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Original Paper

On the Concept of "Share" in Julia Kristeva's Post-Structural Feminist Ethics

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Abstract

Addressing marginalization in modern society, Julia Kristeva reconstructs the concept of "Share" in her post-structural feminist ethics by analyzing the causes of able-bodied people's exclusion of disabled people. This reconstruction can be understood at three levels: ontology, epistemology, and axiology. The death anxiety of able-bodied people is an internal cause, so Kristeva advances sharing the ontological basis of "Vulnerability" to promote mutual care among each other. The personal model epistemology of able-bodied people is an external factor. Therefore, Kristeva proposes sharing the "Singularity" as a social model epistemology to dissolve discrimination against disabled people. From the perspective of human relations, Kristeva propounds the relational model of "Love of Maternal Reliance" as a shared value paradigm. By practicing "Interactions" based on "empathy" rather than "sympathy," and "co-creation" rather than "independent creation," she aims to rebuild social bonds grounded in emotional connection and meaning creation.

Keywords

Julia Kristeva, Share, Vulnerability, Singularity, Maternal Reliance

1. Introduction

Amidst globalization, the density of social connections has expanded unprecedentedly—communities interweave into information networks, groups form transnational alliances, and nations forge economic communities. Yet this superficial symbiosis paradoxically exposes structural internal fractures: an invisible chasm perpetually divides mainstream and marginalized groups. Marginalized communities often face systemic exclusion in resource access, social opportunities, and cultural expression. Their voices are drowned by mainstream discourse, and their needs remain unaddressed. This fault line manifests not only materially but increasingly through deepening spiritual and cultural divides, intensifying interpersonal alienation. Thus, the harmonious development of society as a whole remains

constrained by the exclusion of marginalized groups by the mainstream. Social prejudice and systemic discrimination against these groups remain an urgent and formidable challenge.

Julia Kristeva, one of the renowned French feminist "Troika," spent much of her life at the center of exclusionary storms. This was not merely because she was a female philosopher among brilliant philosophers, or a Bulgarian among the French, but because of her most fundamental identity—the mother of a disabled child. Her only son, David, was born with a congenital neurological disorder, preventing him from living like others from birth. While seeking personalized care for her son, she discovered France's institutional frameworks and measures for disability issues lagged far behind other democratic nations, and discriminatory attitudes toward people with disabilities remained pervasive. Facing these formidable challenges, she describes herself as an "energetic pessimist." Her resolute character endows her with transcendent strength and courage to act in the face of adversity. She founded and chaired France's National Council for People with Disabilities, advocating for broader public discourse and action space for the disabled community.

Within the philosophical discourse, Kristeva began precisely from such fragile life experiences to reflect on the ought-to-be nature of the relationship between the subject and the Other. She sought to address marginalization in modern society, thereby giving rise to her reconceptualization of the notion of "Share." The progression from phenomenon to theory represents a feminist consensus research trajectory. The discussion of the ought-to-be nature of the subject-other relationship has long been a focus of feminist ethics. Her post-structuralist perspective excels in deconstructing the foundational logic of philosophy and ethics while proposing creative alternatives. Kristeva's introduction of the "Share" concept stems from her post-structural feminist ethics background—a theoretical context that cannot be overlooked. Her expansion of focus from gender to broader marginalized groups represents the progressive nature of her work as a representative of third-wave feminism (Note 1). Feminist standpoint theory posits that marginalized groups, through their extensive life experience of prolonged social exclusion, are better positioned to offer profound critical reflection on the operational mechanisms and power distribution within mainstream society. As the saying goes, "the bystander sees clearly." Kristeva transformed her own painful experiences of exclusion into an ethical discourse advocating for the benevolent treatment of others. Central to this is her "Semanalysis" (Note 2) alchemy prevents her from merely condemning perpetrators of discrimination from a moral high ground. Instead, she employs multi-layered questioning, inquiry, analysis, and interpretation to understand the humanity behind phenomena. By accommodating and transforming human nature, she guides us into a new worldview that maintains tension without violent conflict, embodying her humanistic spirit of "taking a step back to gain a broader perspective."

"To share: to partake in a distinctiveness beyond the separation imposed on us by our fates; to participate, without erasing the fact that each is 'apart' and recognizing the part that cannot be shared, that is irremediable." (Julia, 2010, p. 43) K.S.'s interpretation of "Share" appears enigmatic and difficult to grasp. Considering the context of this concept (Note 3) it essentially calls for transcending

separation by sharing the shareable aspects of inner experience—a uniqueness inherent to humans as speaking subjects—while acknowledging the unshareable to avoid merging. This transcends the real-world predicament of either alienation or sameness between people. Although feminist ethics have been a persistent focus in readings of Kristeva's work since the late 20th century, the full implications of her concept of "Share" remain under-explored. The rich complexity of this concept reflects Kristeva's challenging yet effective dialectical thinking and the interdisciplinary nature of her background (spanning philosophy, psychoanalysis, semiotics, anthropology, etc.), offering a unique perspective on rebuilding social bonds grounded in emotional connections and meaning creation. This paper attempts to distill the layered philosophical insights embedded in her concept of "Share" by focusing on three primary dimensions of feminist ethics—ontology, epistemology, and axiology—through an analysis of the marginalization of persons with disabilities.

2. Ontological Foundation: Vulnerability

While able-bodied people invariably perceive the wounds on disabled persons—be they physical impairments or psychological scars—Kristeva keenly discerns the wounds inherent in able-bodied people themselves: "Narcissistic Identity Wounds." This perspective is profoundly subversive, as she reveals that the deep-seated reason for the exclusion of disabled people lies in the inability of non-disabled people to tolerate the way disabled people expose their own existential wounds: "Yet, whatever the disabilities, they confront us with incomparable exclusion, different from others: the disabled person opens a narcissistic identity wound in the person who is not disabled; he inflicts a threat of physical or psychic death, fear of collapse, and, beyond that, the anxiety of seeing the very borders of the human species explode." (Julia, 2010, p. 29) In other words, what non-disabled people reject is not the disability itself, but the internal experience of identity trauma that occurs within them when confronted with disability.

From the perspective of psychoanalytic anthropology, human identity formation relies to a certain extent on "Narcissistic Omnipotence." "Narcissistic Omnipotence" serves as a primal psychological defense mechanism and catalyst for self-awareness. During infancy, individuals confront the uncertainties and potential threats of the external world by maintaining the illusion of their own omnipotence. Built upon the psychological stability afforded by omnipotent narcissism, infants gain the courage to explore and learn externally. Through actions like sucking, grasping, and crying, they begin to distinguish themselves from the external world by observing the effects of their actions. In this process, they gradually recognize the limitations of their influence, developing a more realistic self-understanding. Positive responses from the environment and the fulfillment of needs then foster the identification of self-worth. Individuals retain aspects of omnipotent narcissism beyond infancy for self-protection and identity formation. Beyond the developmental perspective, Kristeva posits that healthy identity formation also relies on distinctions between health and disability within symbolic order, briefly tracing this concept through philosophical history. From Aristotle's ancient Greek

conception of disabled people as deviating from "Telos" and thus deprived of "Dunamis"—a perspective profoundly influencing medieval Christian philosophy's ontological dualism of "wholeness/ deficiency" ontological dualism. This framework persisted through modern thinkers like Descartes and Hegel, who presupposed "capacity Integrity" as a prerequisite for subjectivity. Even Heidegger, while critiquing traditional metaphysics, remained bound by an ontological presupposition centered on capacity. Thus, the definition of "ability/disability" consistently corresponds to the binary variation of "capable/incapable" (Julia, 2018, pp. 219-220). In summary, these two perspectives can be consensually synthesized as follows: the identity of able-bodied/disabled people depends on the "possession/deprivation" duality of the capability approach. The distinction lies in the former tending toward an instinctive perception, while the latter is a culturally shaped outcome.

Corresponding to these two perspectives, "Narcissistic Identity Wounds" triggered in able-bodied people when confronting disabled people encompasses two layers of inner "Vulnerability"—the instinctive emotional fragility stemming from the threat of physical death, and the symbolic identity fragility arising from the threat of spiritual death. The former pertains to the death anxiety of biological life (Greek: zoe), while the latter relates to the death anxiety of political life (Greek: bios). On one hand, instinctual emotional vulnerability stems from humanity's ultimate fear as embodied beings. The demise of the physical body signifies the complete deprivation of survival capacity, where omnipotent self-confidence ultimately collapses into a sense of total powerlessness—marked by utter loss of control and complete denial. The high dependency on others for survival and the frequent high mortality rates among people with disabilities instill an instinctive fear in non-disabled people. They recognize their own bodies could similarly suffer such trauma, rendering them incapable of self-care—death is not an abstract possibility. The way able-bodied people reject disabled people like a plague of death is, in essence, a deliberate evasion of their own emotional vulnerability. Yet physical death is an inescapable existential fact for humanity—the authentic foundation of our shared being. Unlike Heidegger, who viewed death as "the most authentic, unconnected, and insurmountable possibility" (Heidegger, 2016, p. 347), she emphasizes the shared vulnerability humans experience in confronting death. Human fragility stems from mortality itself, and this fragility validates the emotional resonance of our embodied existence. "Being Towards The End" need not lead to absolute solitude; people can face death together through mutual support and caring relationships. Embracing this ontology of instinctive fragility means that closeness with disabled people fosters greater acceptance of one's own existential inevitability and deeper empathy toward others. Thus, the fear of physical death transforms into spiritual strength for self-care and an emotional conduit for caring toward others.

On the other hand, the fragility of symbolic identity stems from humanity's fluid existence as symbolic beings. This vulnerability is more pervasive in daily life because the abstract self formed through symbolic identity is not concrete—it is virtual, blurred, and mutable. Consequently, the instability of symbolic identity is constant, a point underscored by Kristeva's early theory of the "Subject in Process." First proposed in her doctoral dissertation Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva combined

Hegel's dialectic of negation with Freud's theory of the death drive to articulate negativity—a productive force capable of transcending the symbolic order—thus introducing the concept of the "Subject in Process": "As the logical expression of the objective process, negativity can only produce a subject in process/on trial. In other words, the subject, constituted by the law of negativity and thus by the law of an objective reality, is necessarily suffused by negativity—opened onto and by objectivity, he is mobile, unsubjected, free." (Julia, 1982, pp. 110-111) This conception of the subject shatters structuralism's illusion of a unified subject, revealing that the subject is not a fixed entity but rather a fluid, ever-shifting state continuously formed through a process of constant destruction and reconstruction. Here, the force of negativity serves as the engine of subject formation, residing in the subversive power of the symbolic state (masculinity/language/rationality/consciousness) within the individual against the symbolic state (femininity/flesh/irrationality/unconsciousness) as the law of objective reality. The permeation of this negative force into reality reveals the existence of "Heterogeneity." By negating old unities, the differences within or between things become manifest. It is crucial to note that heterogeneity cannot be equated with mere difference. Kristeva emphasizes that heterogeneity resides within the chaotic, potential-filled maternal space (Chora), preceding meaning and generating it, beyond the grasp of the symbolic order. Thus, the difference that becomes symbolic can only be described as a static slice within the flux of heterogeneity. From theory to phenomenon, the reality of able-bodied people confronting disabled people may trigger identity anxiety among the former. able-bodied people identify with the label "able-bodied" as distinct from "disabled." To maintain this identity, they reject the possibility of their own disability projected by disabled people. This heterogeneity of disability is thus excluded from symbolic identification and resides in the unconscious. Yet reality shows that non-disabled people cannot guarantee they will remain physically or mentally intact. American sociologist Zola has argued that disability is actually a normal phenomenon spanning the entire human life cycle. Accidental injuries, chronic illnesses, and inevitable aging render non-disability temporary, making disability more universal than "non-disability." Even the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF)—the globally accepted standard for describing health and disability—explicitly addresses a widespread misconception: that the ICF pertains solely to persons with disabilities. In reality, the ICF holds universal applicability (WHO, 2001, p. 7). Thus, Kristeva emphasizes that if able-bodied people confront rather than ignore persons with disabilities, acknowledging the latter can help the former develop a symbolic consensus grounded in reality rather than imagination—human subjectivity is continually formed through process, and the fragility of identity signifies that one's sense of self can be repeatedly shattered and reconstructed, expanded or extended. Spiritual death, in fact, heralds the transcendence of human beings who can continually be reborn in spirit. Simultaneously, when our symbolic structures open to others, it also signifies an opening to our own inner unconscious. In other words, the openness inherent in symbolizing vulnerability transforms both inward and outward gazes from scrutiny and judgment into positive signals of curiosity and welcome. The able-bodied will move from the narrow confines of the

self-centered cage toward the broader realm of the greater self. The fear of spiritual death will become a powerful driving force for innovating the self and embracing others.

As seen above, through Kristeva's positive interpretation, the dual vulnerability of physical and spiritual death evoked in the healthy individual when encountering the disabled ceases to be a negative signal plunging one into the abyss of fear. Instead, it becomes a resonance and consensus fostering mutual respect and affection between self and others. She elevates the significance of vulnerability to a status equal to the humanism inherited from the enlightenment (liberty, equality, fraternity), even suggesting that analytical listening to vulnerability can transform these three iconic terms into a shared concern (Julia, 2010, p. 42). In other words, vulnerability constitutes the ontological foundation of shared existence. Listening to vulnerability reveals our authentic commonality—the transience of the flesh and the fluidity of symbolic construction form the fundamental reality we collectively face. This serves as a shared bridge connecting our emotions and cognition, capable of transcending the limitations of atomized individuals in modern society. Precisely through this shared ground, "Desire and its twin, suffering, make their way toward a constant renewal of the self, the other, and connection." (Julia, 2010, p. 42). That is, vulnerability possesses shareability at the ontological interface, yet we must pay particular attention to its non-shareability within embodied experience. Because our bodies remain separate, and language cannot fully express our complete experiences—as demonstrated by Wittgenstein's "The Mystical" and Heidegger's "The Unspeakability of Being"—the fragility embodied in experience cannot be wholly shared with others. Each person's body anchors their phenomenological "Dasein," grounding a uniquely perceived world. Just as a sighted person, no matter how hard they try to imagine, cannot truly grasp the fear and confusion a blind person feels when exploring the world in darkness; nor can an able-bodied person fully comprehend the helplessness and frustration a paralyzed person experiences upon losing control of their body. These emotions are deeply intertwined with their physical circumstances, forming complex and profound inner experiences. Even when confronted with identical vulnerable situations, the absence of shared bodily experience makes it difficult to achieve complete emotional resonance. Thus, vulnerability possesses a certain non-shareability at the relational interface. Kristeva views this as an incommensurable singularity, whose existence prevents the fusion and assimilation tendencies that might arise from overly intimate relationships.

3. Epistemological Models: Singularity

The exclusion of disabled people by able-bodied people relates not only to the latter's own latent traumas but also to their epistemological perspectives on disability. Epistemology of disability primarily fall into two models: the individual model and the social model. The former privatizes responsibility, viewing disability as an "abnormal" health defect caused by the individual themselves, requiring medical intervention to improve bodily function and approximate the "normal" state of able-bodied people. The latter collectivizes responsibility, asserting that disability stems not from

individual flaws but from societal structures failing to adequately consider and meet the needs of disabled people. Both models share a common perspective of viewing disability formation through the lens of responsibility attribution. Their divergence lies in the causes of exclusion: the former attributes it to "personal tragedy," while the latter attributes it to "social barriers."

Kristeva critiques the early individual model's epistemology of disability, which equates disability with defect—an inferior state relative to wholeness. This binary opposition, centered on wholeness, perpetuates the long-standing marginalization and discrimination against people with disabilities. In other words, Kristeva critiques the inherent hierarchy within the able/disabled binary structure, tracing its origins to the same logic as the male/female binary in patriarchal societies—both ultimately establishing a distinction between superior and inferior groups. The able/disabled hierarchy traces back to ancient Greece, where cultural ideals of bodily perfection were deeply embedded in symbolic order. Plato's Republic posited that individuals with defects could disrupt social harmony and civic perfection, thus excluding them from the ideal city-state. Even Aristotle's Politics contained radical statements suggesting the abandonment of children born with disabilities. This hierarchical classification system perpetuates social inequality, yet it is fundamentally a fictional metaphysics—an artificial construct rather than a natural state. The epistemology of the individual paradigm inherits this traditional philosophical notion, equating ability with autonomy, rationality, and the image of the perfect agent. This construct erects a formidable cognitive barrier, compelling able-bodied people to identify themselves entirely with the concept of "ability," viewing it as an essential existence and seeking to maintain a stable superiority relative to disability. The modern medical paradigm, which views disabled people as pathological anomalies requiring treatment, inherently devalues disability. Yet the pursuit of perpetual normality represents an unrealistic ideal self and self-ideal, as disability is universal (as discussed in the previous section), and the unequal relationship between normality and disability demands reexamination.

Kristeva's perspective leans toward a social model epistemology, positing that disability is a construct of social environments, institutions, and ideas. Western culture is often saturated with the theological notion that "disability is divine punishment." Kristeva refutes this by citing the case of mathematician Sanderson, documented by Diderot in his Letters on the Blind, demonstrating that people with disabilities possess unique abilities. This reveals a positive dimension beyond the tragic narrative logic. Kristeva's emphasis on the unique abilities of disabled people can be articulated through two distinct approaches: the capability approach and the singularity approach. Regarding the capability approach, she aligns with Diderot's view that disabled people are equal to able-bodied people, thus advocating for their recognition as rights-bearing subjects with the same political rights as able-bodied people. Regarding the singularity approach, she draws on Elsland's interpretation in The Disabled God, which posits that Jesus' wounds are an inseparable part of his glory, to articulate her secular understanding: "The wound is not a lack, but a 'Singularity'" (Julia, 2018, p. 222).

This “Singularity” theoretical perspective constitutes Kristeva’s distinctive epistemology of disability, drawing crucial theoretical support from the “Haecceity” doctrine of the Christian scholastic philosopher Scotus. Scotus opposed Aquinas’s view that “Truth exists in the intellect and in the thing,” insisting that truth resides in ‘Thisness’ (the particularity of a thing) rather than “Whatness” (its essential nature). “singular essence” takes precedence over “common nature” because individual singularity is the cause of universality. “Individuality is constituted by both universality and singularity. Yet, as the final cause and necessary agent of universality, individuality—as the mode by which a thing is itself—maximizes the realization of all its constitutive characteristics (most of all. That is, individuality actually encompasses universality), thus forming the so-called law of individuation.” (Sun & Wang, 2022, p. 38) Thus, under the law of individuation, “Thisness” becomes the ultimate self-determining factor, signifying the substantial reality of the particular essence of persons, things, and events.

However, Kristeva’s interpretation of “Singularity” is a post-structuralist reworking grounded in Scotus’s doctrine of individuality. She breaks free from the static, unchanging shackles of theological predestination, dynamizing Scotus’s doctrine of individuality through the poststructuralist subjectivist lens of the “Subject in Process.” She posits that humans are never fixed, unified “things,” but rather each person exists as a singular, dynamic “Thisness”—the singularity of being ‘this’—the “Singularity.” On one hand, the “Singularity”—as exemplified by the aforementioned law of individualization—embodies both universality and irreplaceable singularity. For instance, “a person” signifies both the universal ‘human’ and the particular “this one.” On the other hand, the singularity evolves through the impact and disruption of heterogeneous objects on the symbolic order. Consequently, “this one” cannot be fixed; it cannot occupy a consistent position or maintain an unchanging structure. This implies that the singularity is perpetually renewed.

From the above, it is evident that the “Singularity” cannot be simplistically equated with uniqueness. The Western emphasis on uniqueness has traditionally been grounded in the independence of the subject, whereas Kristeva’s theory of the “Singularity” is built upon the interactivity of the subject. The commonality of singularities builds bridges for resonance between individuals, while their distinctiveness prompts others to become new singularities—a cycle of disruption and creation that sparks extraordinary creativity and the expansion of subjectivity. Therefore, it is crucial to recognize that singularities represent opportunities for social connection rather than obstacles; they are the engines driving the continuous flourishing of social vitality. The shareability of singularities is a prerequisite for their role in fostering social connections and vitality. The shareability of singularities lies in their commonality (such as externally received symbolic orders) and manifested individuality (such as the reconstruction of symbolic orders through heterogeneity). This is the unique quality of humans as “speaking animals,” capable not only of language but also of semiotic signification practices. These aspects enable people to reach consensus and understand differences through language and symbols, and to reconstruct their own subjectivity by receiving the uniqueness of others. Conversely,

the non-shareability of the singularity lies in the materiality of bodily boundaries (such as the body and its un-symbolized heterogeneities) and the inherent limitations of speech itself (such as the ambiguity or polysemy of linguistic expression). These aspects caution us against traditional subject metaphysics' neglect of the corporeal body and its excessive affirmation of language's objectivity, certainty, and comprehensiveness.

Viewing persons with disabilities through the lens of singularity epistemology reveals their positive aspects within the interplay of individual and contextual factors, contrasting with the ICF's framing of disability as a negative condition. Traditionally, persons with disabilities are often viewed as deficient, with their physical or intellectual impairments overemphasized and labeled as "weak" or "incapable"—a manifestation of "ableism." However, disability itself constitutes the heterogeneity challenging ableism. People with disabilities can position themselves as singular points, subverting the hegemony of ableist uniformity by sharing their own negating power, thereby breaking this singular and rigid cognitive paradigm. Second, the individuality of persons with disabilities takes precedence over their commonality. Their impairments are no longer seen as a loss of shared traits but rather as singular differences that precede commonality—part of their unique individuality rather than a defect: "Disability as not a lack to be fixed through charity but rather an opportunity, not a deprivation but rather an irreducible singularity." (Alice, 2020, p.10) Third, each person with disabilities possesses a unique mode of existence and significance, embodying a subjectivity that says "no" to any singular identity. This highlights that persons with disabilities are an integral part of human diversity. The value of this diversity may manifest in their unique approaches to life's challenges, their distinct perceptions of the world, and their exceptional talents in fields like art and science. For instance, Julia Kristeva's son David, despite neurological impairments, composes music through his perfect pitch (Julia, 2015, p.127). Finally, the dynamic nature of the "Singularity" is fully embodied in people with disabilities. They are not individuals fixed in a single state of disability, their lives are a process of constant change and development. Through shifts in social environments, technological advancements, and their own efforts, they continually push beyond their limits and reshape themselves. For instance, Haraway's cyborg theory highlights how modern technology provides persons with disabilities with more sophisticated assistive tools, helping them overcome physical limitations and unlock greater possibilities for social participation. Disabled athletes continually challenge themselves on the field, achieving outstanding results—a vivid illustration of the singularity's perpetual renewal.

4. Value Practice: Interaction

After analyzing the causes of ableism and exclusion, Kristeva updates traditional subjectivities and disability epistemologies with an ontology of fragility and a positive epistemology of singularity. This shifts the foundational logic of how we perceive people with disabilities, enabling able-bodied people to reduce discrimination and exclusion. But how can we proactively improve this relationship? More

profoundly, what should this relationship look like? How can we achieve such a relationship? This leads to the shared concept of humanistic values and corresponding praxis.

In "A Tragedy and a Dream: Disability Revisited," she poignantly reveals her intimate yet separated coexistence with David: "However I only really accompany him in giving him the means of separating himself from me, in individualizing to the maximum his languages, his means of expression, and/or the bond with others." (Julia, 2015, p. 126) Their dynamic fundamentally reflects the core tenet of her feminist ethics—"Maternal Reliance." This concept advocates for a non-sacrificial form of motherhood, where the mother-child relationship is reciprocal rather than one-sided sacrifice. In Passions of *Our Time,* she describes, from a psychoanalytic anthropological perspective, a mother-infant relationship characterized by shared vulnerability and singularity: In the early stages of this relationship, the infant's existence as an Other places the mother in a "state of life emergency" (Note 4). The subject's fragmentation and loss (as some mothers express, "having a child means losing oneself") sparks hatred toward the child, This hatred transforms through the mechanism of "projective identification" into control over the child (attempting to make the child a substitute for myself). When the mother confronts and accepts the "Vulnerability" of her own boundaries, she transforms her possessiveness into tender love for the child, guiding the child into the symbolic order through babbling, and at the appropriate time, actively creates distance from the child. In this way, the mother's sense of absence becomes the child's motivation for expression, thus creating a "transitional space" (Winnicott's term) for the child's own thinking. Then, the child's heterogeneity gains sufficient space to break through the constraints of the symbolic order, generating creativity akin to slips of the tongue and critical independent thinking. The child completes symbolic matricide (detaching from the mother's bodily attachment), shifting instead to interact with the mother's thoughts. Gradually, the child becomes a "Subject in Process," and their "Singularity" becomes shareable. Simultaneously, the mother embraces the child's slips of the tongue and welcomes their unique perspectives, thereby renewing her own language—that is, renewing her own singularity.

The psychoanalytic process described above is not inherent to all mother-infant relationships, but rather an attainable ideal state. It can be summarized as an ethical stance of "holding while letting go" and "depending while remaining autonomous"—an ethos of "linking, gathering, joining, and putting together; but also to adhere to, to belong to, to depend on; and therefore to trust in, to confide in, to ease one's thoughts and feelings, to assemble, and to be oneself." (Julia, 2018, p. 109) This passage offers a concentrated exposition of "Maternal Reliance." Viewed through the lens of traditional subjectivity theory, it appears paradoxical, as the subject who "must be oneself" must be independent rather than dependent. Yet Kristeva posits a relational subjectivity ("Subject in Process"). The Other is no longer, as Sartre claimed, "hell is other people," but rather a necessary component in the formation of our subjectivity. This subjectivity, in turn, demands that human interactions be "harmonious yet distinct." The subject and the Other are neither the devouring nor the cold, indifferent mother figure, but rather a supportive and affectionate "good mother": "I am there, it falls on me, I accompany him or

her, I love him or her as he or she is." (Julia, 2015, p. 125) From the perspective of logic and temporal priority, Kristeva posits that this mother-infant relationship serves as the archetype of "love" for all human relationships. The distinctiveness of "Love of Maternal Reliance" lies in the fact that the relationship between the two is not merely an emotional bond but also a bidirectional relationship of meaning creation. This is precisely the unique aspect of the humanistic value of the concept of "Share," which aims to reconstruct the social bonds of emotional connection and meaning creation, rather than merely material exchange relationships.

So, how can this social bond be reconstructed? Kristeva proposed a practice-oriented approach to the concept of "Share"—namely, "Interaction." This was also the purpose behind her founding of the French Disability Council: to promote "Real interaction between the able and the disabled" (Julia, 2010, p. 39). The practice theory of "Interaction" serves as an alternative to the practice theory of "Integration," where "Integration" refers to assimilating people with disabilities into mainstream society. This approach implicitly carries ableist violence, demanding that disabled people unilaterally conform to an established symbolic order. In contrast, "Interaction" cannot be simplistically understood as mere conscious communication or integration between individuals. Instead, it emphasizes the unconscious breaking through the symbolic order of consciousness—a bidirectional psychoanalytic listening. Psychoanalytic listening seeks to understand repressed emotions and cognition behind others' linguistic and symbolic expressions. This process reveals internal unconscious conflicts—heterogeneous to internalized symbolic orders—accompanied by vulnerable emotions. Such listening to the unconscious first requires mutual "proximity," not merely physical closeness but psychological intimacy. Driven by the call of love, people willingly open the boundaries of their subjectivity to others' souls, even if it risks fracturing those boundaries. Second, beyond proximity, "hospitality" must flourish. Kristeva borrows Roland Barthes' "zero degree of humanity" to describe hospitality's open state: temporarily suspending one's own subjectivity, free from personal emotions and subjective intentions, welcoming and accepting another's spiritual world with a "neutral" attitude devoid of preconceptions. "Hospitality is a genuine attempt to understand other kinds of freedom" (Julia, 2010, p. 22). The "zero degree of humanity" ensures the free expression of others' subjectivity, and the sincere acceptance of another's spiritual world can render one's own mode of existence more diverse and complex. Psychoanalytically attuned listening, through the combined effects of "proximity" and "hospitality," enables authentic interaction between subjects. This authenticity emerges when the symbolic order's social conventions are set aside, revealing the sincere encounter between true selves. Only through deep emotional and conceptual engagement with others can authentic social bonds be reconstructed. Interacting based on externally prescribed moral ideals is merely the social etiquette exhibited by disciplined individuals.

First, the emotional dimension of "Interaction" lies in "empathy" (Note 5) rather than "sympathy." Kristeva commends the generous care of helpers within traditional charitable ethics, yet points out that the "sympathetic" attitude in such actions, though well-intentioned, often stems from external moral

obligations or subjective projective identification with others' misfortune. It fails to truly engage with the recipient's lived experience and may even carry an underlying sense of superiority—"I am fortunate, but he is unfortunate," thereby overlooking the recipient's authentic experience and dignity. Thus, Kristeva advocates mutual emotional care to avoid condescending pity and charity. This proposal can be summarized as replacing one-way "sympath" with two-way "empathy." "Empathy" authentically embodies "shared vulnerability," as omnipotence typically suppresses vulnerability to maintain the illusion of self-integrity. Only by acknowledging and sharing one's own vulnerability can individuals forge more genuine and profound emotional connections with others. The emotional bond of empathy generates an embracing form of care: I see that vulnerable part of myself in you. When you are vulnerable, I hold you—and in doing so, I also hold myself. Vulnerability is an inseparable part of human existence, especially the vulnerability stemming from death anxiety. Thus, empathy leads to mutual emotional care.

Second, the cognitive dimension of "Interaction" lies in "co-creation" rather than "independent creation." Krasner challenges traditional charitable ethics that view persons with disabilities as incomplete and incapable weaklings. This perspective risks permanently positioning them as "objects of care," overlooking their agency and inherent qualities while reinforcing their marginalized status and trapping them in passive dependency. In traditional charitable practice, persons with disabilities appear as beneficiaries yet simultaneously become objectified subjects. Their infantilization stems from an inability to assert their agency, thereby hindering the unfolding and societal sharing of their creative, singular potential. From the perspective of Ke's "Love of Maternal Reliance," persons with disabilities may lack the conditions for meaning creation. They require spiritual guidance and space for autonomous action to foster their capacity for independent thought and self-directed behavior, thereby forming shared singularities—the fundamental condition for cognitive interaction. The ultimate direction of cognitive interaction is to transcend the symbolic order through "shared singularities," where unique meanings circulate and propagate between individuals. Innovation in singularities arises from bidirectional communication through shared participation and collaboration, not from the isolated creation of individual singularities. Thus, the cognitive interaction emphasized by Kristeva can be described as bidirectional or even multidirectional "co-creation" rather than unidirectional "independent creation." "Co-creation" is the practical outcome of "shared singularities." From the perspective of subjectivity, the mutual collision of alterities and the resulting symbolic implosion transform the other's subjectivity from an obstacle to one's own into a source of vitality. Alterity becomes the resource and dynamism for the generation of subjectivity, thereby making meaning creation a social bond.

As evident above, the value of "Love of Maternal Reliance" requires an "interactive" practice theory of "empathy" and "co-creation" for its realization—that is, it can reconstruct the social bonds of emotional connection and meaning creation through "shared vulnerability and singularity." In this way, persons with disabilities are no longer passively excluded from the world of the able-bodied; instead,

both groups actively engage in mutual connections of vulnerability and singularity. However, the sharing of vulnerability and singularity has its limits. We must respect the non-shareability of vulnerability and singularity to avoid the potential threat of overly tight social bonds—social fusion. Kristeva links the struggle for dignity for people with disabilities to new humanism: "Respect for a vulnerability that cannot be shared." (Julia, 2010, p. 30). It is precisely by respecting the non-shareability of the "Singularity" of "Thisness" and "Vulnerability" that the finitude of zoe and bios—as the authentic state of human existence—must be acknowledged by us, rather than concealed beneath the illusion of omnipotence. The incommensurable residue beyond the boundaries of finitude, though excluded from socialization, underpins each individual's irreducible and irreplaceable uniqueness. Recognizing and respecting the non-shareability of singularity and fragility implies that interconnectedness cannot be total—there will always be unreachable spaces. Thus, the ethical practice of the concept of "Share" ultimately leads to a vision of pluralistic symbiosis: one that escapes the loneliness of interpersonal alienation while avoiding the homogenization trap of merging into uniformity. "The 'I' created in maternal passion from then on becomes the 'multiverse'." (Julia, 2018, p. 104). Jung borrows the astrophysical concept of the "multiverse" to metaphorically describe the dynamic, open, perpetually reborn, and expanding internal landscape of the subject nurtured by maternal love. The interaction between the subject and the other, sharing vulnerability and singularity, similarly reflects this social microcosm.

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Notes

Note 1. Professor Gao Xuanyan, an expert in French philosophy, divides the theoretical development of French feminism into three generations. The first generation, represented by Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex, represents "the philosophy of the second sex." The second generation, from the 1960s to the 1970s, is represented by Derrida, Foucault, and Irigaray, representing "deconstructive feminism." and the third generation, from the 1980s to the present, is the "heterological feminism" represented by Kristeva, which transcends binary gender categories to explore multiple possibilities for human development across broader interfaces (see Gao Xuan Yang. On Kristeva's New Feminism [J]. Journal of Tongji University (Social Sciences Edition), 2009, 20(03): p.910.).

Note 2. "Semanalysis" is a post-structural research method pioneered by Kristeva, first systematically elaborated in her early work Semeiotike: Recherches Pour une Semanalyse (1969) and subsequently employed in her subsequent theoretical studies. "Semeiotics" transcends structuralism's static analysis of fixed frameworks by focusing on the dynamic process of meaning formation, with its core concern being how meaning is generated. Moreover, this process of meaning-making is not confined to the "consciousness" of the symbolic order. Kristeva introduces Freud's "unconscious" as an "other scene" within this process, necessitating not only cognitive analysis of consciousness but also perceptual analysis of the unconscious.

Note 3. The concept of "Share" emerged gradually through Kristeva's analysis of the marginalization of disabled people and her ethical advocacy. She advocates reflecting on disability to reconsider the limitations of humanism. On a broader level, she positions "Share" as an alternative model of freedom for a new humanism, distinct from traditional humanism that conforms to causal logic. Thus, the context of this concept can be divided into the metaphysical issue of marginalizing disabled people and the metaphysical reflection on humanism.

Note 4. Unlike a "narcissistic identity crisis," the child experiences a physical "intrusion" by the mother, not a psychological one.

Note 5. The "empathy" here differs from the psychological concept of empathy, defined as the ability to understand another's emotional and cognitive states. Here, "empathy" refers to a mutual emotional resonance arising from the psychological foundation of empathy.