

## Original Paper

# The Copyrightability of Artificial Intelligence-Generated Content in China

Qin Xiaojing<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> School of Law, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China

\* Qin Xiaojing, School of Law, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China

Received: May 4, 2026

Accepted: June 15, 2026

Online Published: October 5, 2026

doi:10.22158/wjssr.v13n1p55

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/wjssr.v13n1p55>

### Abstract

*The commercial application of generative artificial intelligence has rapidly brought to the fore the structural tension between machine-generated content (AIGC) and the core presuppositions of copyright law concerning the “author”. Adopting a Sino-US comparative law approach, this paper examines the institutional divergences between the two countries on the question of AIGC copyrightability and their jurisprudential roots. The research posits that artificial intelligence possesses a dual attribute in the creative process—“transcending tools yet lacking complete creativity”—which constitutes a meta-constraint for institutional design. Through cases such as the “Feilin Case”, “Tencent Case”, “Li v. Liu”, and “Huan Zhi Yi Case”, Chinese jurisprudence has developed a three-stage evolution: from denying AI authorship to establishing human-machine collaboration, and then to strengthening evidentiary review, thereby establishing a process-oriented originality standard centered on substantial human intellectual input. On this basis, and through comparative analysis, this paper proposes a localized path for refining AIGC copyright protection tailored to China’s institutional context: establishing differentiated protection rules through tiered classification, constructing an originality assessment framework centered on human intellectual input, and introducing supporting mechanisms such as content labeling, good-faith disclosure, and extended collective licensing, in order to achieve an institutional objective that balances technological development with rights protection.*

### Keywords

*artificial intelligence-generated content, copyrightability, originality, human authorship requirement, tiered and classified protection*

## 1. Introduction

The commercial deployment of generative artificial intelligence (Generative AI) has rapidly rendered explicit the structural tension between AI-generated content (hereinafter “AIGC”) and copyright law. When technological systems such as diffusion models and Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate realistic images, music, and text within seconds, the core presupposition of copyright law regarding the “author”—that is, a natural person who, through creative labor, imparts a distinctive mark upon a form of expression—faces an unprecedented institutional challenge. From a comparative law perspective, significant institutional divergence among major jurisdictions regarding the protection of AIGC has already emerged: Chinese courts, through the accumulation of individual cases, have explored a copyright protection path centered on “substantial human intellectual input”; the U.S. federal courts and the Copyright Office have systematically rejected copyright applications for purely AI-generated content based on the “human authorship requirement”; the UK Copyright Act provides a legal fiction-based protection mechanism for computer-generated works through the “person who undertakes the necessary arrangements” provision; and while the EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act, after its entry into force, has profoundly influenced the operation of copyright law in terms of transparency obligations and Text and Data Mining (TDM) exceptions, it has yet to form a unified rule on the copyrightability of AIGC itself (Note 1).

Existing research exhibits notable limitations in two directions. Current scholarship lacks systematic attention to the originality assessment of “prompt engineering” as a novel form of creative behavior. In recent years, the international academic community has produced significant theoretical contributions in areas such as a three-dimensional framework for AIGC originality determination, a subjective-objective balancing methodology, and the structural boundaries of AI creativity (Note 2). These contributions provide crucial academic resources for deepening the aforementioned issues, yet they have not been sufficiently introduced and absorbed within the domestic Chinese academic community. This paper aims to address this gap by systematically integrating theoretical insights from cutting-edge international literature into the analytical framework for China’s AIGC copyright protection system, with the goal of providing a reference scheme for legislative improvement and judicial practice that possesses both theoretical depth and operational value.

## 2. China: An Exploratory Path from Judicial Cases to Administrative Compliance

### 2.1 Interpretive Space within the Current Legal Framework

Understanding how China’s Copyright Law responds to the copyrightability of AIGC requires returning to the core provisions of the current legal text. Article 3 of the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (amended in 2020) defines “works” as intellectual achievements in the literary, artistic, and scientific domains that are original and can be expressed in a certain form, and Article 11 establishes

the basic principle that “the natural person who creates the work is the author” (Note 3). Regarding the originality requirement, Chinese judicial practice has long formed a binary judgment framework of “independent completion” plus “creativity”, requiring that a work originates from the author’s independent conception and manifests individualized choices and judgments. The 2020 amendment changed the catch-all clause to “other intellectual achievements that meet the characteristics of works”, representing a legislative shift from a closed list to an open-ended enumeration, which objectively creates an interpretive pathway for the copyrightability of AI-generated content. It should be noted, however, that “intellectual achievements” within the current copyright law system is generally understood to specifically refer to human intellectual labor, embodying an institutional logic whereby copyright holders are limited to natural persons or legal persons. Consequently, originality determinations must consistently inquire as to who exactly is the subject of “originality” (Note 4).

In recent years, international scholarship has paid cutting-edge attention to the originality assessment of “prompt engineering” as a novel form of creative behavior. Regarding the copyrightability of prompts, one must first ask: do they constitute purely functional instructions, or literary works with individualized expressive characteristics? According to established positions, purely ingredient lists or instructional lists do not possess copyrightability; however, if prompts contain creative elements that transcend the scope of functional instructions—such as specific metaphorical structures, personalized narrative perspectives, or highly distinctive aesthetic choices—they may rise to the level of protectable literary works (Note 5). In the Chinese legal context, when assessing human contributions in AI-assisted creation, one cannot rely solely on the fact of “inputting prompts” itself. Rather, the specific creative content carried by the prompts—the degree of their linguistic sophistication, the specificity of the objects described, and whether the guidance to the AI system has formed a sufficiently distinct personalized direction—must be examined in order to determine whether the threshold of originality in the sense of copyright law has been met.

## *2.2 In-depth Analysis of Core Representative Cases*

The series of judgments rendered by Chinese judicial authorities between 2018 and 2024 form a three-stage evolutionary system: from “denying AI subject status” to “establishing the human-machine collaboration path” and then to “strengthening evidentiary review”. Notably, during the same period, judicial practices in the United States and the European Union both adopted positions of refusing protection for AI-generated content (Note 6). Chinese judicial practice thus presents a distinctive characteristic of “functional flexibility” within the comparative law landscape.

**Feilin Law Firm v. Baidu (2018): Denying Independent AI Authorship.** This case is a foundational one in China’s AI copyright field. The Beijing Internet Court held that although the text content intelligently generated by computer software reflected a certain degree of selection, judgment, and analysis regarding relevant data, natural person creation remains a necessary condition for works under

copyright law. Textual content generated by artificial intelligence software that merely combines inputted keywords with algorithms, rules, and templates does not constitute a work under copyright law (Note 7).

This case established two fundamental propositions: artificial intelligence cannot be the subject of copyright, and purely algorithmically generated content does not constitute a work, although the commercial use of such content is not entirely outside the scope of legal protection.

**Tencent v. Yingxun (2019): Methodological Contribution of the “Two-Step Test”.** This case represents China’s first effective judgment recognizing an AI-generated article as a copyrighted work. The court analyzed both the external form of expression of the article in question and its generation process, and, upon determining that the text in question exhibited certain differences from existing works, possessed a minimum level of creativity, and could reflect the creator’s personalized choices, judgments, and skills, held that the article generated by Dreamwriter constituted a work protected by copyright law (Note 8).

The core value of this methodology lies in expanding the originality determination from a solely result-oriented approach to a combined result-oriented and process-oriented approach—that is, a dual examination of the distinctiveness of external expression and the reality of personalized choice—embodying a composite adjudicative logic that considers both subjective and objective dimensions. By characterizing the generated subject matter as a “work made for hire” (legal entity work), the court reserved institutional space for copyright protection of AI-assisted creations without breaching the fundamental principle of “natural person author”.

**Li v. Liu (2023): Establishing the Copyright Path for “Human-Machine Collaboration”.** This case is the most landmark judicial decision in the field of AI-generated image copyright protection globally. The plaintiff, utilizing the open-source software Stable Diffusion, systematically designed positive and negative prompts, adjusted iteration steps and image parameters, repeatedly modified model weight parameters, and selected the final work from candidate outputs (Note 9). The court made affirmative findings on two dimensions: concerning the “intellectual achievement” requirement, the plaintiff designed picture elements through prompts and set layout and composition through parameters, with the entire process reflecting intellectual input; concerning the “originality” requirement, the plaintiff’s adjustments and revisions to the image reflected aesthetic choices and personalized judgments. From a comparative law perspective, the adjudicative logic of this case shares deep theoretical affinity with the “collage work analogy”. The core originality of collage art under copyright law lies not in the individual materials themselves, but in the artist’s selection, arrangement, and combination of those materials. In AI-assisted creation, human users—by constructing prompt strategies, setting parameter frameworks, iteratively adjusting, and screening outputs—functionally play a role highly analogous to that of collage artists (Note 10).

**“Huan Zhi Yi” Case (2024): The Criticality of the Evidentiary Dimension and the “Proof Problem”.** This case stands in stark contrast to *Li v. Liu*. The plaintiff claimed infringement of the “Huan Zhi Yi Transparent Art Chair” series works created using AI tools such as Midjourney but failed to provide complete records of the Midjourney generation process and the full evidence of optimization processing. The court accordingly found that the works did not meet the constitutive requirements for works (Note 11). The institutional significance of this case lies in refining the judicial threshold for originality determination from “whether human input exists” to “whether the complete chain of human input can be proven”, thereby revealing the “proof problem” in AIGC copyright protection: retrospectively tracing and quantitatively proving the extent of human contribution constitutes an extremely difficult judicial task. Highly creative AI-assisted works are often outwardly indistinguishable as to whether they originated from deep human input or mere simple instructions, and judges lack clear discretionary criteria, leading to systemic adjudicative uncertainty (Note 12).

This reality necessitates the establishment of verifiable mechanisms for the creative process at the institutional level, rather than shifting the full burden of proof onto individual creators.

Surveying the evolutionary trajectory of the above judicial practices, its underlying logic can be distilled as a “human-centered logic”: human subjectivity is an essential element for AI-generated content to constitute a work, with creative intent and emotional thought being two fundamental markers of human subjectivity. Regarding creative intent, a salient feature of human labor is that the result at the end of the process is already present in the worker’s representation at the beginning—that is, “intent precedes generation”—whereas the operational process of AI fundamentally lacks this creative structure. Regarding emotional thought, AI can only engage in patterned imitation of human thought expression, arranging and combining expressive forms according to algorithms, and the resulting expression lacks genuine emotional content (Note 13). This human-centered logic is theoretically consistent with the “process-oriented” standard confirmed in judicial practice: both take the “intervention of intent” and “individualized expression” by a human subject as core criteria for copyrightability, rather than the superficial quality of the AI output.

### *2.3 Legislative Trends and Policy Orientations*

At the administrative regulation level, Article 7 of the Interim Measures for the Management of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services (2023) requires generative AI service providers to legally process training data and not infringe upon others’ intellectual property rights, and Article 12 establishes mandatory labeling obligations for AIGC content. The Measures for Labeling Artificial Intelligence-Generated Synthetic Content (2025) further refined the labeling requirements (Note 14). Examining China’s institutional evolution on the AIGC copyright issue, the following patterned observations can be summarized: First, institutional responses exhibit an uneven development pattern characterized by “judicial precedent, administrative follow-up, and legislative lag”. Second, courts

have developed an adjudicative system centered on “substantial human intellectual input”, while simultaneously emphasizing the actual existence of individualized expression rather than mere organizational arrangements. Third, evidence preservation has become a bottleneck issue for AIGC creators in enforcing their rights, urgently requiring systematic institutional responses.

### 3. Recommendations for Localizing China’s AIGC Copyright Protection

#### 3.1 *Constructing a Tiered and Classified Protection System*

The current copyright law adopts a single-track logic of “either full protection or no protection” for AIGC, which reveals significant institutional tension when confronted with the highly differentiated reality of AIGC: AI-assisted works with rich creative content under deep human-machine collaboration, and purely machine outputs autonomously generated by AI based on a few words entered by the user, differ vastly in terms of human creative input, yet are forced to undergo the same judgmental logic under the current framework. It is recommended that the fourth revision of the Copyright Law introduce a tiered and classified protection framework, dividing AIGC into three tiers based on the extent and nature of human intellectual input, and granting differentiated protection (Note 15).

**Tier 1: Human-Machine Collaborative Creations—Full Copyright Protection.** Where human users have made substantial and provable creative inputs during the AIGC generation process—including systematic prompt engineering design, multi-round parametric iterative adjustments, post-generation manual modification and reconstruction, and personalized screening and arrangement of multiple candidate outputs—the resulting AIGC shall be recognized as a work within the meaning of copyright law, with the user as the copyright holder, and shall be entitled to full copyright protection. This tier directly connects with current judicial practice and constitutes a legislative confirmation of the adjudicative logic in *Li v. Liu*.

**Tier 2: AI-Assisted Creations with Low-Level Human Intervention—A “Quasi-Work” Protection System.** For AIGC where humans provide only basic instructions and the AI system dominates the generation process and determines the final expressive form, consideration may be given to introducing the concept of a “quasi-work”, granting special rights that are lower than full copyright but higher than zero protection. The term of protection may be set at fifty years from publication, with reference to Article 12(7) of the UK CDPA (Note 16). Moral rights (except for the right of attribution to indicate AI-generated identity) are not granted; only economic rights are retained. From a legislative perspective, a “registration-based approach with shorter protection period and limited rights” scheme may be further adopted: registration would require a clear indication of the intellectual input elements integrated into the creative process; economic rights would be limited to core rights such as reproduction, distribution, and communication to the public; and the public would be permitted to freely adapt and translate, provided reasonable compensation is paid. The introduction of a

“quasi-work” system does not constitute a subversion of the copyright law system but rather an extended application of existing institutional logic; legal fiction techniques analogous to those used in the legal entity work system and the compilation work system have already been employed.

**Tier 3: Fully Automatic AI Outputs—Protection under Competition Law as a Safety Net.** For content entirely autonomously generated by AI, where humans act merely as passive recipients, no copyright or quasi-work protection shall be granted. However, when third parties engage in commercial large-scale copying of such AIGC, regulation may be pursued under the general clause of Article 2 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. Placing pure AI outputs into the public domain is not a passive laissez-faire approach by law, but rather, under the principle of maximizing the efficiency of knowledge dissemination, constitutes a moderate legal response to Tier 3 AIGC through a combination of fair use, anti-unfair competition regulation, and labeling systems.

### *3.2 Refining the Originality Determination Standard: Constructing a Four-Dimensional Evaluation System*

“Substantial human intellectual input” is the core standard used by current judicial practice for determining the copyrightability of AIGC, yet it still exhibits considerable ambiguity at the operational level. What constitutes “substantial” lacks an operational, structured analytical framework, leading to a persistent risk of inconsistent judgments in similar cases (Note 17). This dilemma is deeply related to the “proof problem”. It is recommended that, at the legislative level or through a Supreme People’s Court judicial interpretation, a “four-dimensional framework for evaluating the degree of human intervention” be established, replacing the current single vague standard with a structured analytical tool.

**Dimension One: Creative Dominance in the Goal-Setting Stage.** This assesses whether the human, before initiating AIGC generation, had formed a creative goal with personalized content and communicated that goal to the AI system in a sufficiently specific form through prompts or other instructions. Providing only thematic keywords does not constitute creative dominance, as such input falls within the category of functional instructions. Conversely, providing systematic descriptions containing specific expressive elements such as composition, style, color palette, and character relationships enables prompts to transcend functional instructions and obtain originality recognition (Note 18).

**Dimension Two: Iterative Control during the Generation Process.** This assesses whether the human continuously exercised aesthetic judgment during the iterative AI generation process, including repeatedly adjusting prompts to correct AI output deviations, modifying model parameters to optimize specific expressive elements, and selecting from multiple candidate outputs based on personalized aesthetic standards. The core of this dimension lies in the continuous cycle of “feedback-adjustment”, which distinguishes between two distinct behavioral modes: active guidance by the human and passive

acceptance of AI outputs (Note 19).

**Dimension Three: Degree of Post-Processing Intervention on the Final Output.** This assesses whether the human made substantive manual modifications, reconstructions, or arrangements to the initial AI output. Complete rewriting is not required; it is sufficient that the modification creates a recognizable creative change to the initial AI output in functional terms. This dimension is the closest among the four to the assessment dimension traditionally used for the originality requirements of collage works. The substantive screening, arrangement, and post-processing of AI-generated content is functionally equivalent to the collage artist's creative integration of materials (Note 20).

**Dimension Four: Degree of Externalizability of Creative Intent.** This assesses whether the human's creative intent has been sufficiently externalized through behavior in the above three dimensions, such that the final AIGC can be reasonably recognized as a substantive embodiment of that intent, rather than a coincidental result of random AI system output. This dimension serves a comprehensive evaluation function and remains aligned with the fundamental principle of the idea-expression dichotomy.

At the operational level, it is recommended that “visualizable textual records formed during the AI creation process” be explicitly designated as a basic evidentiary form capable of proving originality. According to Article 7(1) of the Supreme People's Court's Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Copyright Dispute Cases, manuscripts, originals, legal publications, etc. relating to the work may serve as evidence in copyright cases. This provision may, through interpretation, naturally encompass evidentiary materials in the form of “visualizable text” such as written drafts, thought records, and iterative log screenshots formed during the AI creation process (Note 21). Compared with technical means such as blockchain deposit certification, the evidentiary requirement of “visualizable text” has a more direct legal applicability basis and can be implemented within the current judicial interpretation framework without the need for additional legislation.

### *3.3 Improving Supporting Technical and Administrative Mechanisms*

**Regarding content labeling systems,** it is recommended to promote the establishment of standardized metadata formats for AIGC content, requiring AI service providers to embed machine-readable metadata containing elements such as generation model information and generation time upon content publication; to require that, when applying for AIGC copyright registration, applicants disclose to the copyright administrative department the AI tools used, the main parameter settings of the generation process, and basic records of human intervention; and to establish tiered compliance obligations for platforms providing AIGC services—platforms for professional creators must provide a complete creative process log export function, while platforms for consumers must at least provide standardized “AI-generated” watermarks or statements (Note 22).

**Regarding copyright collective management**, in light of copyright compliance difficulties in large-scale AI training data usage, it is recommended to explore the establishment of an extended collective licensing mechanism for AI content. This would allow filed AI research and development institutions to obtain centralized authorization from copyright collective management organizations for the use of copyrighted works, pay reasonable compensation to rights holders, and simultaneously reserve an “opt-out” opportunity for rights holders, thereby achieving a dynamic balance between AI technological development and rights holder protection (Note 23).

**Regarding good-faith disclosure**, it is recommended that a clear provision be established: anyone applying for copyright registration of a work shall declare whether generative AI tools were used; if used, a brief description of the stages and scope of AI participation, the specific content dominated by human creation, and whether the AI tools used claim rights over the generated content shall be provided; those making false declarations shall bear corresponding legal liability and shall not be entitled to claim copyright in the work (Note 24).

#### 4. Conclusion

China, adopting a path of conditional functional flexibility, has opened a practical outlet for AIGC copyright protection through the judicial interpretation of “human-machine collaboration”. However, it has also left behind a difficult interpretive dilemma concerning the placement of highly autonomous AI-generated content at the theoretical level. The institutional scheme proposed in this paper—the refinement of a tiered and classified protection system, the construction of a four-dimensional originality evaluation framework, and the systematic development of supporting administrative mechanisms—aims to achieve “bounded flexibility”: providing sufficient legal certainty for human-machine collaborative creations while preventing copyright monopoly from unduly encroaching upon the public information domain and the human creative ecosystem. From a broader perspective, the competitive choice of AIGC copyright protection systems is not merely a matter of legal technicality, but also a systemic strategic choice concerning a country’s international competitiveness in the AI industry. While deepening its own institutional improvements, China should actively participate in international rule-making under multilateral mechanisms such as WIPO, in order to secure an advantageous discursive position in the global rule game of AI content governance.

#### References

- China Academy of Information and Communications Technology. (2023). *Research report on legal issues of artificial intelligence intellectual property*. Beijing: CAICT.
- Cong, L., & Li, Y. (2023). Determination of works and copyright ownership in generative AI: Taking ChatGPT’s work application scenarios as an example. *Journal of Shandong University*

(*Philosophy and Social Sciences*), (4).

- Gaffar, H., & Albarashdi, S. (2025). Copyright protection for AI-generated works: Exploring originality and ownership in a digital landscape. *Asian Journal of International Law*, 15, 23.
- Mazzi, F. (2024). Authorship in artificial intelligence-generated works: Exploring originality in text prompts and artificial intelligence outputs through philosophical foundations of copyright and collage protection. *The Journal of World Intellectual Property*, 27, 410.
- Quintais, J. P. (2025). Generative AI, copyright and the AI Act. *Computer Law & Security Review*, 56, 106107.
- Wang, G. (2023). The human-centered logic in determining the copyrightability of artificial intelligence-generated works. *Journal of East China Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)*, (1), 135-141.
- Wang, Q. (2015). *Copyright law*. Beijing: China Renmin University Press.
- Wu, H. (2024). On the copyrightability of artificial intelligence-generated content: Practice, jurisprudence, and institutions. *China Legal Review*, (3), 116.
- Yuvaraj, J. (2025). *Submission: UK copyright and artificial intelligence consultation 2024-2025*. Auckland: University of Auckland.
- Zhuk, A. (2024). Artificial intelligence copyright conundrum. *Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law*, 26, 1291.

#### Note(s)

Note 1. See Jo ão Pedro Quintais, “Generative AI, Copyright and the AI Act”, 56 *Computer Law & Security Review* 106107 (2025), pp. 5-8.

Note 2. See Francesca Mazzi, “Authorship in Artificial Intelligence-Generated Works: Exploring Originality in Text Prompts and Artificial Intelligence Outputs through Philosophical Foundations of Copyright and Collage Protection”, 27 *Journal of World Intellectual Property* 410 (2024); Hafiz Gaffar & Saleh Albarashdi, “Copyright Protection for AI-Generated Works: Exploring Originality and Ownership in a Digital Landscape”, 15 *Asian Journal of International Law* 23 (2025); Joshua Yuvaraj, “Submission: UK Copyright and Artificial Intelligence Consultation 2024-25”, University of Auckland, 2025.

Note 3. See Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (amended 2020), Articles 3 and 11.

Note 4. Wang Qian, *Copyright Law*, China Renmin University Press, 2015, pp. 17-22.

Note 5. See Mazzi, *supra* note 2, at 413-414.

Note 6. See Anatoliy Zhuk, “Artificial Intelligence Copyright Conundrum”, 26 *Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law* 1291 (2024), pp. 1302-1303; Gaffar & Albarashdi, *supra* note 2, at 43-44.

- Note 7. See Beijing Internet Court (2018) Jing 0491 Min Chu No. 239 Civil Judgment.
- Note 8. See Shenzhen Nanshan District People's Court (2019) Yue 0305 Min Chu No. 14010 Civil Judgment; see also Wu Handong, "On the Copyrightability of Artificial Intelligence-Generated Content: Practice, Jurisprudence, and Institutions", China Legal Review, No. 3, 2024, p. 116.
- Note 9. See Beijing Internet Court (2023) Jing 0491 Min Chu No. 11279 Judgment.
- Note 10. See Mazzi, *supra* note 2, at 421-422.
- Note 11. See Jiangsu Zhangjiagang City People's Court (2024) Su 0582 Min Chu No. 9015 Civil Judgment.
- Note 12. See Mazzi, *supra* note 2, at 422-423.
- Note 13. Wang Guozhu, "The Human-Centered Logic in Determining the Copyrightability of Artificial Intelligence-Generated Works", Journal of East China Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), No. 1, 2023, pp. 135-141.
- Note 14. See Interim Measures for the Management of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services (2023), Articles 7 and 12; Measures for Labeling Artificial Intelligence-Generated Synthetic Content (2025).
- Note 15. Cong Lixian & Li Yonglin, "Determination of Works and Copyright Ownership in Generative AI – Taking ChatGPT's Work Application Scenarios as an Example", Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), No. 4, 2023.
- Note 16. See UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), Article 12(7); Yuvaraj, *supra* note 2, at 6 (para. 22).
- Note 17. See China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, Research Report on Legal Issues of Artificial Intelligence Intellectual Property, December 2023, pp. 25-28.
- Note 18. See Mazzi, *supra* note 2, at 413-416.
- Note 19. See Gaffar & Albarashdi, *supra* note 2, at 38-40.
- Note 20. See Mazzi, *supra* note 2, at 421-422.
- Note 21. See Supreme People's Court Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Copyright Dispute Cases (Fa Shi [2002] No. 31), Article 7(1).
- Note 22. See Measures for Labeling Artificial Intelligence-Generated Synthetic Content, Articles 3-8; Mazzi, *supra* note 2, at 424-425.
- Note 23. See National Copyright Administration, Regulations on the Administration of Copyright Collective Management (Revised Draft for Comment), July 2022.
- Note 24. See Copyright Law (amended 2020), Article 57.