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The Role of Turkey as a European Union Security Player in Africa

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Abstract

Turkey's current role as international mediator tempers the year 2020 with repeated crises, and the multiplication of misapprehensions with France and Greece. Therefore, as tensions gradually erupted between Turkey and the European Union (EU), this article through the retrospective of partnerships in the African space, highlights evidence of the advantages that the integration of Turkey in its area or more targeted and consensual policies could confer to the EU. The paper expounds on the new model of cooperation within the discipline of security studies; it merges the institutional approach and the triangular cooperation framework in illustrating Turkey and EU foreign policy towards Africa. The work fundamentally explains the transformation of Ankara and European Union's security policies within Africa. It notes that the change from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and later on to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) provides a new synergy for cooperation among the three actors. Therefore without being an EU member, this model legitimately provided Turkey with a kind of de facto membership and consequently grants them with the latitude to engage in EU's security policy.

Keywords

European Union, Turkey, Triangular Cooperation, Security, Africa

1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War and with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the concept of war and security have fundamentally evolved to meet the complexity of the new reality. In this context new threats range from state to non-state actors as well as many of regional or even global influence. In this perspective, weak and fragile states have become a predominant security challenge for global security actors, notably the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and NATO (Note 1). In the process of

strengthening the EU, the transformation of security approaches that are responsive and adaptable to current insecurity constrains remains fundamental. The mutation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) into European Security and Defense Policy (ESPD) and later on into a Common and Defense Security Policy (CDSP) in 2009 seemed to be an attempt to give appropriate answer to the said security issues. In a bid to improve efficiency and ensure better outcomes the new EU security approach was designed to function within the framework of multilateralism. It is in accordance to this model that Turkey (Note 2) emerges as an actor within the EU foreign and security policy in Africa through a trilateral cooperation scheme.

In a more practical way the process of EU integration and extension has generated a lot of hope and expectations to membership candidates of states such as Turkey. This could be seen in what scholars called the Europeanization of Turkey's (foreign) policy from 1999 to 2011, which culminated with the creation of a Ministry of European Union Affairs in charge of the accession process (Note 3). This justified the connection of Turkey to many EU's policies such as security and defense that provided opportunities for Ankara to act on strategic grounds. For instance, it is in the aftermath of "communautarization" or "harmonization" of Ankara's security policies with that of EU and the signing of a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) that Turkey found itself engaged in African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through the European Force (EUFOR) Congo in 2006 and the European Police (EUROPOL) Kinshasa as from 2005.

From what precedes, the aim of this paper is to merge the institutional analysis and the triangular cooperation in assessing EU and Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa. What it fundamentally brings is a change and renewal. It suggests that Turkish foreign policy in Africa should not be only scrutinized from a political, diplomatic, trade, economic, foreign development aid, cultural or humanitarian assistance perspective. Giving the current presence of Turkey in Africa, notably with the increasing number of security and defense agreements, this article notes that more room should be given to geopolitical and geostrategic security stakes of Turkey in Africa. It also emphasizes how such partnerships play as a gateway in developing the very idea of an EU security and defense foreign policy amidst challenges.

While tensions gradually grounded between Turkey and the European Union (EU), mainly with France and Greece, throughout the year 2020, this article through a retrospective of partnerships in the African space, highlights evidence of the advantages that the integration of Turkey in its area or more targeted and consensual policies could confer to the EU. With more recent developments, Turkish involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been going on for almost 240 days since February 2022, is far from being an isolated event, but is more of a heavy trend in the international posture of this country and its role as mediator. Whether it is viewed with perplexity or with suspicion by certain Western actors, or whether the speeches of certain powers tend to marginalize or downplay its international action (Note 4), it is clear, however, that no one can ignore Ankara's international activism. The new Turkey that has been building since the early 2000s has quickly learned to surf as a diplomatic mediator or security mediator

on various international fronts, particularly with the European Union in African theatres.

This article spotlights the important part that a country like Turkey can play on the strategic and security policies of Western partners in general and the European Union in particular, without being a member.

This article further provides answers to diverse problems: *(i) primo*, it provides a breakthrough in the realist concept of national interest which has always be appraised in egoistic terms. At the age of global interdependence and institutionalist research programs that advocates for a supra-nationalistic IR, states' national interests can converge towards common goals of foreign policy (even though the gains are not expected to be equivalent); *(ii) secondo*, the challenge to EU membership of Turkey which finally went dormant in 2007 never meant impossibility for strategic and privileged cooperation. That is to say, in spite of the current freezing of its candidacy to EU membership, Turkey could play a strategic role in EU foreign policy in the area of CSDP; *(iii) tertio*, this paper ends up by revealing that the narrative of Turkey as security player in Africa today as it can be seen in Somalia, or in Libya, or in the security and defense agreements signed with many countries, did not start immediately on a bilateral or B to B format. It generally started with Turkey operating in NATO or United Nations' coalition and later on as a third state in EU security policies abroad and specifically in Africa.

2. Theoretical Framework

As far as the theoretical framework is concerned we will make use of institutionalist theory and triangular cooperation as up to date version of cooperation theory. In writing this paper, I relied more on secondary sources such as academic journals, articles and books.

2.1 How Institutionalist Theory with Norms and Institutions Shape Foreign Policy Making

The traditional analysis of International Relations (IR) and foreign policy in particular emphasizes a state centric narrative. Since the beginning of 2000s, most of the account over Turkey-Africa's relations has repeatedly fallen in the direction of reductive prism. The participation of Turkey to a security operation in Africa headed by the European Union therefore offers a new configuration and a tremendous opportunity to approach Turkish-African relations differently. Many foreign policy analysts tend to focus more on the traditional state centric approach in explaining Turkey's relations with African states. By resorting to the institutionalist approach as a theoretical guideline of our research, this paper embraces a more large view that includes states and non-state actors or inter-states players such as international organizations. Thus we witness a shifting game moving from the national stage to a supranational one in a so called principal-Agent perspective (Note 5). In respect to this, institutionalism sets the foundation for an open based-rule system in which diverse actors come together to address security dilemmas or any other challenge through a process of collective action.

If institutionalism approach in social sciences is not that much new, in revenge it is only by the end of the Second World War and precisely in the periods preceding 1970s that it starts playing a major role in the study of international relations. The EU project has thus released a spectacular example in grabbing the contribution of institutionalism in the study of IR. Institutionalist analysis through the European Security

and Defense Policy allows us to examine Turkey's African policy from a very unusual and unique perspective. This model reveals the new challenges that EU faces in waving of interests of its Member States and meeting needs of its regional and international security organs like NATO and UN (Note 6).

The notion of organization in IR opens up to a universe of state and non-state entities. Therefore turbulence in world politics (Note 7) and the questioning of stato-centrism cannot be the genuine echo of the multitude of non-state actors. This challenge also finds its extension in the emergence of interstate actors who devote the displacement to higher echelon above the nation-states of the decision-making processes. We thus enter the world of supra-nationality. Liberal institutionalism as older as President Wilson's fourteen point speech strengthens the plurality of diverse views and norms within a given society and rejects the rigid claim that states form sole actors in international affairs (Note 8). This then easily takes us away from the realist orthodoxy cantata of International Relations that posits an international system characterized by anarchy and devoid of effective institutions (Note 9).

Our research then integrates a broader view of "institutions" going beyond what Oran Young presents as "social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles" (Note 10). The main interest of this definition is to remind us that formal international organizations are not the unique focus of contemporary institutional analyses. Still it should not hide the physical dimension of institutions "understood as material entities" or "organizations possessing physical locations, offices, personnel" and so forth (Note 11). This therefore goes along with Jacques Chevallier's (Note 12) analysis as well as dean Maurice Hauriou's interpretation of institution in their dual dimension of internalization (set of values or cluster of rules accepted as such) and externalization (projection of accepted values through physical entities or existing practices) also known as "reification" (Note 13). The EU both as physical organization and a cluster of norms and values through its CSDP helps to shed more light on how an institutionalist theoretical framework provides the main lenses through which Turkish-African relations can be viewed. It opens the path to a deep assessment of multilevel cooperation or partnership which brings Turkey and EU together on the African ground, whereas the first still face a long tradition of rejection as candidate to EU membership.

Traditionally the utilization of institutionalist analysis in the study of the European Union reveals immensely deep underpinnings. EU is "well understood as a process rather than a frozen institution as the organization is still an unsettled constitutional order" as we refer to its geographical reach, the institutional balance, decision rules and functional scope. It is broadly admitted that "EU is more than an international organization but less than a federal state" (Note 14). This is also brilliantly emphasized by March and Olsen as they posit that "the EU has become the most highly institutionalized international organization in history, in terms of depth as well as breadth, yet without becoming a federal state" (Note 15). Without being that much common, seeing third parties being associated to EU's projects has also uncover a new dimension of the process of building the EU. Since its emergence, EU provides a fecund room for institutionalist analysis and its diverse branches. It reveals the multiple benefit of the

institutionalist approach that creates new research opportunities in the science of international relations. However the analysis in this work is centered on rational choice institutionalism.

Rational choice institutionalist, "Institutional analysis, informed by rational choice theory, assumes that utility-maximizing individuals (or, at the international level, states), acting out of self-interest, are central actors in the political process, and that institutions emerge as a result of their interdependence, strategic interaction and collective action or contracting dilemmas. Institutions emerge and survive, because they fulfill important functions for the individual actors affected by these institutions" (Note 16). In that view institutions provide guidelines for agents to form alliances pursue common interest in a rational way and solve existential problems. In other words institutions shape equilibrium ways to address issues (Note 17). Sometimes coordination for mutual gain may take the form of a more formal or structured arrangement and at other times it may take an unstructured one. Whatsoever, rational choice reminds us that institutions offer avenues for collective actions as it enables different groups of actors to coordinate activities for mutual advantage. The EU decision of associating Turkey in its operations in Africa through EUPOL Kinshasa (and later EUPOL D.R Congo) and EUFOR D.R Congo (Note 18) then reflect a rational choice institutionalism approach enforced through a novel conceptual triangular cooperation.

2.2 About Triangular Cooperation

The concept of cooperation in international relations emerged mostly from Robert Keohane's researches. He assumes that conflicts arise in international politics when actor's policies are pursued without regard for the interests of others and are perceived by others as hindering the attainment of their goals. He then added that once areas of potential or actual conflicts are identified; states should then resort to cooperation by communicating with each other and coordinating affairs to adjust to their policies and become more significantly compatible with one another.

As underlined by Helen Milner, according to Robert Keohane, cooperation occurs "when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination" (Note 19). On the one hand, such a definition assumes that each actor's behavior is directed toward some goals, common or not. On the other hand, cooperation provides actors with gains or rewards. These gains may not be the same in magnitude or kind for each state, but since they are mutual it is seems enough. In fact each actor helps the other to realize their goals by adjusting its policies in the anticipation of its own rewards. This goes in line with Turkish's cooperation to EU foreign policy of security and defense in Africa, since by providing help for European military deployment in Africa, both parties can benefit substantive interests, also through the process of securitization by EU and Turkey, African targeted countries achieve more stability. If the main aim of cooperation is the achievement of a balanced distribution of gains, then the main core component of cooperation remains reciprocity and iteration (Note 20).

Nevertheless our research will not limit itself to the classical view on cooperation. The end of the Cold war in early 1990s, followed by a progressive opening of new forms of partnership between Africa and emerging countries gave a room to a new form of cooperation known as triangular or trilateral

cooperation which can take two forms: The first one associates an African country and two emerging economies in a South-South cooperation model (Note 21). The second one brings together a traditional donor and an emerging economy for the realization of a project in the African ground or in any other developing country. In both a global and multi-centric world era, cooperation modalities between traditional partners and new ones are changing. Trilateral cooperation is therefore one of these modalities of international development alleviating a new ground brightening the future of the mere idea of cooperation. And even if it is only but since the 2000s that we can observe a strong increase in this kind of cooperation initiative, triangular cooperation is not completely a new phenomenon. In a more systematic approach, it can be defined as a partnership between traditional donors and providers of South-South cooperation to implement development cooperation projects in beneficiary country (Note 22). More to this, a study conducted by UNICEF in 2015 emphasizes that the traditional donor here can be a state or international organization (Note 23).

However this cooperation model has thus so far been implemented only in the field of economic investments. The cooperation between Turkey and EU for a common investment in the security area in Africa via EUPOL and EUFOR DR Congo therefore opens the gate for a case study of triangular cooperation in military and security domain.

3. Turkey and EU Security Programs: A Back Ground Study

Since the end of the World War II, the building process of EU goes together with security issues. At first, the purpose was to bring more peace in the priority to European states and later on, may be share such experience with other part of the world. Since 1959 that Turkey applied to join the European Community, the country has participated to various EU policies related to matters of security.

More practically, Turkey's association to EU security policies is both the result of its status as NATO (Note 24) member, as well as its status as candidate of EU membership.

3.1 Turkey's Participation as a NATO Member

Following the principle of the indivisibility of security, between NATO and the EU a huge imbrication is observed within the EU security architecture and that of NATO. In fact the two organizations are almost made up of the same states. For NATO countries, while contributing to EU missions may be interpreted as a recognition of EU's role in crisis management (including the military sphere), it is also a demonstration of solidarity among states belonging to the same security community as being the case with Turkey (see the *Figure 1* in appendix).

As both an EU candidate and a regional power that is trying to reconcile its commitment to "soft" crisis management with its aspiration to play a leading role in its periphery (in particular in the Balkans), Turkey appears to be a special case in that respect (Note 25).

In the same vein, it is fundamental to note that the Turkish army is the second largest standing military within NATO, the 9th largest in the world, with over 515,000 active troops and an additional 380,000 reserves. Membership in NATO and cooperation with the Israeli military has helped it become the most

powerful army of Europe, after Russia and UK. It spends 5.3% of its GDP on defense; in comparison, the US that spends 4%, the United Kingdom 2.3% and France 2.4% (Note 26).

3.2 Turkey's Contribution as an EU Candidate Country

As said by Thierry Tardy, the participation of third countries in Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) operations is, arguably, mutually beneficial (Note 27). In consideration of their geopolitical agenda, their strengths and their own projections as well, non-EU states participate to EU operations for a variety of reasons ranging from security interests and the acquisition of operational experience to broader institutional motives (Note 28). The contribution of Turkey to EU security is both related to its geographic position (as the country sits at the nexus of the Balkans, the Middle East, the Mediterranean basin, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus beyond to Central Asia), and to its military operability capacity giving the importance of Turkish's troops (Note 29). Indeed, medium-size or bigger powers like Turkey (or Russia) may also hope to influence the EU's policies through their presence in EU operations. At the same time, as a declared candidate to EU, Turkey's involvement helps to raise its profile and familiarize the country with the various components of the EU and its procedures. Whilst for the EU, such involvement allows the Union to interact with future members and thereby establish or deepen operational links (Note 30). In a short way, the recent dramatic changes in world security, from Syria to Ukraine and from the Middle East to North Africa, require Turkey and the EU to act jointly against global and regional threats.

3.3 Turkey and EU from CFSP and ESDP to CSDP

Turkey has been participating in the EU security program for long, and as such, Turkey has been an associate member of the Western European Union since 1991 and within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) following the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Turkey was already active in the EU security architecture when it relied on Western European Union (WEU) as its instrument for security and defense matters. Then the years 1995-1999 were especially fruitful, because Turkey was an associate member of the WEU and participated fully in key EU decision-making issues. But after the emergence of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1998-1999, most WEU institutions were transferred to the EU, and Turkey's status in the WEU became irrelevant (Note 31). And Even if such changes did not really ameliorate the status of Turkey, the transformation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) into Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as from 2009 provided a structure for European countries to face common security challenges and reduce the cost of externalities through a strategic multilateral approach (Note 32).

Such mutation in security architecture conceptually involves "third states" and frequently takes the form of a coalition between one of the EU's 'big three' (most often involving France, and often Germany or UK as they were still EU's member) and groups of small and medium-sized countries that have found the EU to be a convenient framework for modernizing their forces and achieving synergies. In the process, EU member states as well as candidate member states, have built up a common operational culture that facilitates future endeavors.

Therefore, in order to cope with such state of facts, the EU constituted an attraction pole for third countries (such as Norway, Ukraine, Croatia, Turkey, Switzerland, even Russia), interested in taking part in the EU's military operations, partly as a way to engage politically with the Union and for some of them like Turkey, as a way of reinforcing their bid for EU membership. So even without being an EU member, these operations in the field legitimately provide Turkey with a de facto membership, consequently it grants Ankara the latitude to engage in EU's foreign and security policy under the principle of a triangular multilateralism.

During the last decade, Europeans have repeatedly deployed some 60,000 expeditionary forces (Note 33); but, although naval and air forces may appear easily available, the constraints on the availability of ground troops for the EU by the late 2000s became a serious dilemma. So far, nearly forty-five non-EU states have participated as third part in CSDP operations since the first mission in 2004 (Note 34). Within the guise of this participation Turkey is the largest non-EU contributor to CSDP operations. Ankara provided the second-largest contingent of 255 military personnel to EUFOR Althea, and 48 law enforcement officers to the police mission in Bosnia. It has also contributed 55 law enforcement personnel to EULEX in Kosovo and indicated its willingness to increase the number from 91 in December 2008 to 150 personnel in 2011 (Note 35). Turkey has also participated in two CSDP operations in the past: CONCORDIA, the military operation in Macedonia; PROXIMA, the police mission in Macedonia. Turkey is the second biggest contributor to the mission among non-EU countries after the USA (Note 36).

Following the Paris meeting of 13 May 2009, Turkey was invited to join, as an observer, the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) which consists of France, Italy, Portugal, Spain Romania and the Netherlands. Within the EGF context, Turkey has deployed an Operation Monitor and Communication Team in Afghanistan (Note 37).

Given the huge imbrication of the European Union and NATO security and defense policy, Turkey's involvement as third party can be linked to it great capacity as NATO contributor on the one hand, but this status may also be related to its position as candidate member to the EU on the other hand. With this associated security process, let's underline that the visibility and effectiveness of the EU in crisis management partly relies on its capacity to attract such non-EU countries and institutionalizes relationships with them (Note 38).

In fact, all EU candidate countries from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia or Turkey have participated in CSDP missions formalized through Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) with the EU signed in 2004, 2007, and 2013 prior to their accession (Note 39). In practical terms the drafting of policy guidelines regulating cooperation with non-EU states started as early as 2001, and in December 2002 the Council adopted a document on Consultations and Modalities for the Contribution of non-EU States to EU crisis management operations.

Such a partnership between EU and Turkey aims at underlining the growing importance of the EU's role in the security sphere where other institutions like the UN, NATO or the OSCE (Organization for

Security and Co-operation in Europe) already operate (and exert a strong domination) and sometimes in collaboration with Turkey as well. Even though this partnership also faces some limitations in terms of collaboration among actors especially regarding disagreements over communicating documents to Turkey (Note 40). As candidate member of EU since 1963, Turkey of course benefits a huge know how in participating in EU security programs, this is compounded by the fact that Turkey has been an associate member of the Western European Union bloc since 1992. Even if this collaboration has experienced obstacles and negative perceptions among which are the recurrent problem with Cyprus, a feeling of inefficiency with its third-participating country status in ESDP and CSDP, and a sense lost a privileged position in the WEU, this paper maintains that Turkey of course continue to benefit from huge know how with its participation in EU security programs (Note 41) It is in this context that the military operations of Turkey in Africa organized in a model of trilateral partnership with the European Union reveals.

4. Turkey and EU Security (Co)operations in Africa

From 2002 until February 2014, European Union has undertaken thirty overseas operations, using civilian and military instruments in several countries in three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa) as part of its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) known till 2009 as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These operations in Africa encompass among others the EUFOR intervention in D.R Congo, EU Police in D.R Congo, and EUFOR in Central African Republic (CAR). EU military operations hitherto now contributed to stop the escalation of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and to shield vulnerable refugees in Chad, and helped stem piracy off the coast of Somalia. The map in appendix *figure2* thus gives an overview of the European Union military deployment abroad so far.

4.1 Turkey in EUFOR Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

In order to calm down the political atmosphere in DR Congo in the period of presidential elections, EUFOR D.R Congo was adopted by United Nation Security Council's Resolution N°1671. It was a mission of the European Union, following a UN request and in full agreement with the Congolese government in support of MONUC (United Nations Mission to D.R Congo). The forces were officially authorized by United Nation on April 25th, 2006, to secure the first tour of presidential elections of 30 July 2006. So their deployment was launched on June 12, and it ended on November 30, 2006. The EUFOR D.R Congo troops could intervene in different parts of the country to help to secure the region in close coordination with MONUC and the national authorities.

The Headquarters of EUFOR DRC forces (Force Headquarters (FHQ) was located in Kinshasa at the airfield of N'Dolo hosting a permanent group of 170 personnel. Apart from the head city, the mission also covered sensitive provinces such as Kasa ï-Oriental or Ecuador. Part of the troops also stationed in the city of N'Djilli so as to use its local airport in any case if needed. It should be reminded that the atmosphere was heavily tensed in a context where European forces were first perceived as manoeuvring to ensure a

re-election of the outgoing president Joseph Kabila, until they had to intervene in September to protect the residence of the main opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba following violent shots. The coordination of different forces under this EU operation was then at the core of the success of the mission.

Turkey on its part actively participated in this operation with 17 personnel and one C-130 aircraft (Note 42). This was quite a significant presence in such environment, especially with the presence of the Turkish aircraft, given that many troops of EUFOR Congo, up to 1200 of them, stationed in Gabon. The Turkish airlift approach was then very important for troop's mobility. Turkey's contribution is further of significance as we bear in mind that the country did start contributing to MONUC operation since 2002 with 3 personnel. And up to 2009 with the arrival of MONUSCO they had a staff of 15 persons on the field. Since then the country still act in support of EU and UN in D.R Congo. As MONUSCO is still ensuring stability in D.R Congo, Turkey last contributed 9 personnel to the mission in 2019. Turkey also contributed staff officers who served in the Strategic Command Pole for EUFOR DRC in Potsdam, Germany and in Africa (Note 43).

4.2 Turkey and EUPOLICE in Democratic Republic of Congo

Turkey contributed to the EUPOL mission in Kinshasa from 31st March-13th October 2005. Later on from July 1, 2007 to September 30, 2014, European Union Congo Police Mission (EUPOL D.R Congo), will take on as a successor to EUPOL Kinshasa. Through this mission the European Union provided support to the transition process going on in the D.R Congo. In this regard Turkey has always played a supporting role to EU troops for military operations aimed at protecting civilians. In collaboration with associate states namely Turkey, EU could lead a number of military and police missions in D.R Congo following the two wars which brought bloodshed to the country between 1996 and 1997, and between 1998 and 2002.

In April 2005 the DRC government requested the European Union's assistance in the field of security sector reform. The Council responded favourably to this request. The EUSEC DRC mission was launched on 8 April 2005. Its mandate has been extended twice and was due to come to an end on June 30, 2009. Then followed the EUPOL DRC as from July 2007. From an initial duration period of twelve months, its mandate has been extended to 30 June 2009. These missions come under the framework of the European Union's contribution towards conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa (Common Position 2004/85/CFSP). Furthermore, the Council appointed a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in the African Great Lakes Region, who, since 1996, has been responsible for supporting efforts aimed at creating the necessary conditions for a sustainable and peaceful resolution to the crises which hit this region. And since those EU operations all took place from MONUC to MONUSCO deployment, Turkey always contributed in civilian police officers. Up to 2019 about 9 of Turkish police staff were still active on the African ground under the EU and UN coordination. Thus bringing on stability and strong contribution in the rebuilding process of local police and the judicial system in a multi-ethnic context

4.3 Turkey in EUFOR Operation in Central African Republic

The creation of EUFOR-RCA Bangui was approved on January 20, 2014 following a decision of EU Foreign Ministers, in a context where France was already very active considering the colonial link with this African country. This mission represents the 9th EU military operation deployed under the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and their seventh operation on the African ground. Through this mission, the EU in a role of stabilizer was thus returning to Africa five years after conducting the EUFOR Chad/RCA terminated in 2008-09.

The operation first included about 600 troops initially deployed in February 2014 for a six months period (Note 44), with a mandate of securing the capital city of Bangui and to enable appropriate conditions for the conveyance of humanitarian aid. In February 2014 the EU officially required the support of Turkey and 6 other countries to strengthen the joint force acting on the field. Ankara reacted and expressed its readiness to participate as far as needed provided that clear conditions were defined and appropriate legal framework were set down. Finally the Turkish contribution will be minimalistic in respect of the legal agreement between the parties (Note 45). The decision was taken to send one staff member specialized in transport and logistics who within the framework of the CSDP was part of the European Union Training Mission in RCA (EUTM-RCA) (Note 46). As observed by Criseide Novi, "only nine Member States and three third states" including Turkey, were part of EUFOR RCA (Note 47).

Furthermore and considering the UN data it appears that in 2015 Turkey also contributed 11 police officers to MINUSCA. And to confirm their total support with Turkey's contribution to international peace forces, in 2018, on an annual basis, the Turkish parliament approved a motion to extend the deployment of their troops in the RCA, in D.R Congo and in Mali from October 31, 2018 to October 31, 2019.

4.4 Turkey, EU, UN and NATO in other Forms of collaboration in Africa

In the same vein and within the framework of operations associating EU actors in Africa, Turkey appears very active. This is the case with the European Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-Mali) acting within the framework of a collaboration with MINUSMA as set up in 2013, also including the presence of special French forces "Barkhane". Turkey will contribute here for the training of police personnel under the reform of the security sector.

In Libya, following two UN Resolutions 1970 and 1973 adopted in 2011 under the instigation of France and Great Britain and respectively imposing sanctions and weapons embargo for the first one, and a no-fly zone for the second, NATO was then in charge of the enforcement of these Resolutions. Turkey although reluctant, took part to this European-led NATO operation under the code 'Operation Unified Protector' (OUP). Turkey joined the NATO force and provided four frigates, a submarine and a vessel, to support naval operation in implementing the UN-mandated arms embargo against Libya (Note 48). Furthermore between March and October 2011, Turkey also contributed six F-16 air defense aircraft, two KC-135 tanker aircraft, a ship based helicopters, one Special Forces staff personnel, Underwater Demolition Team and Amphibious and Underwater Teams (Note 49).

And even before the Libyan episode, in 2008 Turkey already joined NATO and its Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) in fighting terrorism and piracy in Somalian sea and in the Gulf of Aden. This operation known as 'Operation Ocean Shield' also brought further security cooperation between Turkey and European forces on the African field (Note 50).

5. Conclusion: Impact of Turkish Participation to EU Security Programs in Africa

Despite asserted ambitions, EU could not sustain a CSDP in the long run alone. The main challenges of EU as a military force have always been the issue of equipment, the confrontation of national interests in terms of leading staff on the ground and the effectiveness of fields operations. Concerning the effectiveness of the military in the field, it should be underlined that from 2003-2007 for instance, the French and British military expenditure increased only slightly though they are the main leading European forces. That is why EU could not mobilize the requested equipment out of coalition with other states such as Germany, Belgium or Turkey (Note 51). This justify the presence of Turkish logistic in Gabon, Libya and with the CTF-151, to name a few. But those European operations are mostly criticized for their short term duration (around four to six months or maximum one year), and also because of the European choice to intervene in what is generally considered as low intensity conflict and less risky (Note 52).

Also, in terms of political implications, the former colonial links may sound as obstacles to EU's security actions on the African soil. Critics of French military action in Africa show that joint action give more legitimacy to European military action in Africa, but far more to individual states, since the operation carried by France alone or mostly directed by France may put to the forefront their main interests (Note 53).

Clearly, this article also points out that EU defense and security policy may be used by a country like France to secure its position in the French part of Africa. This is the reason of the reluctant attitude of some big states to support EU militaries operations. Mostly Great Britain rather aligns with NATO's operation, while Germany is generally caught between residual pacifism and a reluctance to get involved in African operations, particularly if pushed by the UK or France (Note 54). In that perspective the ATHENA mechanism played a role in alleviating the financial burden incurred by the deployment of EU's troops.

It is in view to cope with such state of facts that the EU constituted an attraction pole for third countries (such as Turkey, Norway, Ukraine, Croatia, Switzerland, even Russia), interested in taking part in the EU's military operations, partly as a way to engage politically with the Union and in part for some of them like Turkey, as a way of reinforcing their bid for EU membership (Note 55). Thus even without being yet an EU member, these operations on the field are legitimately recognizing de facto, Turkey as an actor of EU foreign policy of security and defense taking part under the principle of triangular multilateralism. By engaging in EU security's policy, Turkey could gain a rich military experience on Africa's field as well as more legitimacy in its future independent interventions in Somalia or Libya as

seen nowadays.

So finally, those operations give EU more flexibility on the field with large troops and a lesser cost. Such multilateralism is less expensive than if a state had to support it alone. It also gives more legitimacy to EU as an emerging actor in international sphere of security. In a context of current tensions, on the one hand between France and Turkey on the situation going on in Libya and other questions of Turkish internal politics (including the Kurdish question), and on the other hand between Greece, the EU and the Turkey over their maritime delimitation in the eastern Mediterranean, through the African case, this article tended to highlight the potential areas of partnership that these different actors are losing for a better cohesion of the international arena.

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Notes

Note 1. Bjoern H. Seibert, Operation EUFOR Tchad/Rca and the European Union's. Common Security and Defense Policy, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, p. 1-2.

Note 2. Though we decide to keep the name Turkey in this paper, it should be known that the official name of the country has changed to "Republic of Tükiye".

Note 3. After the presidential elections of June 24, 2018, the Cabinet reshuffle was taken from thirty five Ministries to sixteen, and the Ministry of European Union Affairs was then turned into a sub-department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This also reveals a Turkey distancing itself from European system after long time of vain unsuccessful expectations.

Note 4. Eugene Chausovsky, "Turkey Is the Biggest Swing Player in the Russia-Ukraine War" in https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/11/turkey-russia-ukraine-war-swing-player/, accessed on 07/10/2022; also see Atlantic Council, "How long can Turkey play both sides in the Ukraine war?" in https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-long-can-turkey-play-both-sides-in-the-ukraine-war/, accessed on 07/10/2022; Les Echos, « L'ambigu soutien de la Turquie à l'Ukraine », in https://www.lesechos.fr/monde/europe/lambigu-soutien-de-la-turquie-a-lukraine-1783418, accessed on 04/10/2022; Le Monde, « Comment le président turc Erdogan cherche à se poser en arbitre incontournable de la guerre en Ukraine », in https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/08/19/a-lviv-en-ukraine-erdogan-cherche-a-se-poser-en-arbitre-incontournable-du-conflit_6138415_3210.html, accessed 04/10/2022

Note 5. A well-established trend of the early work on transaction costs was agency theory, which focuses on the so-called agency relationship that arises whenever one actor (the principal) engages another actor to perform a task on its behalf (the agent). In this tradition, states are viewed as principals, delegating functions to international institutions, agents, so as to minimize a cost of any eventual individual action.

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Note 11. Jönsson-Tallberg, op. cit., p. 88.

Note 12. Jacques Chevallier, "Droit Constitutionnel et Institutions Politiques : Les Mésaventures d'un Couple Fusionnel", La République-Mélanges en l'honneur de Pierre Avril, Montchrestien, 2001, p. 11.

Note 13. Eric Millard, "Hauriou et la Théorie de l'Institution", Droit et Société, 30(31), p. 397-398.

Note 14. Jönsson- Tallberg, op. cit., p. 101.

Note 15. James G. March-Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political

Orders", International Organization, Autumn 1998, p. 967.

Note 16. Jönsson-Tallberg, op. cit., p. 89.

Note 17. Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Rational Choice Institutionalism", R.A.W. Rhodes et al., ed., The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, p. 23-28.

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Note 19. Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations. Strength and weaknesses", World Politics, 44(3), April 1992, p. 467.

Note 20. Robert Axelrod-William D. Hamilton, "The Evolution of Cooperation" Science, New Series, 211(4489), 27 March 1981, p. 1390-1396.

Note 21. CNUCED, South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership, Economic Development in Africa Report 2010, United Nation, New York-Geneva 2010, p. 20.

Note 22. Nadine Piefer, "Triangular Cooperation–Bridging South-South and North-South Cooperation?", Paper prepared for the Workshop on South-South Development Cooperation, University of Heidelberg, 26-27 September 2014, p. 1.

Note 23. UNICEF, Trilateral South-South Cooperation. Guidelines for Trilateral South-South Cooperation Initiatives, Brasilia March 2015, p. 4.

Note 24. It should be underlined that as organization NATO is almost intertwined to the existence of EU, as some practical observations reveal that the extension of EU goes together with the expansion of NATO since the end of the Cold War in the so called "dual enlargement" process.

Note 25. Thierry Tardy, "CSDP: Getting Third States on Board", European Union Institute for Security Studies-Brief Issue, March 2014a, p. 3.

Note 26. Maria do Céu Pinto, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union in Terms of Impact on the EU's Security and Defense Policies. Potential and Drawbacks", Brazilian Review of International Politics, 53(1), 2010, p. 90.

Note 27. Tardy, op. cit., p. 2.

Note 28. Ibid.

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Note 30. Tardy, op. cit., p. 3.

Note 31. Arkalı Saltuk Buğra, Turkey's Role in NATO-European Union Cooperation, Naval Postgraduate School, Security Studies, Monterey-California June 2008, (Published Master's Thesis).

Note 32. Demir, op. cit., p. 3.

Note 33. Katarina Engberg, "Ten years of EU military operations", European Union Institute for Security Studies / Brief Issue, 41, November 2013, p. 1.

Note 34. Tardy, op. cit., p. 1.

Note 35. Heather Grabbe-Sinan Ülgen, "The Way Forward for Turkey and the EU. A Strategic

Dialogue on Foreign Policy", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace-Policy Outlook, December 2010, p. 9; See also RTMFA, "Turkey's International Security Initiatives and Contributions to NATO and EU Operations", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iv_-european-security-and-defence-identity_policy-_esdi_p_.en.mfa, (Date of Accession: 21.04.2018)

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Note 37. Ibid.

Note 38. Tardy, op. cit., p. 2.

Note 39. Tardy, op. cit., p. 1.

Note 40. Tardy, op. cit., p. 4.

Note 41. Maria do Céu Pinto, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union in terms of impact on the EU's security and defense policies. Potential and drawbacks", Brazilian Review of International Politics, 53(1), 2010, p. 92, 95; See also Grabbe-Ülgen, op. cit., p. 8.

Note 42. Numan Hazar, "Peace Keeping Operations and Perspectives for Cooperation between Turkey and the African Union in the Field of Security", www.tasamafrika.org/pdf/yayinlar/Numan-Hazar-EN.pdf, (accessed on 27.04.2018).

Note 43. Claudia Major, "EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crises Management: The Experience of EUFOR DR Congo in 2006", Occasional Paper, 72, September 2008, p. 18-19.

Note 44. Thierry Tardy, "EUFOR RCA Bangui: 'Defence Matters", European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2014b, p. 1.

Note 45. Emine Akçadağ, Alagöz, "AB'nin Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti'ne Müdahalesi", 2014, http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/1455/-ab%E2%80%99nin-orta-afrika-cumhuriyeti%E2%80%99ne-mudahalesi/#.WQCD9dyBrIU, (accessed on 18/04/2017).

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Note 49. David Brunnstrom and Paul Taylor, "NATO to Run Libya no-fly Zone but not all Action",

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Note 50. Ibid.

Note 51. Catherine Gegout, European Foreign and Security Policy: State, Power, Institutions and American Hegemony, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2010, p. 50.

Note 52. Engberg, op. cit., p. 2.

Note 53. Ibid.

Note 54. Ibid., p. 3.

Note 55. Ibid.

Appendices



Figure 1. Map of European Security's State Actors with both NATO and EU Members

Figure 2. Map of European Union Interventions Overseas