Game Analysis on the Evolution of Summer Fishing Moratorium System Strategy Under Ecological Compensation Mechanism

Abstract

Ecological compensation mechanism, as an effective means to resolve the contradiction between sustainable development of fisheries and poverty alleviation of fishermen, plays its role effectively through an in-depth exploration of game strategies of relevant subjects. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, the relevant game matrix is constructed by invoking the mathematical model of the evolutionary game in this paper, by which the differential equilibrium results of the fishery ecological compensation game are analyzed. Furthermore, MATLAB software is employed to simulate and analyze the evolutionary stable strategy under different parameters by combining the relevant data. The study shows that: ⅰ) In the case of ecological compensation payments by local governments to fishermen, the enthusiasm of fishermen to conduct fishing moratorium increases with the increase of ecological compensation payment. Excessive ecological compensation payments will reduce the willingness of local governments to carry out ecological compensation. ⅱ) In the case of political rewards from superior governments to local governments, neither excessively low political rewards nor insufficient penalties help improve the enthusiasm of local governments for ecological compensation. When political rewards are greater than a certain limit, local governments’ willingness to make ecological compensation will increase with the increase of political rewards from superior governments. Fishermen’s willingness to choose to conduct fishing moratorium, influenced by the enthusiasm of local governments, will also increase.