Non-Identity Problem: Impersonal Total Principle and Population Implications

Abstract

Some philosophers have argued that the Impersonal Total Principle can resolve the Non-Identity Problem by stipulating that the act under scrutiny is considered wrong when it fails to maximize utility. This perspective has faced criticism for (1) implying an excessively stringent moral requirement and (2) leading to the Repugnant Conclusion. In this paper, I present the following arguments: (a) the welfare of potential individuals holds equal significance to that of actual individuals, (b) in addition to mitigating suffering, the well-being of individuals also carries importance. Our duty to improve the well-being of others is weak rather than strong, thus indicating that the Impersonal Total Principle does not entail an overly strict moral requirement. Furthermore, I maintain that either the Impersonal Total Principle cannot lead to the Repugnant Conclusion, or the conclusion itself, which appears "repugnant," is not truly repugnant. Considering my analysis, I propose the adoption of a resource-conserving lifestyle to contribute to a sustainable future for potential beings.