Research on the Motivation and Effect of "Deceptive" Share Repurchase—Take Orient Group Incorporationas an Example

Abstract

With the continuous improvement of China's share repurchase system, the policy optimization actively promotes the application of share repurchase in the capital market, and makes it become a common way for listed companies to manage market value. However, the problems presented by listed companies in the implementation of share repurchase plans have gradually been exposed, especially the frequent occurrence of "deceptive" repurchase, which has become the focus of the market. In order to solve this problem, China has issued detailed rules for the implementation of share repurchase, clearly emphasizing the prevention of "deceptive" repurchase, aiming at guiding listed companies to operate in compliance. However, due to the low cost of violation, most listings still fail to comply with the standards and continue to appear "deceptive" buyback behavior. Therefore, by analyzing the motivation of listed companies to implement "deceptive" share repurchase behavior and the economic consequences, this paper provides a warning for investors, urges listed companies to self-examine the share repurchase plan, and puts forward regulatory suggestions for the regulatory authorities to be optimized.