Governance Mechanism of Non-state-owned Shareholders and Enterprise Investment

Abstract

The participation of non-state shareholders in governance, as a key aspect of deepening the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, holds significant importance in improving corporate governance, particularly in corporate investment. This paper manually compiles a unique dataset of non-state shareholder governance indices for state-owned enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2010 to 2024, considering multidimensional governance at three levels: equity governance, top management governance, and network governance. It examines the impact of non-state shareholder participation in governance on corporate investment. The research indicates that the participation of non-state shareholders in governance can enhance corporate investment efficiency. Specifically, this enhancement is primarily achieved by increasing the level of compensation incentives and capital allocation efficiency. This paper expands the research on non-state shareholder governance mechanisms and corporate investment, providing empirical evidence for improving internal governance and investment levels of state-owned enterprises in the context of mixed-ownership reform.