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Artificial Intelligence (AI), Politics, Military Science and the Art of Future War

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Abstract

This paper is for anyone who wants to understand Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology, as it relates to respective armed forces. Indeed, AI will power several new weapon systems used on the military battlefield of the future. This paper uses Sun Tzu's The Art of War and Karl von Clausewitz's profound study On War as source works, to give an overview of the role of Artificial Intelligence; and how military technology might be used during future wars. In this respect, governments have an obligation to consider new and more deadly weapons for their national defense. Hence, this work shows how AI will be intricately entwined with arming our respective militaries with autonomous weapon systems. But will countries or governments follow AI technology blindly without considering the negative consequences of using such deadly AI weapons? Finally, this paper asks the question of whether AI manufactured weapons are even necessary. Indeed, using futuristic AI weapons of war might (wholeheartedly) transform our warring world. Only time will tell if human beings will deploy such unconventional measures/weapons — to resolve violent conflicts.

Keywords

Artificial intelligence, counterintelligence, technology, warfare, military operations, drones, autonomous weapons, national sovereignty

1. Introduction: Sun Tzu and Artificial Intelligence

Although Sun Tzu (2019), the famous Chinese General, in his famous military treatise or important study of war, entitled *The Art of War*, didn't know about Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology, or modern weapons of war, students of military and political science can adapt his brilliant and classic study and "principles to modern warfare" (p. 1). Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, which was written in 500 B.C., "is also highly valued in foreign countries and has been translated into English, Japanese, German, French, and

Russian" (Hanzhang, 1990, p. 7), and other languages. Moreover, in terms of military strategy and tactics, Sun Tzu's succinct guidance in *The Art of War* "has also been adopted as a text or reference book in a number of military academies and research institutes" (Hanzhang, 1990, p. 7). This influential reference is also studied by business leaders and in premiere graduate schools around the world.

Although Artificial Intelligence (AI) was never considered during Sun Tzu's seminal time, his profound and astute principles are "the quintessence of [military] strategic ideas, which has been greatly valued by militarists in history" and should be "observed in all [aggressive and] anti-aggressive wars" (Hanzhang, 1990, p. 17). To be sure, *The Art of War* is ultimately a political document. Moreover, this influential military volume is:

> A systematic guide to strategy and [military] tactics, [as] it discusses various maneuvers and the effect of terrain, the importance of accurate information about the enemy's forces, and emphasizes the unpredictability of battle and the need for flexible responses. ("Sunzi or Sun-Tzu," 2000, p. 1562)

Additionally, as one of China's greatest military strategist, Sun Tzu's "[insisted] on the close relationship between political considerations and military policy [which has also] influenced modern strategists" ("Sunzi or Sun-Tzu," 2000, p. 1562) over the centuries, which is of significant importance to modern *warfighters*, who should know how Armed Forces will use or deploy AI and autonomous weapon systems in future wars, particularly as such technology continues to grow. Consequently, Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be necessary in warfighting across the globe, unlike during Sun Tzu's days, when wars were more centralized and purposefully deliberate. And, although "the chariot has gone and [specific] weapons have changed — that is, since Sun Tzu's time, "this ancient master holds his own, since he deals with fundamentals, with the influence of politics and human nature on military operations." In so many words, Sun Tzu (2019) was a great man and iconic military thinker, whose written work "shows in a striking way how unchanging these principles" (p. 1), presented in *The Art of War* are, even with today's AI technology and computerized learning. In this respect, we must also acknowledge the challenges with integrating AI technology efficiently to supplement militaries during times of war.

Equally important, as nations embraced and used autonomous drones and low flying, strategic guided missiles in war fighting and planning, "Artificial Intelligence and machine learning are general-purpose technologies that can be leveraged across a broad range of use cases that offer tremendous benefits to society and national security" (Seeds, 2024, p. 1). It might also be an interesting and worthwhile endeavor to understand when it comes to military operations on the respective battlefield — and during specific military operations. Question: Can AI generative weaponry systems be duplicated by different nations, particularly against an implacable enemy? More questions remain. Thus, to achieve a specific end to war, there will always be a struggle between nations or opposing forces. Indeed, armed fighting or warfare is a given in combat and related concerns, no matter the weapons being used. Therefore, "AI, [weapons and] machine learning and autonomy are all poised to drive sophisticated military technological innovation to equip warfighters with AI-enabled systems to improve the speed, [and] quality accuracy of

decisions in the field, which can provide the decisive advantage needed to deter or win a fight" (Seeds, 2024, p. 2). This is to say that we have this advanced AI technology at our disposal. Also, the implications for using AI during times of war must be thoroughly studied, while keeping the well-being of human beings in mind. Additionally, focusing on the long-term health of military organizations in the United States must be *front-and-center* for finding more permanent options to protect our national security. Therefore, we need to build confidence in this kind of military AI technology.

This point is important to understand because war also includes military *counterintelligence* — that is, when it comes to denying adversarial countries from penetrating our (electronic) communications grid and accessing our (war-time) technologies remotely. Meanwhile, our nation through the National Security Agency must protect and formulate "codes, ciphers, and other cryptology, as well as [provide] the interception, analysis, and solution[s] of [military] coded transmissions" ("National Security Agency," 2000, p. 1132), which can be put in place through Artificial Intelligence (AI). It should also be noted that, "research sponsored by the military has long been an important source of innovation for the [Armed Forces and] the U.S. economy." For example, "Radar and nuclear power stemmed from military research, as did the internet" (Lowi, Ginsberg, Shepsle, & Ansolabehere, 2021, p. 660). In this regard, new technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), "has grown and developed at about the same rate as computer speed and sophistication, which are its main limiting factors." And even more important, "The development of computer memories containing circuits that are comparable in number to the synaptic connections in the human brain has brought about the most striking advances in the [AI] field" ("Artificial Intelligence," 2000, p. 95). In war, Sun Tzu (2019) persuasively argued that: "fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one. It is merely a question of instituting signs and signals" (p. 45). Perhaps the invariably insightful Sun Tzu might have used strategies and technologically advanced weapons during battles on land, sea, and in the air — that is, if he had lived and had the chance to use AI weaponry.

2. Method

2.1 Governments and Artificial Intelligence

All in all, and for some governments, embracing and investing in AI might be like climbing out on a limb, so to speak, especially if their investments in certain technologies fail. Of course, "Typical applications" of [military] technologies "include game playing, language translation by [AI] computers, [weapons implementation,] fault diagnosis [and expected weapon] systems, and robotics" ("Artificial Intelligence," 2000, p. 95). Hence, we must ask: Are nations fully invested in purchasing such military (weapons) hardware or AI technology? Or is such an investment a tremendous waste of time? Or should respective governments continue to worship at the *altar of AI*, to use the metaphor, and other modern-day weapons technologies? In other words, should modern militaries rely on AI machines/technology to conduct total war? To be sure, AI technology can move forward strategically by governments, or be used in a collective synchronized, war-fighting way. In either case, timing is *everything*. For example, "the U.S. Defense

Department has identified AI as a technology with disruptive potential for [military] defense and [highlighted] it as a technology area for enhanced attention and [possible] investment" (Seeds, 2024, p. 2). No doubt, such activity gives authority or power to different communities within their own territory or government, as in *national sovereignty*.

In terms of disruption and destruction on the battlefield, while possibly deploying advanced weapons that would come to be feared by rival enemies, the dedicated Sun Tzu (2019) wrote:

> There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; dropping fire amongst the enemy. [Finally,] In order to carry out an attack with fire, we must have [the] means available; [and] the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. (p. 83) (Note 1)

We must keep in mind that Sun Tzu's prescription for bombing and annihilating people or societies, as well as destroying/obliterating structures from afar is apparent — that is, to crush the enemy entirely, and without remorse. In this respect, military drones or AI autonomous, cruise-missile systems are sure ways of utilizing and employing "the concept of fire" in military combat for which Sun Tzu wrote about so long ago. In fact, using AI weapons and "Prioritizing next-generation munitions has become central to modernization strategy to ensure land-power [military] superiority" (Lima, 2024, p. 1), especially in special operations combat. And we cannot ignore such sophisticated weaponry. According to Chief Warrant Officer Michael K. Lima (2014), the U.S. military must incorporate "six critical modernization efforts," to actually "deliver a force capable of multidomain operations," which includes: long-range precision fires, next generation combat vehicles, future vertical-lift-aircraft, air and missile defense, as well as "advanced communication networks and individual soldier lethality" (p. 1). Artificial Intelligence (AI), of course, will enhance such military efforts, and this strategy is why in almost every battlefield scenario that we can, perhaps, imagine is something that militaries must think about. Furthermore, what might happen if world armies totally rely on new AI weapons technology, as earlier mentioned? In a nutshell, *breakthrough*, AI weapons might go *awry* or be used in pernicious ways. Therefore, there is the possibility of risks using AI, even if such technology can be transformative in many unprecedented, destructive ways. Also, should nations be seriously concerned about the viability of AI weaponry?

It should be abundantly clear that, "there are risks to the [AI] technology's use by governments, including possibilities [that] it could be harnessed for [illegal] mass surveillance, cyberattacks or even [creating] lethal autonomous devices" (Klepper, 2024, p. 6A). But AI weapons will be unique in the *warfighting pantheon* of military and political violence. Therefore, for some military strategists, the reality of adopting AI technology can be a dangerous proposition, particularly with the purchase of autonomous aircrafts or drones, which can be used in warfare and other modern-day struggles of violence. Equally important, aided by AI technology, "strategic weapons [can] strike at the seat of an enemy's military, economic and political power, targeting cities, factories, military bases, transportation and communications networks, and seats of government" ("Weapon Systems," 2000, pp. 1729-1730). As with

many new military AI technologies, having the will and the ability to fashion and use them in war should be of primary importance. But is it irresponsible to spend money on AI weapon systems for the military if we don't know or understand the *unintended consequences* of deploying them in some tactful or strategic way? Also, what should we know about the *behind-the-scene* manufacturing of such deadly, AI weapon systems?

Fortunately, "only a few nations operate strategic weapon systems; [however,] tactical weapon systems exist in almost every country" ("Weapon Systems," 2000, pp. 1729-1730) (Note 2). More importantly, powerful weapon systems, powered by AI technology are evolving at a rapid pace and/or at an alarming rate; but at the present time, it remains to be seen if innovative, AI military weapons of war or AI missile programs will allow us to make sense of dangerous weapon systems and other destructive technologies. For example, shrewdly tactful, military "Drones have proved [that] they offer greater flexibility and affordability than traditional airstrikes," because they operate "at lower attitudes and [can reach] previously inaccessible [battlefield] areas" (Lima, 2024, p. 2) (Note 3). This sort of thinking about *singularity* in terms of using AI technology and deploying military drones seem appropriate for the times, if not improbable.

Moreover, according to Lima (2024), AI technology and "Upgrading major munitions systems such as missiles is essential, but modernization should also address [AI] technologies, none more prevalent than drones and the munitions they carry" (p. 2) (Note 4). Nevertheless, uncertainty remains about incorporating AI technology in the manufacturing and *up-keep* of autonomous *weapons of war* by different nations.

2.2 Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

So, will AI technology and other autonomous weapon systems be the solution to our munition needs for the next war or future wars? Or will AI weapons development be responsible for enduring wars, unimaginable sufferings, and the deaths of millions of people? Perhaps. But it should be understood that the increase in AI and other technologically advanced weapons in the U.S. (and other countries) will challenge governments and various militaries to adapt. Although such AI weapon systems will be accessible in the near future, "in most very poor countries there will be significant lags in adoption" of AI weaponry and munitions "due in part to affordability" (Cowen, 2024, p. 3) (Note 5). Furthermore, it should be clear that, "Attributable [military] drones, autonomous vehicles and other AI-enabled systems are not able to fully replace soldiers and exquisite [weapon] systems and platforms on the battlefield, but they are already rapidly changing the character of war and how our military services might engage [enemies] in the future" (Seeds, 2024, p. 2). The issue of incorporating new missile technology for military units and operations was/is something that Sun Tzu never lived to see or understand — that is, knowing about the weaponization of AI technology or modern weapons of war — but he did understand that, "War is a clash between major interests that is resolved by bloodshed…" (Howard, 1983, p. 33), and other hostilities. In this respect, let us hope that nations don't start a new "arms race in AI [technology] infrastructure" (Crow, 2024, p. 21), to further fashion and build/construct dangerous weapons of war,

relating to atomic energy. In other words, such ambitious actions might spur the use of AI in developing nuclear weapons or atomic bombs, which "are the most potent explosive devices ever invented" by mankind ("Nuclear Weapon," 2000, p. 1172). And, although "we might prefer to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with other nations, the world can be [a] dangerous" (Ginsberg et al., 2025, p. 439) place; but it might be also argued by some military strategists that war among some nations is *inevitable*. Hence, we must focus on a "strategy for harnessing the power, and managing the risks of AI [military technology] to advance our national security" (Klepper, 2024, p. 6A); and to effectively protect ourselves and national independence; and to receive the indispensable respect from interacting with our allies about matters of war.

2.3 Clausewitz and Artificial Intelligence

If war is about the negative part of human nature, it can be both *active* and *transactional* in the sense that it can be political and (often) business-like — that is, with death and destruction being the order-of-the-day or main highlight of major conflicts. So, was Japanese philosopher and educator Inazo Nitobe (2004) right when he wrote that in war, we must "Bear and face all calamities and adversities with patience and a pure conscience…" (p. 71)? Also, writing about the late Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz's book, *On War*, which is a masterpiece about war and maintaining armies, political scientist Michael Howard (1983) convincingly argues:

> We can find many whose writings illustrate how successive generations have thought about war, but there are remarkably few who can help us to think about it; who have penetrated below the ephemeral phenomena of their own times and considered war, not just as a craft, but as a great socio-political activity, distinguished from all other activities by the reciprocal and legitimized use of purposeful violence to attain political objectives. (p. 1) (Note 6)

The *ephemeral* phenomena of war — and our times — that is, of which Howard speaks, is how we (as humans) should deal with violence while thinking about integrating AI technology in our future *warfighting* strategies and tactics. To be sure, the emergence of *Artificial Intelligence* in developing new, technological weapons will only make engaging in war more complicated, significant, and potentially devastating. Indeed, how exactly can we use AI technology to advance the idea of using autonomous missile systems on the modern-day battlefield? The legendary military writer, Clausewitz, of course, advocated for "a policy of total war," which revolutionized the concept of an effective military; and his writings have been extremely influential in military strategic circles over the years ("War," 1994, p. 1172). Moreover, if war means "a military conflict between two [or more] states, or, in the case of civil war, between different groups within a state" — that is, in a respective country ("War," 1994, p. 1172), Clausewitz would have embraced the entire notion of AI as it relates particularly to total war or *warfighting*. Yet, he wrote: "The conduct of war has nothing to do with making guns and powder out of coal, sulfur, saltpeter, copper and tin; its given qualities are weapons that are ready for use and their effectiveness" (Howard, 1983, p. 2), like with modern weapons of war. In this regard, AI has opened

many of the questions raised by the notion of war; and this sophisticated technology will likely bring impressive advances in future weaponry. But to be effective today, complex *Artificial Intelligence* technology must be knowingly programmed by humans, which ties in with AI safety (Perrigo, 2025, p. 15). Perhaps later on in the creation and/or evolution of military weapon systems, as intimated or mentioned (in this paper) by science writer Billy Perrigo, there might not be a reason an AI "thought process [will] be legible [or understandable] to humans at all" (Perrigo, 2025, p. 15) when it comes to the process of making weapons of war. And therein lies the rub of whether AI weapons technology can be possible or especially dangerous. Consequently, "As with every new technology, there are tremendous advantages, but also problems" (Lowi, Ginsberg, Shepsle, & Ansolabehere, 2025, p. 702) (Note 7).

This particular assertion is all to say that, "such generative AI technology is baked into an increasing number of technology services [such as creating autonomous (weapon) systems] whether we're looking for it or not…" (O'Brien & Parvani, 2025, p. 7), or wanting them or not. This specific point is also important to understand because maybe humans will be able to fight wars (by mutual agreement — that is, in terms of *everything* being about politics) without being in a physical location or on a dirty battlefield *somewhere*, like in an original TV series *Star Trek* episode where two groups of humanoids on different planets fight with AI computers; and the people go to their respective death chambers, based on the decisions made about how many should die through complicated political, AI calculations. It is a way of fighting (even politically) without fighting, or having boots on the ground, so to speak. After all, as Clausewitz tells us: "War is always the servant of policy… [and] without a sound policy," as in the computerized warfare, *Star Trek* episode, "success in war is improbable" (Howard, 1983, p. 64) — that is, without political considerations. So, is war inevitable? Perhaps. Moreover, political repercussions are also important to consider when fighting a war with possible AI technology. In this regard, Artificial Intelligence (AI), as mentioned, is the "ability of a machine [such as with an applied computer] to perform [technical and specific] tasks" ("Artificial Intelligence," 2000, p. 95), while requiring the delicate touch of human beings — at least for now — and in the near future. Additionally, it should be noted that the potential for AI technology in conducting wars and ending with "total victory," as well as moving forward with autonomous weapon technologies, is of continuing significance. Furthermore, as the "premier philosopher of war," Clausewitz suggested:

> Once a major victory is achieved there must be no talk of rest, of breathing space… but only of the pursuit, going for the enemy again, seizing his capital, attacking his reserved and anything else that might give his country aid and comfort. The reason for this is that after war come negotiation and the division of territory. If you have only won a partial victory, you will inevitably lose in negotiation what you have gained by war. The solution is simple: Allow your enemies no options. Annihilate them and their territory is yours to carve. (Greene, 2000, p. 112) (Note 8)

So, was/is Clausewitz right in his assessment about fighting total, ruinous wars and winning on the proverbial battlefield, without mercy, and making deaths *ghastlier* at the expense of a losing and devasted army?

3. Result

If Artificial Intelligence (AI) is eventually used in future wars, it will, perhaps, raise new doubts about the advancement of weapons technology that can be extremely dangerous, as mentioned in this paper. Unfortunately, the militaries/armies of respective nations will have to dream bigger than ever before when incorporating such AI technologies — that is, to survive the onslaught of another warring nation. Hence, discussions about the effectiveness of AI technology will continue. Among other things, *warfighting* success must also come from a respective nation's will to employ or use such deadly AI missile systems and other new weapons. "With this in mind," according to Seeds (2024), the U.S. Defense Department, for example, and the other military branches of "services are continuing to move forward with efforts to harness AI and autonomous technologies to meet the challenges of the [future] battlefield…" (p. 2) (Note 9). To be certain, confronting the cold-bloodiness of *pain* and *death* in war is where AI technology will, no doubt, fit in with military fighting, no matter the circumstances. Furthermore, the use of complex and powerful AI models and powerful *quantum computers*, running autonomous military systems might often be "riddled with uncertainty…" and confusing. Additionally, some "dangerous [military] capabilities" will be hard to measure, define, or be "hidden from [the public] view" (Perrigo, 2025, p. 15). Nevertheless, in the future, AI technology will be used to meet the demanding weapons needs of whatever military, or a means to an end in their commitment to survive and succeed as *warfighting* entities. Moreover, in terms of military success, ethics, and safety, journalist Rebecca McCarthy (2025) writes: "The idea is to create a system of benchmarks that use the [U.S.] Department of Defense's five principles of AI ethics to judge current and future technology: In order to pass muster the technology must be responsible, equitable, traceable, reliable, and governable" (p. 8). These roles or codes include military AI technology, when it comes to weapons development. It is also worth noting that Artificial Intelligence (AI), in the long run, will help various governments to better serve their militaries, while encouraging additional AI research in weapons technology. Moreover, as far as Armed Forces are concerned, "AI will enable individuals, or very small [and large] groups, to run large [military weapon] projects." Ultimately, there must be ample opportunities to prove the previous assertions. Equally important, "By directing AIs, they [military organizations] will be able to create entire think tanks, research centers or businesses" that invest in bringing to light new AI weapons of war (Cowen, 2024, p. 3) (Note 10). The point is: *Artificial Intelligence* will also help us better serve and support democracies and their militaries.

4. Discussion

Of course, military organizations will continue to discuss and explore how AI technology will specifically affect private businesses and governments on a large scale. But perhaps creating autonomous missile systems will have the biggest impact on modern military units — that is, if the potential of AI technologies don't have an unpredictable turn. Uncertainty, of course, will cast doubt about the specific assumptions that we might have about the effectiveness of generative-AI weaponry. According to science writer Edward Ongweso Jr. (2024), as AI technology continues to proliferate, it "will make us more productive or unemployable, diversify or homogenize [military] culture," while "[alleviating] human suffering with leisure or zero it out via extinction" (p. 47) (Note 11) by gruesome war. But we cannot use AI technology in an obtrusive way, as it could make military matters worse, or *warfighting* difficult, or hard to do for a country. Yet, "cutting-edge AI [technology] with military corporate and scientific payoffs may receive premium valuations" (Sommers, 2025, p. 3) and attention (Note 12). AI technology can also be deeply alluring (generally) to military organizations, but we might be in a better position for safety if humans have control of the *algorithms* that create dangerous AI weapons. Journalist Billy Perrigo (2025) said it best when he wrote: "While having AI explain itself in human terms isn't perfect, many researchers think it's better than the alternative: letting AI develop its own mysterious internal language that we can't understand" (p. 15) or control, especially in devising weapons of war. It should be understood that having political considerations about employing AI autonomous weapons will be of increasing importance in the near future. And for long-term success and given the current potential for war, nations would be foolish to ignore the drumbeat of war. Frankly, it might be surprising if all industrialized countries decide to develop their own AI weapons; but this offensive move might be detrimental to the entire planet; or it might come at a serious price for humanity.

Aside from the unique commitment to AI technology when it comes to the military and warfare strategies and tactics, there is still uncertainty. Unfortunately, no such restraints are expected in the near future; and unfortunately, more people are, perhaps, unfamiliar with AI technology in creating sophisticated military weapons to destroy whole populations of human beings (or hostile nations) perceived as the enemy. In the final analysis, will governments be the beneficiaries of AI military technology? Or will there always be confusion over exactly what Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology will entail when using *algorithms* to create weapons of war?

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Notes

Note 1. It should be remembered that "The US armed forces have deployed a range of cruise missile systems including ground-launched (GLCMs), sea-launched (SLCMs, capable of being launched from small warships and submarines) and air-launched weapons (ALCMs)." See Cruise Missile. (1994). In *The Cambridge Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed (p. 309). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Note 2. Deploying drones, of course, is a "cheap means of delivering… conventional warhead over a long distance, using onboard computer power to provide pin-point accuracy." See Cruise Missile. (1994). In *The Cambridge Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed (p. 309). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Note 3. It should be pointed out that drones today have come to prominence and can bring destruction and fire; and they can also be "directed either by an external source of command or by an internal computer which sends electronic guidance instructions to the missile's control surfaces." See Guided Missile. (1994). In *The Cambridge Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed (p. 495). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Note 4. "Regardless of the future of drone capabilities [or AI missile systems], modernization of munitions for drones is a must, particularly the development of drone-dropped and loitering munitions, which are likely to be key elements of future warfare." See Lima, M. K. (2024, October 17). Munitions Modernization: The Family of Drone Munitions. *Army Sustainment*, p. 1.

Note 5. The ultimate AI weapons development technology industry is still unclear, but it will move forward exponentially in the future, no matter the circumstances — that is, when it comes to respective militaries.

Note 6. This book about Clausewitz combines military and political lessons of the past with important insight for future wars. Moreover, Howard's book provides a scholarly account of Clausewitz's words of absolute war and psychological warfare; and how military leaders can learn from the past.

Note 7. According to philosopher and historian Yuval Noah Harari, "As long as democratic societies understand the computer network, their self-correcting mechanisms are our best guarantee against AI abuses." See Harari, Y. N. (2024). *Nexus: A Brief History of Information Networks from the Stone Age to AI*. New York: Random House, p. 340.

Note 8. According to Clausewitz: "We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide

an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later, someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms." See Howard, M. (1983). *Clausewitz*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 46.

Note 9. Seeds also argues that AI will "produce thousands of large uncrewed jets that could fly alongside new and existing crewed aircraft and be capable of performing a diverse set of missions, including electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, dogfighting and more." See Seeds, M. (2024, October 22). Pentagon Sorting Out AI's Future in Warfare. *NDIA's Business & Technology Magazine*, p. 1.

Note 10. It should be noted that, "The challenge driving AI research today is to understand how computer capabilities must be organized in order to reproduce the kinds of thinking that are thought to be uniquely human, such as visual pattern recognition, complex decision making, and the use of natural language." See Artificial Intelligence (AI). (2000). In *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Encyclopedia* (p. 95). Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, Inc.

Note 11. It should be understood that "AI systems that provide [related] companies are developing," like autonomous military weapon systems, "far surpass anything the government [might or] can do. As a result, the government is more likely to buy access to an A.I. system rather than create its own." See Savage, C. (2024, November 17). Spy Agency Memo Sets Rules for Using A.I. and Americans Private Data. *The New York Times*, p. 21.

Note 12. In terms of AI military science and weapons development, "AI agents will be able to come together and perform a job [such as manufacturing AI military weapons] the way multiple people come together and solve a problem as a team rather than simply accomplishing tasks as individual AI tools." See O'Brien, M. & Parvani, S. (2025, January 2). In 2024, Artificial Intelligence was all about putting AI tools to work. *Las Vegas Sun*, p. 7.

Biographical Sketch

EARNEST N. BRACEY is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel, with over twenty years of active military service. He was commissioned through Reserve Officer Training (*Distinguished Military Graduate*) at Jackson State University, where he graduated with honors (*Magna Cum Laude*), and received his Bachelor of Arts degree in political science in 1974. In addition, he received the Masters of Public Administration in 1979 from Golden Gate University, his Masters of Arts degree in International Affairs in 1983 from the Catholic University of America, his Masters of Business Administration in 2009 from California Coast University, and his doctorate of Public Administration (with emphasis in Public Policy) in 1993 from George Mason University. Dr. Bracey also earned his Ph.D. in Education from Capella University in 1999.

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Dr. Bracey is professor of political science, and currently teaches American Politics and Black American History at the College of Southern Nevada in Las Vegas. He was formerly Chair and Professor of Political Science at Jackson State University and Chairperson of the Political Science and History Department at Hampton University. He has also served as an editorial board-member for the Nevada Historical Society Quarterly. His work has appeared in professional journals and other publications, and he is the author of the books, *Prophetic Insights: The Higher Education and Pedagogy of African Americans*, University Press of America, 1999, *On Racism: Essays On Black Popular Culture, African American Politics, and the New Black Aesthetics*, University Press of America, 2003, *Daniel "Chappie" James: The First African American Four Star General*, McFarland & Company, Inc., 2003, *Places in Political Time: Voices From the Black Diaspora*, University Press of America, 2005, *The Moulin Rouge and Black Rights in Las Vegas*, McFarland & Company, Inc., 2009, and *Miles Davis and Jazz as Religion*, Lexington Books, 2021. He also co-authored the book, *American Politics and Culture Wars* (2001). He is also the author of the novels, *Choson* (1994) and *The Black Samurai* (1998), and the books of short stories, *Requiems for Black Folks* (2002) and *The Big Black Three* (2022).