Hard Law Hegemony and Soft Law Resistance: The Proof of Illegality of Western Sanctions against Russia and the Reconstruction of the International Law System

Abstract

Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, Western countries led by the United States have constructed an unprecedented multi-level sanctions system against Russia. This paper deconstructs the hard law tools (e.g., secondary sanctions legislation) and soft law instruments (e.g., commercial boycott campaigns) in sanctions through the dichotomy theory of soft and hard law in international law. For example, in the context of the failure of the UN Security Council mechanism, Western countries have turned to rely on non-traditional means of sanctions implementation, such as domestic legislation (e.g., the International Emergency Economic Powers Act) and club-like alliances (e.g., the G7 oil price cap). This legal practice has objectively resulted in a threefold alienation: first, the extension of long-arm jurisdiction from the commercial sphere to the realm of sovereign immunity; second, the formation of "quasi-legal" market expulsions through transnational corporate pressure; and third, the distortion of the political instrumentalization of international soft law mechanisms, such as sports and culture. This paper will take a case study approach to prove that the West's "long-arm jurisdiction" of domestic law disguised as international hard law is essentially a hegemonic expansion of rule-making power. Based on this, this paper will explore the possible solution paths to reshape the balanced pattern of pluralism, fairness and justice in international law.