When Anti-Corruption Meets Industrial Policy: Nigeria’s EFCC’s Function Creep into Industrial Policy Enforcement

Abstract

Industrial policy in countries characterized by high levels of unproductive and disorganized corruption is, unsurprisingly, also ridden with high levels of corruption. With dispersed distributions of power, it is more difficult to create and maintain pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness to drive successful industrial policy. This is the case in Nigeria. There has, however, been no research into the involvement of its premier anti-corruption agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), in industrial policy enforcement. The article identifies this phenomenon through news reports and proposes avenues for empirical research and policy experimentation. The EFCC has, over years, been involved with development loan recoveries, local content policy enforcement and infrastructure contract enforcement. These have often been at the invitation of the relevant implementing agencies which often display inundation with the enforcement challenge. Its substantial investigative and prosecutorial capabilities acquired from anti-corruption activities in a highly corrupt country have made it a key agency for others to call when help with enforcement is needed. There are some indications of propositions to institutionalize or regularize the EFCC’s involvement in local content policy and infrastructure contract enforcement, but no serious attention has been paid to these in the literature or news circles.