How Epistemological Disjunctivism Aligns with Fine-Grained Belief

Abstract

Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED), as a well-known anti-skeptical strategy, claims that in good perceptual cases, the subject’s perceptual experience itself constitutes factive reasons that are sufficient to directly support the knower’s knowledge. However, critics such as Ranalli (2014) have pointed out that ED’s account of the role of “belief” in knowledge ascription is in fact unclear. This calls for an explanation of how perceptual experience can attain reflective accessibility in good cases; otherwise, the thesis that “experience = reason” lacks persuasiveness. To respond to this challenge, this paper proposes a “layered belief framework” to supplement the shortcomings of the original ED. I will argue that this proposal not only effectively responds to the criticisms from Ranalli and others, but also provides ED with new explanatory dimensions that bring it closer to human cognitive psychology. At the same time, I will also demonstrate that its anti-skeptical capacity can only be regarded as a local defense strategy.