Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Sharing among Supply Chain Enterprises Considering Incentive Strategy

Abstract

This paper aims to explore and enhance the influencing factors which effect the evolution of supply chain knowledge sharing under different incentive strategies. Furthermore, it also helps supply chain managers determine whether incentives are needed and if needed to what extent they are needed to deal with the dynamic changes of factors in the evolution of supply chain knowledge sharing. The evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing without considering incentives is established respectively, and the influence of relevant influencing factors on the evolutionary results of knowledge sharing is analyzed. The results show that enterprises’strategy of selecting knowledge sharing can be attributed to the change by the degree of knowledge complementarity among enterprises when the incentive is not considered. The incentive of supply chain will stimulate knowledge sharing between enterprises but then the incentive coefficient needs to meet certain conditions; can the evolutionary system converge to the state of {knowledge sharing, knowledge sharing}, and the analysis shows that the relationship capital, knowledge’s unit value, knowledge sharing cost, knowledge sharing risk and other factors have significant effects on the evolution rate of knowledge sharing. Finally, based on the research conclusions, the countermeasures and suggestions for supply chain knowledge sharing are proposed.