobile social security system simultaneously to solve the problem of coverage discontinuity for workers engaged in new forms of employment during cross-platform and cross-regional mobility. These accounts need to use the individual’s personal ID number as the unique identifier, store contribution information and benefit status on all platforms and at different times, and thus support the continuous calculation of benefit rights and convenient cross-regional transfer. This will help to complete the system of occupational injury insurance and provide a foundation for the adjustment of the entire social security system in the new era of flexible employment.

epilogue

As a product of the era of the digital economy, new forms of employment have emerged, creating numerous jobs and revitalising the market; at the same time, serious problems have also arisen in the traditional system of labour protection laws. Legally speaking, the three main problems that workers in these new forms of employment face are systematically examined in this paper: legislative gaps, weak enforcement and judicial inconsistency, and specific recommendations are proposed in the three areas of a categorised protection system, platform responsibility and algorithmic governance, and stronger occupational injury protection. According to research, to solve these problems, we should no longer use an “all-or-nothing” approach to labour relations, establish tiered protection systems based on the degree of subordination, clarify the legal liability of platforms as digital employers, promote algorithm transparency and a reversed burden of proof, and build independent occupational injury insurance systems outside the traditional employment model. Only by working together, at the level of legislation, administration, justice and society, can we protect the development of the platform economy and strengthen the safety net for workers simultaneously. With changes in employment models, the institution’s system will also need to be adjusted. In the future, top-level policy design and grassroots innovation will work together to promote the development of specialised legislation, improve

cross-departmental cooperation mechanisms, and ensure that the rule of law provides a fairer and more humane environment for all workers.

References

- Chen, S. J., Han, Q., & Jing, Y. X. (2026). Exploring Legal Approaches to Strengthening Rights Protection for Workers in New Forms of Employment. *Sanjin Grassroots Governance*, 2026(01), 114-120.
- Hou, C. X. (2026). Analysis on the Construction of a Social Security System for Workers in New Forms of Employment. *Economist*, (02), 281-283.
- Jin, J. C. (2022). *Research on the occupational injury protection system for workers in new business models*. Zhejiang Gongshang University.
- Li, G. H., & Gao, H. H. (2022). Research on the Construction of a Regulatory System for Protecting Labor Rights of Workers in New Forms of Employment – An Analysis Based on Shandong Province. *Journal of Jinan University (Social Sciences Edition)*, 32(06), 124-134.
- Liang, D. (2026). Model Selection and Institutional Framework for Occupational Injury Insurance for Workers in New Business Models. *Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, (01), 146-157.
- Ma, M. C. (2025). Research on occupational injury protection for workers in new forms of employment – Taking online delivery couriers as an example. *Social Security Review*, 9(05), 66-81.
- Qian, Z. W. (2024). The Internal Logic and Implementation Path of Building a Social Protection System for Young Workers in New Forms of Employment. *Journal of Beijing Vocational College of Labor and Social Security*, 18(04), 9-15.
- Wang, Y. F. (2025). Improving the Legal Protection System for the Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment. *Workers' Legal World*, (17), 39-41.
- Wu, Y. X. (2024). Introduction and Rule Construction of the Platform Gatekeeper Supervision Model in Protecting the Rights and Interests of Workers in New Business Models. *Local Legislative Research*, 9(04), 103-122.
- Ye Lei. Optimization of the Construction Path for a Rights Protection System for Workers in New Forms of Employment. *Life and Partner*, (19), 18-20.
- Yuan, W. Q., & Mao, J. (2022). Institutional responses to the determination of legal status and protection of rights for online streamers under new business models. *Journal of Wuhan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 75(06), 144-153.
- Zhang, Y., & Li, X. J. (2023). An Empirical Examination and Rule Construction of Labor Relationship Determination under New Business Models. *Journal of Liaoning Public Security Judicial Management Cadre College*, (05), 86-95.
- Zheng, L. (2026). Exploration of issues concerning workers in new forms of employment under the

internet economy. *Today's Wealth*, 2026(02), 16-18.

Zhou, N. X. (2026). Recommendations for protecting the personality rights of workers in new forms of employment from the perspective of algorithmic governance. *Workers' Legal World*, (03), 20-22.

Notes

Note 1. Zheng Lei. Exploration of issues concerning workers in new forms of employment under the internet economy [J]. *Today's Wealth*, 2026(02):16-18.

Note 2. Hou Chenxi. Analysis on the Construction of a Social Security System for Workers in New Forms of Employment [J]. *Economist*, 2026, (02):281-283.

Note 3. Jin Jincheng. Research on the occupational injury protection system for workers in new business models [D]. Zhejiang Gongshang University, 2022.

Note 4. Zhang Yue, Li Xiaojun. An Empirical Examination and Rule Construction of Labor Relationship Determination under New Business Models [J]. *Journal of Liaoning Public Security Judicial Management Cadre College*, 2023, (05):86-95.

Note 5. Wang Yifei. Improving the Legal Protection System for the Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment [J]. *Workers' Legal World*, 2025, (17):39-41.

Note 6. Chen Sijing, Han Qing, Jing Yaxuan. Exploring Legal Approaches to Strengthening the Protection of Rights and Interests for Workers in New Forms of Employment [J]. *Sanjin Grassroots Governance*, 2026(01):114-120.

Note 7. Zhou Nanxi. Recommendations for Protecting the Personality Rights of Workers in New Forms of Employment from the Perspective of Algorithmic Governance [J]. *Workers' Legal World*, 2026, (03):20-22.

Note 8. Wang Yifei. Improvement of the legal protection system for the rights and interests of workers in new forms of employment [J]. *Workers' Legal World*, 2025, (17):39-41.

Note 9. Ma Mengchen. Research on occupational injury protection for workers in new forms of employment - Taking online delivery personnel as an example [J]. *Social Security Review*, 2025,9(05):66-81.